Freedom and the Unity of Knowledge

By Whitney J. Oates

This article is based on Mr. Oates' address at a symposium on liberal education held at Wabash College in October, 1957. Mr. Oates is professor of classics and chairman of the special program in the humanities at Princeton University.

The tripartite organization of this symposium on liberal education seems natural to all of us. To invite three persons, one from the domains of natural science, social science, and the humanities, more or less explicitly reflects the threefold divisional structure of the curriculum in most of the institutions of arts and sciences throughout the country. We have all become so accustomed to this "divisional" approach that we tend to accept it and its implications uncritically, just as though the lines of demarcation between these divisions had a sacred and unchallengeable reality in their own right. Against this habitual and, at least at the moment, traditional attitude of mind, I should like to urge that the principle of the unity of knowledge is not merely an empty set of words, but accurately designates what all institutions dedicated to the life of the mind seek to acquire and impart. In other words, the relation of the three of us in this symposium, each representing his own bailiwick of learning, is not additive but organic. Knowledge is one. Diversity characterizes the people who seek it.

I do not propose to belabor the evils of specialization or of departmentalism, or inter-divisionalism or of general education. We can take it for granted that every teacher worth his pay, however unjustly low it may be, knows that he must face and resolve as best he can this dilemma: liberal education must be both broad and deep. I do want to address myself to the principle of the unity of knowledge by exploring a bit the notion of freedom.

But first I would like to illustrate the kind of tricks that the divisional frame of mind plays upon those of us who are in the academic life. When we were in the early stages of organizing the Council of the Humanities at Princeton, members of the conventional humanistic departments were asked about the role of the humanities. They insisted that theirs was the really important business in education, that they alone were the sole custodians of values and of tradition, that the natural and social sciences were concerned with quantity and measurement, not quality. The natural and social scientists, on the other hand, vociferously proclaimed that their subjects were really humanities, and that they promulgated values and principles. The upshot of it all was that we finally came to recognize how we were behaving. We realized the palpable fact that we all needed each other, that we were allies and not rivals. In substance, the real situation is something like this: The scientist knows that his subject involves human values. The social scientist knows he must use appropriate scientific techniques and he knows as well how difficult it is to divorce his own enterprise from that of the humanities. Furthermore, the humanist desperately needs the natural scientist and the social scientist if he is going to keep his own thinking clear and rigorous. The natural sciences and the social sciences know how the humanities can develop, in a very peculiar and distinctive way, the kind of creative imagination that is indispensable in experiment and research. In fact, they all must know that values and principles underlie all their activities and that they must all, therefore, have a philosophy if they are to understand and interpret the nature of the values and principles with which they are concerned.

But now to turn to the notion of freedom, may I attempt, by means of perhaps a crude or over-simplified analysis, to show how any effort to plumb this incredibly rich conception involves one in every territory of the intellect's activity—which may be a way of indicating what we mean by the phrase "the unity of knowledge." I believe this same kind of illustration would be effective by analyzing any one of a number of other equally founding notions in our culture or tradition. I choose freedom, as a value or principle that seems to be embedded deeply in reality, simply because of its relation to liberal education. My purpose in analyzing freedom in this present context is that it may perhaps give us some additional insight into the goal of a liberal education as well as to show how knowledge is one.

At the outset I suppose we ought to be aware of the philosophical or metaphysical assumptions upon which the argument will be based. In the first place I am assuming that the human individual is of infinite worth, and secondly that his will is in some sense free—for the simple reason that it would be very difficult to attach any significant value to a puppet, to a being that was not self-determined in some degree, and responsible accordingly. And thirdly I am assuming that human life in fact has purpose, that teleology is a profoundly valid activity. Any adherent of an extreme form of mechanistic materialism clearly will be my opponent from the very beginning.

Let us now address ourselves to the conception, or value, or principle: freedom. As a matter of fact, I do not care very much what you call it. My own metaphysical approach would be in the Platonic mode, that is, I would hold that a Form or an Idea of Freedom exists and has some kind of vital relation to the phenomena involving freedom in the world of our experience. As for freedom itself, it is perhaps commonplace to observe that it can be viewed both positively and negatively. In recent years the negative aspect has been emphasized. We have subtly been invited to think of freedom
as freedom from restraint, restraint of all sorts, on the somewhat naïve assumption that everything would be just fine if these restraints were removed. This freedom from or negative freedom may be even more dominant in a curious way than perhaps we realize. For example, take Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous "Four Freedoms": Freedom of speech and expression; Freedom to worship; Freedom from want; and Freedom from fear. Notice that it is explicitly negative freedom in the case of want and fear. It is also implicitly negative in the case of speech and expression, for it really means freedom from restraint in these instances. In other words, in only one out of the four is positive freedom present: freedom to worship.

It is true that the negative sense must always be present in any thinking about freedom. In the sphere of the social and political its point is very clear, as for example in a remark of a recent political theorist: "Liberty must always be conceived, if a philosophy is to be an adequate one, as relative to law. It can never be absolute; some restraints are inevitable: some opportunities have to be denied simply because men must live together." Even though the negative sense must receive appropriate emphasis, a moment's reflection will reveal that freedom viewed only as freedom from restraint is a pretty sterile conception. It must be completed by insisting upon the positive aspect. In other words, "freedom from" must be completed by the notion of "freedom to," as in freedom to worship, or "freedom for," or finally "freedom why." Clearly no fundamental thinking about the problem can be carried on without facing squarely the question of purpose, without asking, "Why are we free? What are we going to do with our freedom?" Freedom viewed sheerly in its negative aspect invites a kind of anarchic ethic of self-gratification, and as such would be unacceptable to most men. Certainly this is not the human "value" for which men have fought and died from the very beginning of recorded history, long before the Greeks at Marathon. But freedom viewed in the perspective of purpose leads one inevitably into the most fundamental of all questions: What is the nature of man and what is his destiny?

A glance at St. Augustine's analysis of the will may be instructive at this point. There are three states of the human will. First is the condition of *posse peccare*: the will is free to choose, but its range of choices includes only actions that are unrighteous. In Augustinian terms, this amounts to a spurious kind of freedom. Second is the state of *posse non peccare*: the will has the ability not to sin, as a result of the advent of Grace. Such was Adam's condition before the Fall, and such is the condition of men upon whom Grace has been visited. The range of the will's choices in this state is extended, for not only can it still initiate unrighteous action but also it is now capable of righteous action. The third and final state is that of *non posse peccare*, the complete inability to sin. This happy circumstance comes to the human will only after death when the saved soul enjoys God in Paradise—and, for St. Augustine, this is the only state in which the will enjoys perfect freedom: freedom from the "bondage of sin," if you will, but freedom for an eternity of righteous action. Whatever may be your view of this conception of the will's freedom, it is important to note that in all three states St. Augustine sees it always as *positive*, that is, in the complete perspective of the action that will ensue.

To pursue our analysis further, let us try to summarize all the conditions that limit man's freedom. To do this, I would like to introduce the conception of Reality as comprising everything that can be said to exist in any sense whatever. Let us call this "Reality as it really is." We have, of course, a number of fairly sound bits of knowledge about this Reality, but its true nature is ultimately a mystery to us; it is unknown to us in its *complete* character. For the human individual who finds himself, and such freedom as he may possess, as a part of this Reality, there are certain things that are given, which he must accept, about which he is powerless to do anything. These are, first, the fact of Time and the fact of Space. Then there are natural phenomena of various kinds. In the order of physical nature, there are such things as the fact of atomic and molecular structure, or the fact of gravity. In the biological order there is the fact of heredity; and in the psychological order there is the phenomenon of the brain, its motor centers, and its mysterious capacity to have various types of experience and to record them in memory. And then finally there is History as past, that infinite body of events that have taken place—what actually happened, which nothing in Heaven or on earth can alter or change. Over against this mass of the given—this vast congeries of data that limit or condition our freedom, but also give us clues as to the nature of Reality as it really is—there stands an imposing set of interpretations. These interpretations represent the constructs of the collective minds of men in their effort to give as intelligible an account as possible of this Reality—and the interpretations themselves have likewise a way of limiting or conditioning the freedom of man. There are the interpretations of the natural sciences, the hypotheses that often go by the name of "laws," such as the "law" of gravity, or the second "law" of thermodynamics. In the realm of morality there are the widely varying codes of behavior, ranging from those sanctioned by the mores of a primitive tribe to those ethical systems undergirded by a powerful metaphysical vision. It goes without saying that these moral formulations profoundly influence the lives of men, as individuals, as members of society, and as members of a body politic. To these must be added the interpretations of Reality that the great religions of the world have laid before the mind and heart of man. And, lastly, there is History, not as past, but as written—as written and rewritten by successive generations of historians, as they seek to understand this past not only for its own sake, but also for the sake of the light it might shed on the future. Could we not say that the historian is doing his share in the task of probing more deeply into Reality as it really is? History, too, as written and rewritten, limits and conditions the life of man and that man's freedom.

In the light of this analysis, let me repeat that the will cannot argue with what I have called the given. These comprise the brute facts with which men must live. One cannot will the fact of gravity out of existence. But on the other hand, the great task of each human will—and here I contend that the will is ultimately free, or can be made so by seeking to eliminate the grievous blindnesses that beset it—the great task of the will is to choose which one of the interpretations it will adopt or which combination of them. This choice will determine for the individual what for him is the goal of man. Further, it will determine for him his conception of the nature of the will itself and how it may function. These two conceptions taken together will determine for him the answer he will give to the question, Freedom for what?

It should be clear that every man must choose his interpretation, the interpretation on which he is placing his wager, as Pascal would have it, in the light of all

---

**THE KEY REPORTER**

www.pbk.org
relevant evidence of all sorts and orders. And here I hope that in some measure I have succeeded in demonstrating that one cannot reflect fruitfully about freedom without ranging through the entire spectrum of human learning, from science, to social science, the arts, philosophy, history, and religion. In this context, at least, Knowledge indeed appears to be one.

But how is one to distinguish between a superior or an inferior interpretation? Judicial appraisal of relevant evidence is obviously essential. May I suggest that the notion of “Reality as it really is,” conceived objectively, may be helpful? May we not say that the superior interpretation is the one that more closely approximates “Reality as it really is”? The closer the chosen interpretation approximates Reality, the better will be the man’s sense of goal, and—I would even go so far as to say—the more genuine will be the quality of the man’s freedom. If he freely pursues a false goal that only remotely approximates Reality, his freedom must in fact be less genuine, for there is a sense in which he is being enslaved by the “false¬ness” of that goal. If ever man could (which he cannot) fully comprehend this true Reality we have been talking about, then his would be the true goal, and the quality of his freedom would be perfect.

Perhaps we might even suggest that those monuments of the creative and speculative minds of men, those monuments that have stood the test of time, occupy their high position because they embody within them the most profound visions into the essence of Reality as it really is. I mean the Iliad, the Oresteia, the Oedipus, the Book of Job, the Gospels, the Upanishads, the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, the B-Minor Mass, the Ninth Symphony, Hamlet, Lear, the Sistine Chapel. Maybe this is why the casual phrase of St. Augustine, secures judicat orbis terrarum, “the judgment of the world is sound,” proved to be so full of meaning for John Henry Newman—and for that matter, for us.

Viewed in the perspective of this kind of thinking about freedom, the task of liberal education is unmistakable: it is to impart to its students the breadth and depth of vision with which freely to choose, and to rescrutinize throughout a questing lifetime, a sustaining interpretation of that which is. All educators dedicated to this purpose are, and must be Humanists, if that title is to bear the dignity and worth that it deserves.

Is Intelligence Always a Handicap?

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22—Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont this week asked a question in the Foreign Relations Committee that deserves an answer.

“Who,” he inquired, “would want to see the Senate of the United States run by ninety-six Phi Beta Kappas?”

This may turn out to be the most provocative question since Bill Terry asked whether the Dodgers were still in the league. It obviously terrified the right honorable gentleman from Vermont, who likes his seat and is not a member of the honorary scholastic society, but it is worth dreaming about anyway.

Among the Phi Beta Kappas who have something to do with the affairs of this city were John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, Franklin Pierce, Rutherford B. Hayes, James Garfield, Grover Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Calvin Coolidge, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

There were, and indeed still are, a few fairly useful jurists in this company, among them Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Rufus Choate, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Charles Evans Hughes, John Marshall, John Bassett Moore, Owen J. Roberts, Harlan F. Stone, Joseph Story. And this is not to mention Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and John Marshall Harlan, who can, if they wish, still clink their Phi Beta Kappa keys on the Supreme Court bench.

The late Robert A. Taft of Cincinnati was a Phi Beta Kappa, and Mr. Aiken used to think he was a fairly good Senator. And just to prove that even in this anti-intellectual age some voters do not regard academic excellence as a disqualification for public office, there are eleven Phi Beta Kappas in the Senate today.


It cannot be said that this is a list of chalky pedagogues, or, for that matter, that they are the best eleven Senators on Capitol Hill, but they are good enough to make a man look around for more.

Would the quality of the Senate be lowered in this scientific age by the presence of Alan T. Waterman, head of the National Science Foundation; Ernest Orlando Lawrence, director of the Radiation Laboratory, University of California; Dr. Merle Tuve, director of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institution of Washington, or Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology—all of them members of Phi Beta Kappa?

Would Ohio be worse off if its Republican Phi Beta Kappa Governor, C. William O'Neill, replaced its Republican Senator, John Bricker, or Michigan feel blue if G. Mennen Williams brought his bow ties and his Phi Beta Kappa key to the Senate to replace Pat McNamara?

Senator Aiken could surely not complain, as a stanch conservative, about having Bernard M. Baruch or Nelson Rockefeller in the upper chamber, for Mr. Baruch is right in line of succession to those other famous Phi Beta Kappas, Otto Kahn, Cyrus McCormick and Owen D. Young. And Nelson Rockefeller follows naturally in the path of his Phi Beta Kappa father, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

Other Phi Beta Kappas could also probably make their way in the upper chamber, among them Governor Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr., of Massachusetts, and Herbert Brownell, Jr., of New York, to say nothing of such Congressmen as Hale Boggs of Louisiana, Brooks Hays of Arkansas, and Walter Judd of Minnesota.

The country is not short of practical men of academic excellence; they are merely blunted by the mocking joke about eggheads. We even have a couple of great sports stars with Phi Beta Kappa keys who could give the sitting Senators a run for their money in Maryland or Colorado—namely, Byron "Whizzer" White, the All-American from the University of Colorado (who finished No. 1 in his class at the Yale Law School and is now a lawyer in Denver), and Dr. William Barry Wood, the former Harvard football captain who is now a physician and a vice-president of the Johns Hopkins Hospital.

Maybe all these distinguished men would not improve the Senate, and certainly any patient man could make another list of ninety-six different Phi Beta Kappas who would make it worse. But if Senators scoff at Phi Beta Kappas and Presidents prefer the company of retired distillers, steel tycoons, and muffin-pak artists, who is to put an end to this silly and divisive national joke about intellectuals?

(From The New York Times, February 23, 1958. Reprinted with permission.)

APRIL, 1958
The Book Committee Recommends...

C. Vann Woodward


A new subtlety and a lot of fresh perception and original thought have gone into the making of this rewarding study. The author has succeeded in adding a new dimension to the study of political thought and in wringing new meanings out of old sources. The Jacksonians are viewed with detachment as both creators and critics of their system, and old interpretations of the period come in for reassessment. Mr. Meyers writes skillfully and attractively. His book is enthusiastically recommended.

BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR. By Bray Hammond. Princeton. $12.50.

Mr. Hammond has put many years into his study of banking "as a point of observation whence one looks over the landscape and spies out things not to be seen clearly from any other angle." Given the importance of credit in a nation of speculators, what he spies out is highly significant for the understanding of American history. He debunks the myth of the "poor debtor" and demolishes a whole array of Jacksonian clichés. For good measure and for comparative purposes he throws in a history of Canadian banking. An important book full of mellow wit and sharp insight.

THE SOUTH IN NORTHERN EYES, 1831 to 1861. By Howard R. Floan. Texas. $3.95.

The author has assembled the views of the leading literary figures of New England and New York. He finds the New Yorkers, Bryant, Whitman, and Melville, more accurate and understanding of the South than the New Englanders, whose views differ in no important respect from the propaganda image of the South devised by Garrison and Phillips. None of them realized the literary potentials of the tragic experiences that were unfolding before them.


Although Mr. Tugwell did not meet Franklin Roosevelt until the spring of 1932, his biography takes on the character of personal memoirs. Tugwell is a confessed admirer but a critical and discriminating one. His attitude is best revealed by his own statement: "There was much that was worthy of praise; there were some things to be deplored; there were some disastrous decisions; but there was nothing of consequence." As a frequent participant in the events and decisions he describes, he brings a wealth of rich observation and experience to his task. As a one-volume life of Roosevelt (a large one), this book is first in the field.


The old classic on Stonewall Jackson by G. F. R. Henderson is at last supplanted by a book that is more thorough and complete. Using new materials, Mr. Vandiver investigates in detail the prewar years of Jackson and unveils much that explains the general's later peculiarities. The military narrative is written with clarity and superb zest. While not uncritical of Jackson's military career, Vandiver considers the great reputation he earned secure and deserved. Among the many Civil War books of late years, this biography is outstanding.

Robert C. Angell

600 MILLION CHINESE. By Robert Guillaun. Criterion. $5.

The author, a French correspondent, returned to mainland China for two months in 1956. He records vividly the impressions gained in extensive travels. He finds that Communism has brought remarkable material achievement but terrifying spiritual degradation. Marxist doctrine has been so successfully inculcated and Russian technicians are so essential that he sees no prospect of a rift with the Soviet Union. One may wonder about the validity of sweeping generalizations based on brief observation.

AN EPITAPH FOR DIXIE. By Harry S. Ashmore. Norton. $3.50.

The Little Rock editor who opposed the actions of Governor Faubus analyzes the contemporary South. Though he believes the leaders' fears of economic reprisal from the U. S. Government and northern business will prevent organized violence, he gives no clue how the moderates are to be released from the thrall of the White Citizens Councils to get on with the job of gradual desegregation.

STYLE AND CIVILIZATIONS. By A. L. Kroeber. Cornell. $3.

The elder statesman of American anthropology draws upon his great knowledge and wisdom to discuss lucidly the role of style in the arts, in science, and in civilizations. His comments on Danilevsky, Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin are scrupulously fair and always enlightening.

AMERICAN HUMANISM. By Howard Mumford Jones. Harper. $3.

The thesis of this small volume is that humanism is a point of view, a concern for the dignity of man and its expression in all fields of knowledge and art. It is not to be identified with the humanities, which are frequently pursued only with technical expertise. On the other hand, some scientists work for the sake of mankind. The Founding Fathers gave us a rich tradition of humanism to which we must revert for the sake of ourselves and the world.

THE DIRECTOR LOOKS AT HIS JOB. Edited by Courtney C. Brown and E. Everett Smith. Columbia. $2.75.

Report of a high-level symposium on the responsibilities, functions, and composition of boards of directors of large American corporations. The record has been edited so as to preserve the verbal interchange while eliminating trivia.

THE MORMONS. By Thomas F. O'Dea. Chicago. $5.

A careful study of the history and present adjustment of the Mormons. Of special interest is the discussion of the internal strains and conflicts accompanying loss of isolation and re-integration into the general stream of American culture.

Albert L. Guérard


I came to scoff. Wilson's sudden vogue, compared with Camus' slow ascent, made him the Elvis Presley of Existentialism. Nothing novel. Lucifer invented rebellion. Spurning the world, and shirking congenial work are ancient and common. But Wilson is no flamboyant show-off. He thinks honestly. He writes well, without tricks. His rich information is at second-hand: so is Spengler's, and most of Toynbee's. Discovering facts is not so important as looking at facts intelligently. A minor prophet? I'd nominate him for a professorship-at-large, if not at Stanford, at any rate at Harvard.


Title cryptic and precious, in the tradition of our Metaphysicians. An Italian teaching Slavic to Slavs and New Englanders, Poggioli is Comparative Literature incarnate. Our knowledge of Russian literature is spotty; so, starting with the

Lawrence A. Cremin

CHANGING VALUES IN COLLEGE. By Philip E. Jacob. Harper. $3.50.

A genuinely disturbing book, based on some 850 research studies, which shatters cherished assumptions about the impact of formal college programs on the values and attitudes of students.


An objective, though not uncritical, review of recent developments in pedagogical thought and practice by the dean among American students of comparative education.

SoVIErT EDUCATION FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. By Alexander G. Koral. Wiley. $8.50.

SOVIErT EDUCATION. Edited by George L. Kline. Columbia, $3.50.

SOVIErT YOUTH. Edited by Dorothy L. Meek. Humanities Press. $5.50.

Three solid volumes for those whose appetites have been whetted by the Office of Education report on Education in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Koral's book, a more general treatment than its title would suggest, provides a balanced combination of hard-to-get statistical data and penetrating ideological analysis. The Kline and Meek volumes are anthologies, the former a collection of first-hand reports on pre-war Soviet education by refugee students and teachers, the latter a compilation of informative excerpts from the recent Soviet press.

George N. Shuster

A shelf of new books speak reverently, probingly of the nature of man and of life. Paul Weiss, Yale's noble metaphysician, gives his doctrine of fresh pertinence and breadth in MODES OF BEING (Southern Illinois University, $10). Perhaps this sentence indicates the core of what he has to say: "To know who he is [man] must know what he represents; to know what he represents he must know what it is for man to be; and to know what it is for man to be he must know the modes of being." THE IMMENSE JOURNEY, by Loren Eiseley, (Random House, $3.50) conjures up a scientist's vision of Nature with almost startling beauty of phrase; and in EDMUND W. SINVOTT'S MATTER, MIND AND MAN (Harper, $3.50) the same vision leads to religious conviction. "History is not a problem to be solved, but a mystery to be looked at." concludes Jacques Maritain in ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (Scriver's, $5.50). The question here is not what, but how. Those who wish to be tested out of thought will find the means in MAN AND TIME, edited by Joseph Campbell (Pantheon, $3). Here is the third volume of papers from the Eranos Yearbooks. THE REFORMATION, by Will Durant (Simon and Schuster, $7.50), is the sixth volume of this writer's STORY OF CIVILIZATION. Writing so much is a prodigious feat, and as a general account of the period it almost succeeds. But the treatment of religious issues is strangely imprecise and diffuse. MEN OF WISDOM, a new Harper series of paper-backs, starts with four impressive illustrated little books. (St. Paul and the Mystery of Christ, by Claude Tresmontant; Augustine and His Influence Through the Ages, by Henri Marrou; Buddha and Buddhism, by Maurice Perche and; and Master Eckhart and the Rhineland Mystics, by Jeanne Ancelet-Hustahe. $1.35 each).

The Key Reporter

Published quarterly October, January, April, and July by the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa at the William Byrd Press, Richmond, Va. Editorial and executive offices, 1811 Q Street, N.W., Washington 9, D. C. Editorial opinions contained are those of the writer and not necessarily those of the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa. Advertising rates upon application. Subscription, 20 cents a year. $1.00 for five years. Second class mailing privileges authorized at Washington, D. C.


A mean soul in a ludicrous body. A treacherous friend. A poor poet. An uncertain novelist. Not a true critic, for he was blind to contemporary greatness—Vigny, Stendhal, Balzac—and infallible

www.pbk.org
Are you looking for information about . . .

Scholarships?

These publications will be helpful:


The undergraduate directory lists more than fifteen hundred institutions by States, with data on location, control, composition of the student body, the highest level of work offered, enrollment, and charges in 1955-56 for tuition, required fees, board, and room. It includes the number and average value of scholarships for freshmen, and the total number, average value, and approximate range of all scholarships; the number and average value of loans, their availability to freshmen, their annual and two- or four-year maximum, the rate of interest before and after the student leaves the institution, and the date of the first and final payments; and the average compensation of teaching and research assistants and other employed students.

The bulletin on graduate awards gives similar information about the institution, loans, and employment opportunities. Fellowships are listed by field of study.

Copies of both bulletins may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.


Covers awards for advanced work available from 350 universities and foundations in the United States and thirty foreign countries. Copies may be examined at graduate schools, university placement or deans' offices, public and college libraries, or may be ordered from the Institute at Box 99E, Greenpoint Station, Brooklyn 22, New York.

A Summer Job?

- The 1958 Summer Placement Directory, also published by the Advancement and Placement Institute, includes information about career trainee positions, work camps, travel tour agencies, and many other summer opportunities in the United States and twenty foreign countries. Copies may be examined at many placement or deans' offices, libraries, or school superintendents' offices, or may be ordered from the Institute at Box 99G, at the address above, for $2.

A Permanent Job?

- Government Careers: Opportunities for College Graduates, by Jay B. Westcott of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, describes career opportunities for college graduates in the Federal Government, and State and local governments, with special reference to New York State. It also discusses the role of graduate school training for the public service in public administration, and in the social, physical, and biological sciences. Copies may be ordered from the Syracuse University Press for $1.

- The Alumnae Advisory Center, a non-profit association of member colleges, will provide assistance to job-hunters in New York City by advising them on techniques, showing them how to assess their experience, and how to go about finding what they want. Alumnae of non-member colleges may become Associate Members (dues: $10) or may use the center on a fee basis. Further information may be secured from the center at 541 Madison Avenue, New York 22, New York.

Costs of Attending College?

- That is the title of the Office of Education Bulletin 1957, No. 9, prepared by Ernest V. Hollis and associates. It is an analysis of the data obtained from replies to a questionnaire received from thousands of students at a representative group of institutions of higher education in the United States. Copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price: 45¢.

Winners of the two $150 scholarship prizes offered by the University of Washington chapter and the Puget Sound Association receiving congratulations from Chapter President Barnet Baskerville. Both prizes go to students with the highest academic standing in their classes. At left is Carol E. Yowell, a senior majoring in physics, and in the center is Rose L. Dennis, an entering freshman. When Miss Yowell was a senior in high school, she received one of the book awards presented by the two Phi Beta Kappa groups to the outstanding boy and girl in the graduating class at twenty-five Seattle high schools.
Advanced Placement Program Provides Rich Diet for Able High-School Students

A n interesting project to strengthen education for unusually talented secondary-school students has been undertaken by the College Entrance Examination Board. Known as the Advanced Placement Program, it began several years ago with experiments supported by the Fund for the Advancement of Education, and has been sponsored, with financial help from the Fund, by the College Board since 1955.

The first step in the program takes place in both public and private schools with the establishment of college-level courses. At Cincinnati's Walnut Hills High School, for example, an advanced course in English covers a great deal of ground usually reserved for college freshmen. In addition to doing intensive work in composition throughout the year, the students study the short story, the novel, analysis of argument, and the techniques of poetry, with readings that include Melville, Joyce, Faulkner, Milton, Chaucer, and T. S. Eliot. In the spring they take an intensive examination designed to test their familiarity with the artistic processes of writing, and their ability to deal with problems of interpretation and criticism. They might be asked to analyze a poem or a prose passage, to discuss a particular literary technique, and to compare two or more works, establishing the literary uniqueness of each.

The three-hour examinations, administered by the Educational Testing Service, are mainly of the essay type and are prepared by school and college teachers under the auspices of the College Entrance Examination Board. The results determine the student's eligibility for credit or advanced placement at the college of his choice. The program has nothing to do with actual admission to college. School reports and examination books are sent in July to the college the student will enter in the fall. Examinations are offered in English composition, literature, American history, European history, French, German, Latin, Spanish, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology.

Many colleges grant credit and advanced placement for satisfactory work in the courses and examinations; others give advanced placement only. Since the program is relatively new, some institutions have not yet set their policies, but interest has grown tremendously every year. A few students have been getting enough credit to accelerate; this year thirty boys went straight from secondary school into the sophomore class at Harvard.

Some schools begin advanced work in the sophomore or junior year and carry groups through two or three years. Others, unable to institute a full-fledged program because of inadequate facilities or scheduling difficulties, provide instruction of a tutorial nature in conjunction with regular courses. In any case, an ordinary enrichment program is not enough; real college work is required. A mathematics sequence must allow for a full year of calculus, with some analytics. "If the senior has to spend time on trigonometry," says Program Director David A. Dudley, "he will not have time to study enough calculus to do well on our examination." Experience indicates that students chosen on the basis of interest as well as superior ability and achievement are likely to profit most from the program; they maintain a high level of accomplishment throughout their college years.

According to Charles R. Keller, director of the program from 1955 to 1957, "it is an enterprise which contains more by way of intangibles, by-products, derivatives, and hopes than of tangibles and realized gains. I have developed," he continues, "an "iceberg theory" of the Program. So much more lies below the surface than appears at or above the surface." Although the advanced courses are established for the ablest students, there is evidence that the whole school benefits from them. The teachers have responded with great enthusiasm to the challenge of learning new subject matter.

The Advanced Placement Program has also had a substantial effect on school curricula and has been credited with being a major influence in current efforts to improve mathematics programs. A school considering advanced placement courses in mathematics or languages, for example, may find that the inquiry eventually leads to consideration of introducing algebra in the eighth grade or language study in grammar school. The program offers, in short, both an opportunity and a challenge to schools, colleges, and able students. By breaking down artificial barriers and by eliminating duplication of ground covered both in secondary school and in college, the program can reshape curricular thinking and benefit education as a whole.

Further information may be obtained from the Director, Advanced Placement Program, 425 West 117th Street, New York 27, New York.
To The Editor

"The Guide of Life" by C. J. Ducasse, which appeared in the January issue, prompted much comment from our readers. Although many of our correspondents praised the article warmly, we have selected for publication one letter that is representative of the critical comments.

I would like to take issue with the opinion which Professor C. J. Ducasse expressed in his article "The Guide of Life" in the January issue. If love of wisdom is the guide of life, then surely Professor Ducasse should go one step further. It is the epitome of wisdom to be able to recognize one's own limitations. Let us acknowledge first, and frankly, that man did not create the universe, nor did he create this minute cohesion of molecules and atoms: he labels the "earth." Even Professor Ducasse admits that man, with all his scientific advances, now stands in danger of destroying "the whole of life on earth or even the very earth itself." To believe that this creature homo sapiens can work out his own destiny with no aid from his Creator is anything but wisdom; it is the height of pretension.

To condemn religion because "bigoted men who were ignorant, stupid, arrogant, sadistic, or perverse...have too often interpreted the dogmas of their religion as warranting wars, persecutions, and senseless cruelties..." is no different from condemning good food because it has been poorly cooked. Certainly "love of wisdom" has been used with dire results, also. Throughout the centuries, tyrants such as Hitler have caused merciless suffering while believing that they were acting wisely for the benefit of their class, race, nation or even a larger goal.

While not belittling "love of wisdom" as a guide of life, I heartily protest calling it "the guide of life." Only pure, unmotivated love, in harmony and fellowship with God and fellow-man, is the guide of first humble acknowledgment that man alone is not capable of shaping his own destiny, and that it is pretension for him to believe that he can do so. Then it would require recognition of Divine sovereignty of the universe, and earnest expression of desire for fellowship and harmony with God and fellow-man. Those four steps which Professor Ducasse prescribes could be useful, but only within the framework of humility and love.

DOROTHY ARNETT DIXON
Berkeley City, Missouri

Mr. Ducasse Replies

To reply adequately to what Mrs. Dixon says, I would have to write at excessive length. If, however, she were to look up a book entitled A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion which I published a few years ago, she would, I think, see that I do not underestimate the important functions of religion in the life of man. The table of contents would give her an idea of the attention I have paid to religious issues.

Her remarks seem to overlook the difference between the guide of life, which is what I was discussing, and the motive power in life. In an automobile, the steering wheel has functions different from the motor; so both are needed. Anyway, I agree that if mankind were motivated by altruistic love to a greater extent than it is, its life would probably be somewhat better. Yet the common saying that the way to hell is paved with good intentions means that intelligence, information, and clear thought are indispensable if the fruits of loving intentions are to be dependably good.

As regards the "creation" to which Mrs. Dixon alludes, I do not know of any reason to believe that the universe was ever "created"—as distinguished from undergoing changes, from one state to another, as it keeps doing and doubtless always has and will. For if everything that exists must have had a cause that created it, then that goes for the creator too; but if anything can exist without having been created, why not the world too?

Also, I notice that she employs throughout the vocabulary of the Judaico-Christian theology. But why does she pick that theology, as if it were known to be authoritative? Just because it was the particular one to which the geographical accident of her birth subjected her from infancy?

C. J. DUCASSE
Providence, Rhode Island