THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES ASSOCIATION
II: Its Institutes

by Kirtley F. Mather, President of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Association.

If I am to judge from the letters that have come to me following my article on "Post-Career Education: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Association" that appeared in its autumn issue, The Key Reporter is one of our country's most widely read publications. The flood of interesting letters that we have received has carried a powerful impact.

Many letters came from colleges. Many came from organized groups; and still more from individuals who have already retired, or who seem to be on the verge of retiring and who face it with some trepidation. Clearly, our purpose has made a deep impression on those who have heard of the O.W.H.A. What surprised and delighted me most was the revelation of the thinking that is going on all over the country concerning much the same factors and possibilities that led to our program "of, by and for emeriti professors and emeriti laymen."

As we see it, the phenomenon of an increasing population of elderly people, many of them retired or capable of retiring, is one that reaches out beyond their own selves. Involved with it are many varied and subtle reactions and interactions; upon the families of the people; upon their children and their families in turn; and, in important measure, upon the communities in which they live. We know, of course, that our program cannot be a full answer to the total need. It is, however, offered as a useful force, as a factor moreover that is capable of wide duplication, so that, in the aggregate, it may have an impact upon hundreds of thousands of people.

We have encountered the grim reality that older people, whether already retired or contemplating retirement are, in many cases, frightened by the prospect. Many of them seem to be faced with a dismal future of empty lives, of just going through the motion of continued living.

At best, few of us are adequately prepared for this change in our lives. From my own knowledge, I can speak of the rapid disintegration of fine people, some of them my one-time colleagues, who have been unable, or have had no instrument with which, to make the transfer from a life of considerable activity and intellectual vigor to a life of retirement.

And let us admit, too, that many of us in the older-age bracket find ourselves lonely. All of us can do with an environment of stimulation and creativeness in which we can share with others the years that are still ahead. In far too many cases, older people are confronted with the prospect of a vacuum, of trivial lives, or of settling into patterns of living that risk the development of possessive and oppressive relations with family and with society.

In addition, among the rapidly expanding older-age group there are a large number who would be prepared to retire from their business or professional activity only if and as an attractive alternative way of life were open to them. It is for all such people, constituting today a sensitive and meaningful problem, that the O.W.H.A. is intended.

We believe that the proposed Institutes would be of service to enrich lives and to fill them with occupational, intellectual, and cultural interests; would bring the satisfaction of creative participation; and would have a direct bearing on physical and mental well-being. Along with this, there would be a social climate and opportunities for stimulating companionships that are often crucial to human happiness.

All these realities take on further significance when we consider the large body of retired university and college teachers, men and women of unique competence, many of them, indeed, with national and international reputations. They too are often stopped in their tracks if they have no opportunity to continue to contribute from their rich store of knowledge and from their teaching experience.

Our own experience with last summer's Rensselaerville Institute in Upper New York State gave support to much of this thinking. It was, in the first instance, on a very high level, drawing people of considerable attainments and capacities. It was in a beautiful setting, in an old community, rich in tradition and with the natural scenic charms of the Helderberg Mountains, west of Albany, N.Y. The level of teaching was high. (This was no casual disarray of pabulum lecturers.)

Professor Paul B. Sears of Yale's Conservation Department, led discussions concerning the centers worked for nine months about the relation between life and its terrestrial environment. Harvard's distinguished astronomer Harlow Shapley helped achieve an appreciation of the vast new learning about the solar system, the other stars and galaxies, together with the evidence justifying the thesis that creatures—some possibly as complex as man—reside on millions of planets in the universe. Some seminar members coupled Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's teaching in The Phenomenon of Man with Shapley's astrophysics, and the result was a remarkable forward thrust in their religious experience.

Throughout the four weeks of August it was my duty to trace the growing edge of several branches of the physical sciences. Together we looked at some of the modern miracles of chemistry, the fantastic gains in biology, the new discoveries of nuclear physics, the fascinating geological measurements and techniques now possible. The head of IBM's research, Dr. G. L. Tucker, told us of the multiplication of human brain power which electronic computers offer. It is not simply that computers have revolutionized business, industry, aeronautics, and considerable scientific research. These machines (some containing 250,000 transistors) are now requiring human beings to think more deeply, and teachers to express themselves more precisely. An illustration of the fact that Man with computers can accomplish things Man alone could not do, was the instance of a military problem on which they worked for nine months with no success, and that IBM technicians (after three weeks of briefing the machine) solved in 80 minutes.

Equally important with an understanding of the new shape of the physical sciences was the layman's study of the psyche and human relations. A psychiatrist discussed what is known about Man's conscious and unconscious self. A historian outlined the

(Concluded on back cover)
ONE MAY SCAN the nation’s role in world affairs from a more or less sanguine outlook—from a standpoint typified by a young and hopeful Tennyson in “Locksley Hall” or that of a less buoyant Tennyson in “Locksley Hall Sixty Years After.” The contrasting premises are parts of a memory reaching far back beyond our national origin.

The more sanguine approach reflects ideas found in Genesis, in the Book of Daniel, in the account in Acts of Paul’s sermon at Mars’ Hill, and in Revelations. It echoes notions emphasized in medieval theocratic theories, the teachings of Jouchim of Fiore, and the beliefs of Anabaptists in the Rhine Valley in the 1500’s and of Levelers and the Fourierian utopists in the 18th century later. Bossuet and Fenelon exhorted such ideas in Louis XIV’s time. Marxist and Darwinian thinkers have produced their counterpart notions. Another version of the concepts appear in the late Pope John’s encyclical, Pacem in Terris.

By the line of thought common to such diverse exemplars, humankind had a common origin: “God... hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth,” according to Paul’s version of the matter. Variations of culture are a product of man’s wanderings away from the original base or reflect some divisive catastrophe like that of the Tower of Babel. Institutional structures called states and governments are a product of, and epitomize, such aberrant developments. Behind, beneath, or despite them, mankind remains inherently a unity. In this vein, as a contemporary example, George F. Kennan, in The Realities of American Foreign Policy, speaks of “these unsatisfactory but indispensable arrangements we call governments” and describes peoples as “separated from one another” by them.

However, to this outlook, moreover, mankind has a potential—that is essentially a document in foreign relations. It presents a bid for entry into the nexus of diplomacy—for assuming “among the powers of the earth... separate and equal station”—instead of continuing to acquiesce in the management of American relationships to the outside world by the vicarious, inequitarian usages of empire. It solicits sympathy and understanding of the norms for relationships among diverse peoples and areas. It does this last on the basis of an assumption of a universal sort of rationality—holding truths to be self-evident to the world at large. As an unquestionable valid idea, it argues the abhorrence of absentee rulership, of government from afar, to basic laws of nature and God. It is to give a new notion to America, to become a new home of nationhood. Such a line of argument was not logically inevitable. The founders might have seized upon practical and particular arguments: the impracticability of control of the colonies from a base so far away, the miscomprehension of American desires and needs in London, the tendency of the new lands to outstrip the mother country, and so on. In the style of the times, however, they did not tackle the problem of the universal rationality, harmony of interest, and the like.

One better understands all this by taking account of linkage between the Declaration and Tom Paine’s ideas in his Common Sense, as elucidated for us in Felix Gilbert’s brilliant small book, To the Farewell Address. Paine exerted not only for separation from the Crown but also for renunciation of all alliances. Force would be necessary only for surrendering the ties to the Crown and thereafter to be dispensed with as an instrument of policy or a basis for security. In Paine’s view, ties to the motherland only made the colonies heirs to the motherland’s ennui. Freed from those ties, the colonies, as states, would enjoy the universal freedom assumed as latent in all relationships among nations. As unencumbered markets, they would serve the interests of all, and all would thereby be constrained to honor and to protect American independence. Thus security was to reside in detachment. America would be attuned to a harmony of interest inherent among nations but concealed by obsolete practices of empire. General interest would be made to flourish simply by eschewing particular interests.

American independence, in Paine’s view, was not merely to serve American interests but to discharge a duty to all mankind. The withdrawal into autonomy would be true only in a juridic sense. Emerging America was to set a republican example destined for general emulation. Power was not to be sought or harbored. It was to come paradoxically in consequence of being avoided—power arising from rational pur-
pose and good example. Such was the source of a persistent set of clichés—a hardy tradition—against power politics. The new nation was conceived then as an exemplar to all mankind, a guide to a new Jerusalem, achieving power by rising above considerations of power, forwarding its interests by forgetting about them, making its way in security by not taking provident thought about its security.

How different is the cast of thought in the Constitution! I do not mean to go so far as to suggest mutual exclusiveness between the ideas of the respective documents. Many men subscribed to both. Some of the bright expectations of the Declaration lingered on and do so even yet. Even so, the national leadership echoed in the Constitution has become less hortatory. The content reflects recognition of needing more than declaratory purposes and abstract good ideas in order to maintain a going concern. A bitter lesson has been learned: independence hinges on capacity and willingness to meet obligations. It is not enough simply to keep attuned to a supposed harmony of interest. The nation must eschew itself in position the better to attend to its own concerns. No universals are proclaimed, and no language of world mission. The document is intent on perfecting the Union of states. It is concerned with justice within—justice not as a spontaneous abstraction, but justice as linked to, and a function of, authority. The tranquility asserted as an aim is domestic. The common defense must be striven for as security for a national base. The welfare postulated is that of the generality of Americans. The blessings of liberty are coveted for ourselves and our posterity. Domestic concerns they all are.

Quite a contrast! On the one hand a nation founded upon and exemplifying universally applicable principles, taking the lead for a new order of the ages, and portraying for others what their future is to be like! On the other hand a nation—in Alexander Hamilton's phrase— "likely to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations" and constrained therefor to do the best it can to fend off trouble and to look out for itself.

In roughly the first three-fourths of the period since the advent of independence these two sets of ideas were engaged in a sort of academic dialogue. That was in the era when, in Lord Bryce's phrase, "America sailed upon a summer sea." The aphorism may indeed have expressed only a relative truth. Actually, in that period, the United States fought in three International wars qualifying as what Wallace would have called "sedate hostility" and in a half dozen more ambiguous occasions of international violence. Americans also engaged in some three dozen campaigns with indigenous tribes and, a century ago, a civil war of huge scope and destructiveness. Without, these massworkings, the atmosphere would be remarkably placid story. So protected was the American position, so remote from pressures, that the nation was able to pass through so great a civil war with impunity—to divide so drastically without rendering itself vulnerable to intrusion.

The center of importance and the world's concerns was in Europe. That was the context of the arbiters in international affairs, the makers of history—"the powers of the earth," on a parity with which the Americans asserted a right to stand. A negus ruled then at Entoto, an emir at Kandahar, a shogun at Kioto, a shah at Isphahan, and innumerable other princes in out-of-the-way capitals. All these were of no real moment in world affairs. They were beyond the scope of diplomacy. Standing among the earth's powers meant entering into relations with Europeans. The world remained largely that way throughout the nineteenth century.

In that situation the dialogue between the two polar ideas of international life in American minds was only one of theory and sentiment. The American discourse continued the echo thoughts characteristic of the Declaration—Jefferson, for example, extolling the dream of a nation destined to be puissant even while eschewing power and affecting the world pervasively while standing aloof from its concerns, or Whitman turning out verses about America bearing the moral weight of all nation's destinies by being the example-setter. In reality, the nation remained boisterous and perhaps less lofty goals—busy looking after itself and rounding out a continental position.

That position, as it developed, was not merely unique, for all national positions are that. It was prodigious in range and endowments, stretching from the Tropics to the Arctic, occupying in great range on both the Pacific and the Atlantic, and lying in both the Western and Northern Hemispheres. The location implanted in American minds a sense of exemption from the world's vicissitudes. Even a quarter century ago, Samuel Flagg Bemis could write, in closing his distinguished Diplomatic History of the United States:

The continental position has always been the strength of the United States in the world. American successes in diplomacy have been based on a continental policy. The interests of the United States today rest on the same support. It is a safe generalization to assert for the future a better world. A continental policy was instinctive with the Fathers. Its pursuit has been most consonant with the genius and the exigencies of the people. Where they have left it, to 'become of age' or 'to take their place'—on other continents—among the great powers of the world, they have made their mistakes. Where they have followed it, they have not gone astray.

Such language, written only in 1936, seems now to echo from another age. Imagine now watchfully waiting from the sidelines for a better world or exercising an option whether really to stand among the great! The contrasting circumstances since interposed are so complex and innovative and require volumes to delineate, but I shall try to name them in essence:

- The establishment of positions of great scope and importance—namely, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and appurtenant areas—for revolutionary purposes with universal claims on the future derive from their asserted monopoly of legitimacy growing out of a purported law of history of which they are the exponents and guardians.
- The emergence of weapon systems characterized by prodigious destructive capabilities and instant readiness for delivery over spans of thousands of miles—weapon systems which cannot be used to interdict attack and which impel their possessors to premise their security on the intimidatory threat of incalculably destructive retaliation.
- The sharing of pre-eminence in such weapons between two societies—one of United States and the other the Soviet Union, based beyond the confines of what used to be the central theater of military significance and political importance in world affairs.
- The progressive disappearance—a major phenomenon—a major phenomenon of our times—of the European-based inequality international order which once served as a framework of relationship between economically and politically advanced societies and less developed and tradition-bound lands and peoples.
- As a corollary, the proliferation of juridically independent new states, by scores entering into the public life of the world without having as yet established adequate bases of public life within their own domains and participating in the making of history without, in many cases, canons of relevant historic experience of their own—states with ambitions far in excess of their precepts.
- As a further corollary, the approach to universality of the equilibrarian usages of diplomacy and successions of the inequilateral arrangements of empire.
- The existence and continuous activity of an institution—to wit, the United Nations—now also approaching universality and designed and devoted to what is called parliamentary diplomacy.
- Finally, the dynamics of contemporary communications, with their tendency to make virtually every problem one of instant concern everywhere and to goad governments into putting decision ahead of comprehension.

I might dwell at length upon that last point, pondering the effects of the torrent, measured in hundreds of thousands of words, flashed into the Department of State and out again every day. How far we have come—and at what cost—since the time when Jefferson, as Secretary of State, noted an interval of nearly two years since the last word received from our envoy in Madrid and the need of looking into the matter in event of the lapse of many more uncommodity can can.

Some of the changes enumerated were never willed by the United States. Some were thrust upon its consciousness by forces beyond its ordaining. Others, though encouraged and aspired to by the United States, have turned out radically different in reality from the hopes prompting sponsorship. The record illustrates the inherent advantages of the United States in internal development, the limitations on power of even one first-rank government for affecting its environment.

The effects on policy obviously are profound. Problems are more inolved and demands hugely more rigorous than in the times when Americans were treasuring their bright expectations about world affairs. The differences in accessibility and reparation in exterior relations is borne in mind, and the general consciousness unremittingly rather than being an intermittent concern as in the past. The margin for error has shrunk. The globe's quadrants are increasingly interactive. Never before, as Raymond Aron has pointed out, have such diverse.
contrasting, and opposed concepts of history been brought into one span of existence.

In face of the exigencies of such a situation, the American dialogue about the nations of the world has been naturally intensified. It is not the more or less academic dialogue of earlier times. It is now related to hard choices and real events. We reflect a habit of thinking of our country as essentially a western hemisphere land, but the problems pressing upon it stem largely from the circumstance of its being located in the northern hemisphere as well. We are affected by pride and tradition from being the first of the areas beyond Europe to challenge successfully for a place in the nexus of diplomacy. Many of us thus sentimentalize about the United States as the bellwether of decolonization. Yet our problems rise largely from the fact of the nation’s having achieved pre-eminence among great powers. National goals defined in terms of a world mission and the ancient expectation of unity and harmony as norms in world affairs still arouse imagination among Americans in the face of obdurate realities.

The outlook of Americans is still deeply affected by the themes of the Declaration. When acting upon finite considerations of interest, Americans broadly feel compelled to account for and justify national actions in a frame of universal validity—a habit lingering on from the past and deserving of a few comments.

In levying war against Spain to clear up a nuisance near the national periphery, the Congress sixty-five years ago felt constrained to enunciate anew the grand propositions of the Declaration. Pondering whether to make avail of an opportunity to take over the Philippines in consequence of that war, President McKinley, after imploping divine guidance, felt behooved to explain in terms of universal altruism.

In the series of positions and actions relevant to that traditional policy known as the Monroe Doctrine—alas! what has happened to it?—the United States’ attitude was that described by Dexter Perkins in The United States and the World. Its purpose is to define the limits within which how little emphasis was placed on national safety. No doubt the foreign offices of all countries indulge in high sounding generalities. But this fact is conspicuously true in American diplomacy. Again and again, the emphasis is on ideology, rather than on security.

Waging war against the Central Powers in 1917, the United States, speaking through its President, was not content to rest its case upon the security issues involved but—adopting a phrase that originated with H. G. Wells—set forth a program to “make the world safe for democracy” and devoted itself at least for a transient moment to extending our summer sea to the world through the program of Wilsonian ideals.

Interposing American resources against the Axis a generation later, Franklin D. Roosevelt propounded an Atlantic Charter with its four freedoms, all universal. The dream of creating a structure of world unity came to life again in a project for perpetuating into the peace the prevailing coalition as a core for an all embracing United Na-

tions. By the way, what a name! What a triumph of the arts of public relations! Suppose it had been called the Diverse or the Assorted Nations!

A skeptic might well agree with Dexter Perkins: “American statesmen have believed and professed, on the belief, that the best way to rally American opinion behind their purposes is to assert a moral principle. In doing so, they have often gone beyond the boundaries of expediency. And perhaps it is fair to say that in underemphasizing security, they have helped to form a national habit which unduly subordinates the necessities of national defense to the assertion of lofty moral aims.”

Yet more than the mere rhetoric of propa-ganda is reflected in this record. The Declaration and its universalistic assumptions are fixed in the conscience and the consciousness of Americans. Ideas of the Enlightenment echo to us in our great normative document, with its age-old assumption about the original and inherent unity of all mankind. Under the Declaration’s aegis, the Americans in world affairs undertaken in pursuance of more finite purposes are not ipso facto justifiable but require vindication under some scheme of universal good. It is part of the national psyche to identify national purposes with service to all mankind, in the manner of Tom Paine.

This attitude dwells upon ultimate goals. It conceives them as including resolution of all differences and harmonization of all interests. It looks to the transcending of politics among nations by policy. It tends to predicate the omnipotence of mankind for solving all problems—given opportunity for reason. It puts faith in the feasibility of new starts. It sets great store by the power of example. It believes strongly in the power of agreed documents to transform situations and to enter into the general conscience.

With Presidents and their spokesmen and their principal advisors, it is not a matter merely of guesswork as to what will go over with the public. It is not a case of humoring preconceptions. Our leaders, I am confident, share these attitudes. Invoking all those habitual ideas is a way for them to justify policy actions to themselves, and not just a way of making them palatable to followers.

As a world power, the United States harks back to propositions in vogue when the new republic was the ugly duckling among nations. Steadfastness in devotion to the universalizing of independence is undiminished. The inherent capacity of any people in which the canons of nationhood and the ability of any people to make good as a going concern are still taken for granted by most Americans who think about the matter. An inherent unity of interests among nations—typified in the idea of world community—is postulated with equal fidelity. The universalizing of independence is assumed as an intrinsic function of human freedom in a realization of world community. The introduction of increasing diversities into the nexus of diplomacy is regarded as forward ing the unification of the world.

These grand developments indeed are not assumed to be as automatic as they seemed to Tom Paine. A little more time and organizing effort may be requisite, but the end is no less sure. The reconciling of ends will enfold even our adversaries, and their adversariness is taken as an aberration destined to abate by some inherent character of events. In this vein, our Secretary of State, ending foci clichés such as having a win position in a war, took himself to win out in a counter cliché about a policy enabling everybody to win.

A danger of sorts in logic inheres in this line of thought. The case for universalizing independence poses the righteousness and goodness of diversity along with the idea of an inherent harmony of interest. Opposed qualities are thus placed in apposition. In like fashion, the case for freedom is linked sometimes to a belief in an undiminishing, an irresistible, an uncontestable force. Free will is seen as being borne along to triumph by deterministic currents.

The logical contradictions inherent in this line of thought no more stay the American faith in its brightest mood than shaded the Age of Enlightenment.

So the United States finds itself promoting them both—diversity and community—on the same package of gold dust twins, along with an emphasis on combining the best parts of two mutually exclusive ideas, to wit, freedom and determinism. As our late President Kennedy put it, “No one who examines the modern world can doubt that the great currents of history are carrying the world toward the pluralistic idea. No one can doubt that the wave of these times is the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men.” In Under Secretary of State George Ball’s words, “Free will, not historic determinism, is the credo of free men”—free will, moreover, as a sure thing, for “This is the only working hypothesis for free men today. We are on the side of history and the trends are running our way.”

Then again the late President: “We have history working for us.” What an addition to the payroll!

The old happy assumptions from our early past are reflected in the government’s proffered solution for the armament dilemma embodied in an official document called Blueprint for the Peace Race. All disputes about particulars are to be engrossed in a general agreement on a collection of principles. These should be documented and made contractually binding. The agreement is to become by stages a basis for a world monoply of force subservient not to any national or regional interest but only to a general good—irresistible power harnessed to an all embracing benefit. The nations are to become secure, tame, inoffensive—such in a phrase of the former President in Revelations—being subsumed into a general order and intimidated by a force made irresistible by definition. Disarmed, the structures of particular governments will no longer be divisive of mankind. On a grand scale, one span of community and authority such as imagined to have obtained by the outset of human experience is to be renewed.

Thus the America of tomorrow dream. Yet policymakers are oath-bound to the Constitution and to the more immediate and limited obligations laid upon them by the world as it is rather than as it should be or might be in one’s dreams. Such is the world written of by Leopold Schwartzchild in World in Trance a score of years ago: “Never again can we believe that any new magic can (Concluded on back cover)

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**Humanities**

**Robert B. Heilman**

Petrarch and His World. Morris Bishop. Indiana. $7.50. A learned but fluent, urbane, and imaginative biography, with lively accounts of many individuals and places.

**Men and Masks: A Study of Molière.** Lionel Gossman. Johns Hopkins. $6.50. A superior analysis of the motives and values of Molière's characters, especially of the willfulness, vanity, and power-lust that animate apparently different characters. Gossman demonstrates how Molière anticipates many themes of later literature.

**Richardson's Characters.** Morris Golden. Michigan. $5. Golden argues convincingly that Richardson's fantasies of dominance energized his most effective characters, and that the final reality of his work is the conflict of strong wills.

**André Gide.** Germaine Bré. Rutgers. $6. A critical guide that goes through Gide's works with admirable lucidity and objectivity. Relevant generalizations and biographical allusions enter easily into detailed analyses and enlarge their scope.

**Suppressed Books: A History of the Concealment of Literary Obscenity.** Alec Craig. World. $6. A calm, upbraidless history of personalities, laws, battles, and court decisions, virtually all in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Mr. Craig is interested in methods that will guard against commercial pornography without endangering literature.

**Christina Rossetti.** Lona M. Packer. California. $9. This very ample and interesting biography

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**Social Sciences**

**George N. Shuster**

A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Translated and compiled by Wing-tsit Chan. Princeton. $10. This book is a great improvement over all similar publications, meritorious though some of these are. The scope is broad, extending from Confucius to Philosophy as dispensed in Communist China. Each segment is presented with a brief but satisfactory introduction; and though few of us could qualify as judges of the accuracy of the translations, these are at least lucid and readable. The knowledge thus made available is engrossing. It is now possible to form a realistic impression of the range and depth of Chinese thought.

**Systematic Theology. Volume III.** Paul Tillich. Chicago. $6.95. This long-awaited volume which completes the author's "systematic" presentation contains two parts: Life and the Spirit, and History and the Kingdom of God. Both are ambitious ventures in theological dialectic, and very likely demand of the reader a sympathetic attitude towards Tillich's basic concern, which is man's "significance for the Divine Life and its eternal glory and blessedness." Noteworthy is the grasp and generosity of the author's concern with both Catholic and Protestant thought.

**Aristotle and the Problem of Value.** Whitney J. Oates. Princeton. $8.50. Taking as its point of departure the thought of Paul Elmer More, this searching and clarifying study of the views of Aristotle (and by indirection Plato) on the important problem of Value, may well be the most important historical study in its field to have appeared in a long while.

**Pope, Council and World: The Story of Vatican II.** Robert Blair Kaiser. Macmillan. $4.95. This book by Time's reporter is much more, for better or worse, than a mere chronicle of the events of the reign of Pope John XXIII. Those who share completely that Pope's vision of how the Church could be renewed in the modern world will find it pleasant reading. To others it will probably be a thorn in the flesh.

**The Existential Background of Human Dignity.** Gabriel Marcel. Harvard. $4.50. Creative Fidelity. Gabriel Marcel. Translated by Robert Rosthal. Farrar, Strauss. $5. Two additions to the list of Marcel's books available in English, of which the first, incorporating the text of the William James Lectures of 1961-62, is essentially biographical in character, and while the second, a collection of essays, may also be described as a series of very personal reflections. Taken together they throw much light on the development and character of Marcel's thought.

**The Responsible Self.** H. Richard Niebuhr. Harper & Row. $3.50. This book is unfortunately a torso, owing to the fact that its author died before his project of studying Christian Ethics could be brought to completion. But as "an effort of faith to understand itself" it merits respect for hard and patient thinking on an elusive topic. It is primarily an attempt to define "Responsibility" in several modes.

**Roy F. Nichols**

These reviews enable this compiler to point out that most of them illustrate a growing tendency among scholars to write relatively short interpretive works which distill significant findings from quantities of research and thus make possible a much wider and more careful reading of their work. This tendency if persisted in will enable the historian to communicate his findings to a much
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In Retrospect: The History of a Historian.
Arthur M. Schlesinger. Harcourt, Brace & World. $4.50.

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It is easier to understand history, if one understands historians. One understands historians better, when seeing how they account for themselves.

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These are the first two books in a new series "Critical Periods of History." They are carefully worked out analyses of two complicated incidents that marked the beginnings of significant departures. The first describes the beginning of a new era in politics and the second the onset of civil war. They are complete and well reasoned.


This is a compact and yet remarkably comprehensive history of American constitutional thinking. The varied concepts which have been the hallmarks of our governmental evolution are very neatly expounded as we pass through successive periods of "legislative primacy," "judicial supremacy," and "presidential preponderance."

The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776.

This quest for power the author believes had been the most important issue in the political life of these colonies during the years prior to 1763; furthermore it became the central issue in the struggle for Independence. This account is organized by topics of legislative interest and is based upon a survey of the proliferating sources and secondary material.

**MARSTON BATES**

**THE KEY REPORTER**
opinion polls, when systematically conducted and interpreted, can provide the groundwork for an imaginative, stimulating analysis of ordinary people's knowledge of, and attitude toward government and politics. The survey is based upon carefully selected random samples of about 1,000 adults in each of five countries (United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and non-rural Mexico).

**EEG and Behavior.** Edited by Gilbert H. Glaser. Basic. $12.50. A collection of uncompromisingly technical papers written with electrical and chemical investigations of the brain and their varied implication for science and medicine. Exciting positive and baffling negative results are reported in a manner which must co- 

gently remind scholars in other fields that human behavior is a function not only of environment and society but also of physi- 

ologic processes.

**Beyond the Melting Pot.** Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. M. I. T. and Harvard. $5.95. A thoroughly readable, documented analysis of the economic, political, educational, and cultural status of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish in New York City. Their differences have changed but not melted away: "It is striking that in 1963, almost 50 years after mass immigration from Europe to this country has ended, the ethnic pattern is still so strong."

**The Analyst's Role.** Richard C. Rortiello, David B. Friedman, and Bertram Pollens. Citadel. $3.50. With the aid of many case histories, consider- 

able common sense, and a dash of theory, a challenging defense of the thesis that the orthodox Freudian approach to therapy requires modification: the analyst should accept only those patients whose per- 

sonality traits "dovetail" with his own, and he should play an active rather than a passive role as he diagnoses and assists them.

**Psychiatric Disorder Among the Yoruba.** Alexander H. Leighton, T. Adeoye Lambo, et al. Cornell. $8.75. A pioneering, painstaking, conscientious re- 

ported study of over 400 members of the Yoruba in Western Nigeria by an extremely competent team of psychiatrists and social scientists. Their concepts of West- 

ern psychiatry are adequate in this African society, a sensational finding for theory and practice. The incidence of mental disease among women but not among men is slightly greater in socially disintegrated than in traditional villages.

**The Vital Balance.** Karl Menninger with Martin Mayman and Paul Pruyser. Viking. $10. A non-technical, non-jargonistic, humane presentation of the view that mental disor- 

ders are not distinct entities but fall along a continuum of "dyscontrol" and "dysorganization." Diagnosis and therapy are eclectic, though strongly influenced by Freud. The patient's individuality must be recognized, and he should be treated with love, faith, and hope, three concepts which are removed from the realm of clichés when their oper- 

tional meaning is disclosed. A long appendix provides a fascinating historical outline of the vicissitudes through which psychiatric nomenclature has gone.

**NORMAN J. PADELSON**

Twentieth Century China. O. Edmund Clubb. Columbia. $7.95. A tightly packed political history covering domestic and foreign affairs by one who has traveled widely in the Far East. Stating that Generalissimo Chiang and his followers have no love for the United States save as it may be useful to them and are opposed to a "two China's" solution, the Consul warns that younger men on Formosa may one day "readily find ways of fitting in with the new order of things on the mainland" if indeed this is not already agreed upon. A timely, enlightening study.

**China and the Helping Hand.** Arthur N. Young. Harvard. $10. A scholarly review of China's struggle against Japan, her efforts to fund the war's costs, and the contributions of the United States and other aid by the Financial Ad- 

viser to China from 1929-1947. A valuable commentary on the uses and limitations of foreign aid. In the author's view only a broad cooperative effort along many lines would have saved the Wartime frictions made this virtually impossible.

**The Last Conflagration.** Denis Warner. Macmillan. $5.95. A critical assessment of American efforts to stop the tide of Communism and chaos in Southeast Asia by a well-informed Aus- 

tralian. In his judgment we have focused too much on raising armies instead of living standards. An independent-minded look at one of America's toughest problems.

**Peking and Moscow.** Klaus Mehnert. Putnam. $6.95. The best generally informative book on the background, present configurations and possible future course of Chinese-Russian relations. A calm appraisal of the causes of the split. In the author's opinion it is essen- 

tial to the West's relations with both powers that it not let down its strength or be induced into fruitless encounters. Highly recom- 

mended.

**Also Recommended:**

**Freedom and After.** Tom Mboya. Little, Brown. $5.50. Personal biography; platform for Africa's future.

**The Craft of Intelligence.** Allen Dulles. Harper & Row. $4.95. Discreet comments on how it is done.

**Policy and Power: Two Centuries of Ameri- 

can Foreign Relations.** Ruhl Bartlett. Hill & Wang. $5. A carefully constructed record for the general reader by an expert historian.

**The Southwest Pacific Since 1900: A Modern History.** C. Hartley Grattan. Michigan. $10. A comprehensive, unsurpassed account of the major developments in this region and related to it.

**Israel: Years of Challenge.** David Ben-Gurion. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. $5. An absorbing review of Israel's growth and problems by the former Premier.
OUR NOBLE DREAM

(Continued from page four)
achieve what we ourselves must achieve by hard work. Mankind is not capable of sudden rebirths. There are good reasons for the fact that the millennium has never materialized. Against the eternally lurking jungle, weapons and compulsions are always the only defense and nothing liberates us from the duty of doing the utmost for ourselves. And if the great powers have a common will, everything is well. If not, there is no collectivity, and once again we are thrown back on our resources.

With such a world—not the world of our preferences or our dreams—policy has to come to grips every day. In such a world national purposes are tested, and, as Casandra says in Girardoux's Tiger at the Gates, destiny is "simply the relentless logic of each day we live." In the world as it is, no universal frame of legitimacy prevails. The governments all sincerely avow a preference for peace over war, but the conditions of universal order nevertheless remain obdurately at issue. Governments vie in invoking the concept of community as a matter of habit, while the constituents of community remain unevenly spread—fairly strong between some, indifferent as between others, and almost nonexistent in other instances. Governments feel constrained to deprecate the high level of destructiveness in armaments, and yet constrained also to maintain it because of the lack of mutual trust and divergence on the conditions of legitimacy. Governments and men are habituated to invoke the idea of international authority, but such authority in fact, far from being effective and continuous, is only something occasionally and contingently contrived, issue by issue. In the world as it is, deep disparities among peoples are a fact, and the dour prospect is that success as going concerns may simply be beyond the means and capacities of many societies and beyond reach of any precept or example that others may set for them. I do not suggest a cause for rejoicing. In the immortal words of Jimmy Durante, "dem is da conditions dat prevail."

The Oliver Wendell Holmes Association

(Continued from page one)
way people have behaved in history. A writer and a NASA officer indicated what it means to have Man orbiting in space. Then five United Nations envoys presented the intercontinental riddles of our lifetime, right here on earth.

What happened to the people who exposed themselves to The Institute?

One young lady, a dropout from college with a good job in a bank, said "The two courses on Man and Science revealed to me a universe so rich, which I was in danger of living all of my life without knowing or appreciating, that I am resigning from the bank to go back to college and study!"

The Oliver Wendell Holmes Association may very well establish a new pattern in education, a registered nurse said.

A retired college professor, who registered as a student in the courses, became convinced that he had never enjoyed a classroom in his active years as much as these two months in his "November Years."

A minister said that The Institute would affect the program in his church for a decade to come.

The village itself, together with friends in Albany, Schenectady, and neighboring communities, voted to do it again. And July 6-31, 1964, will bring five other scientists to the second Institute on Man and Science. The course on Man will bring leaders of the theater, philosophy, and political economy to Rensselaerville.

Much of this agreeable experience is related to the fact that the Institute's courses of study were planned for a leisurely pace. There was no pressure for grades. There was no tension to "get results" and to advance one's career. There was a congenial spirit of exchange of ideas, of learning for learning's sake. Without arrogance, it may well have been a first rebirth of a 20th Century Platonic Academy.

This experience has been so rewarding that we now seek to set up more such Institutes. And there have been calls upon us from across the country, from the Virgin Islands clear across to the State of Hawaii.

We of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Association stand ready to do our part.

But these Institutes, in the last analysis, cannot happen of themselves. Nor can we alone, with our extremely limited resources, set them into being. Another "key" must be found and can be at hand for those who feel strongly enough about it and who want to make the effort.

We have put it very simply in an almost rudimentary guide-sheet, from which I give the following excerpt:

The key to the Oliver Wendell Holmes Association's program is a hoped-for relationship between the Association and a local community group that finds our program of merit and is prepared to work with us to apply it, at any one location. We stand ready to cooperate with such a community group: to provide a carefully developed Institute: a program of 'higher learning' studies; and along with that, a qualified, superior faculty.

The group in turn must assume the responsibilities of its own program. In some cases that requires having local leaders agree to underwrite the costs, all or part of which would be repaid out of enrollment fees.

The costs would vary, depending upon the length of the Institute term and number of courses offered, as well as on the transportation costs for the faculty. In general, the operating costs must make provision for the classroom (either in existing civic or public buildings in the area, or, in some cases, in attractive private homes); for the transportation costs of the faculty members; and for a modest honorarium and affordable maintenance; and some allocations for a competent expediter or secretary and his or her minimal office requirements for the contemplated Institute period.

This is in essence the nature of the expected relationship between a local group and our Association.

As I said earlier, the potential of Americans who are retired or about to retire is, as yet, untapped. We of the O.W.H.A. are established to help tap these manifold capacities.