In many respects the Society at William and Mary was like other literary societies in the colleges. It apparently had had two short-lived predecessors at Williamsburg, and certainly it was younger than societies at some Northern colleges. Like the others it had as a principal purpose to provide its members with the opportunity to perfect themselves in writing and speaking, as a supplement to formal instruction and as a preparation for leadership in the life of the state and the nation. But in three respects, even in the brief period of little more than four years, it developed uniqueness. It was highly selective, it was secret, and it initiated a pattern of sister branches within and without the state. Had not the Yale and Harvard charters been made effective in 1780-81, the Society would probably have been forgotten like its predecessors at William and Mary. Had it not set a standard of selection, based however imperfectly on character and scholarship, the present Society might have been little different from the social fraternities and election to it would not have become the nationally recognized hallmark of intellectual promise or distinction. Had it not been for its secrecy and selectivity, its first half century in Northern institutions would not have aroused loyalty, emulation, curiosity, jealousy, and animosity. Without these converging influences and the reactions to them, Phi Beta Kappa would not be what it is today.

The Importance of Secrecy
Secrecy seems to have played a small role, or none at all, in most other college literary societies, but from the beginning it was emphasized in Phi Beta Kappa. The Society’s double name was expunged from the original records, the first group of letters being quickly—and one may say, happily—replaced by the second in usage. The first group of five undergraduates, who immediately associated with themselves four more, bound themselves solemnly on January 5, 1777 by that oath of fidelity on the “Holy Evangelists of Almighty God” to be true to their “growing fraternity” and to preserve its secrets. The secrets, so far as we know, at the moment consisted only of the mysterious letters and the symbolism of the “index” and the stars. The twenty-seven Laws adopted March 1 added nothing to the “Arcana,” but on May 3 two signs were adopted “for the better distinction of the Fraternity between themselves in any foreign country or place.” Finally, a general revision of the Ritual and Laws was ordered on Sept. 4, 1778 and adopted on February 27, 1779.

Significance of Dual Membership
This chronology is important because it bears directly on the question of possible Masonic influence on the Society in its beginnings at William and Mary. . . . The Williamsburg Masonic Lodge was “thriving” by 1773. One of the Foundation Members of Phi Beta Kappa, Thomas Smith, had been a Mason since June 16, 1775, was “raised” to the third degree Dec. 24, 1777, and was the first Clerk of the new Society. Clearly he could have been influential in the adoption of the earliest “forms and ceremonies.” He was chosen President on May 3, 1777, the day the identifying signs were adopted. No members of Phi Beta Kappa were initiated in the Williamsburg Lodge during 1777, but in 1778 initiations into the first degree were these:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 4</td>
<td>Richard Booker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>Hartwell Cocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3</td>
<td>John Morris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12</td>
<td>Samuel Hardy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

William Short was “admitted a member” on November 12; the records do not show for what degree, first, second, or third. Fitzhugh and Cocks were “raised” to the second degree on November 17. Ten members of Phi Beta Kappa were, therefore, Masons when the revised Ritual and Laws were adopted. More significantly, three of the five persons who served on the Committee, John Stuart, Samuel Hardy, and William Short, became Masons while the revision was being considered. The opportunity for Masonic influence upon Ritual and Laws is therefore clear. . . .

Extension of the Society
The most important Masonic influence was that which preserved the life of the Society, the policy of extension. In the Masonic Order itself I understand that there was some confusion and inconsistency of practice, due partly to the rivalry of the York Rite and the Scottish Rite and to the organizing, without specific authority, of “splinter lodges” by Masons who found themselves in a new community which lacked a lodge. I understand that consistency or regularity of practice was not relatively complete until well into the Nineteenth Century, and that the whole matter is still a lively subject of discussion among Masonic historians. However, by the latter part of the
ACROSS THE CULTURAL BARRIER

Edmund S. Glenn

Mr. Glenn is a research scientist working for the Department of State and specializing in problems of cross-cultural communication. He is also a lecturer at the Foreign Service and the Military Assistance Institutes, and a consultant to a number of scientific research organizations. For many years Mr. Glenn was the chief of the interpreting service of the State Department. He has published in the American Anthropologist, Language, Contemporary Psychology, and other journals.

The present article is based on an address at the 1964 Homecoming ceremonies at the Catholic University of America.

Uncertainty is something that man tolerates poorly. In the words of Hadley Cantril, a great American psychologist who has thoroughly studied the question, in order to act we must firmly believe that the ground under us is solid, that there are friends who are true, causes which are just and courses of action which are good. And yet what the world confronts us with are only probabilities, not certainties. Even what we see—or rather what we perceive—is due in part to guesses.

This was established in a series of ingenious experiments by the late Adalbert Ames, Jr. and his co-workers. Here is one of these experiments:

People are made to stand at the door to a room and to look inside. What they see is just that: the inside of a room, rather drab and sparsely furnished, with two windows in the wall facing them. Then two men enter the room and move towards the corners at the opposite end of the wall with the windows. Right in front of the viewers one of them becomes a giant and the other one a midget. Then they change corners, and likewise they change sizes: the midget becomes a giant, and the giant a midget.

The explanation of this phenomenon is as follows: the room is not a room like any other one. It is distorted. Neither the floor nor the ceiling are horizontal. The angles at which the walls join are not right angles. One corner is much farther from the viewers than is the other one: the man standing in this corner is at a considerable distance from the door in which the viewers stand, and his head reaches only half-way to the ceiling; that is why he appears a midget. The man in the other corner is standing quite close and his head touches the ceiling; he gives the impression of being a giant.

Now, why is it that we do not see the distortion of the room? Visual perception begins with traces on the retina. What determines the size of such traces is not the size of the objects from which light reaches the eye, but the aperture of the angles subtended by these objects. The traces produced by a boulder at a distance and that produced by a pebble nearby may be identical; so can be the traces produced by a vertical object and by one of greater size slanting away from the viewer. Thus it was possible to build a distorted room such that the angles subtended by its walls, floor and ceiling are identical with those produced by a “normal” room.

What follows from this explanation is that everything we see is optically ambiguous: the same traces on the retina can be produced by an infinity of different configurations of objects in front of us. Yet we generally perceive no ambiguity when looking. This is because our perceptions are determined not only by the present configurations of objects in front of us, but also by past experience: each item of perception is a best bet, a highly probable explanation of the traces on the retina. Distorted rooms are improbable; verticals, horizontals—and “normal” rooms—are a part of our experience. We see what we expect—and in most cases we see right. We have selected the configuration with the greatest probability, and we have selected it subconsciously.

What, now, is likely to happen in the case of people whose past experience is not in tune with the present probabilities surrounding them? For example to people coming into contact with a culture vastly different from their own?

The following example (which no longer deals with perception proprio motu but rather with a subconscious judgment) may illustrate such situations.

Shortly after the war the U.S. Government brought to this country many European industrial experts, to observe the working of the American economy, and to derive from their observations an inspiration for the rebuilding of their own, war-torn industries. One of the French participants was becoming increasingly more dissatisfied as his tour through American plants progressed. Finally, he exploded: Why are Americans so hypocritical? Why do they preach one thing, and practice another? They preach free enterprise, and yet practically all American industry has been nationalized . . .

Someone asked what had led the visitor to this unexpected conclusion. He was entirely certain of what he was saying, was his reply. He had seen it. Yet even as he spoke, he became less certain. After all how does one see the ownership of a plant? As the conversation continued, he was no longer quite sure how he had learned about the nationalization of American industry, but it was a fact . . . We took great care not to contradict him directly, but to carry on with discreet probing. At last it dawned upon him—and at that time he was beginning to have serious doubts about the entire question—that what he had seen was the American flag flying over every plant: in France it is not customary to fly the flag over privately owned buildings. Therefore . . .

The visitor was an intelligent man. But intelligence seldom governs the subconscious.

Yet, one might ask, shouldn’t he have expected something different? Shouldn’t he have expected that signs which one interprets in one way within one country might call for a different interpretation in another one? All people have such highly sophisticated expectations when going abroad, and few heed them in actual practice. Strange things brings about anxiety, and anxiety brings about stereotyping.

Contact with an alien culture is disquieting; as a result people become poor observers just at the moment when they need to be good ones; they jump at conclusions based upon their earlier experience, just when this earlier experience is less likely to be relevant.

It is not only at the perceptual level that this takes place. The example of a Frenchman in the United States was described
above; let us now take up an example of some Americans in France.

In the early Fifties, an American officer was assigned to a post in a small French town. On the basis of the experience of his predecessors, he was warned to expect loneliness, particularly for his wife: the French did not like Americans, would not make friends, and American ladies in particular could expect to be very isolated.

The officer went to his post, rented a house, and his wife joined him a few weeks later. On arrival at the station, she was met by a delegation of French ladies carrying bouquets of flowers. During their entire stay in the French community, the American couple experienced warm hospitality on the part of the French and made many friends among them.

Why this difference between the experience and the expectation, or rather between the relationships established by this particular American couple and the lack of such relationships in the cases of their predecessors?

It is customary in the American culture that new arrivals in a community are made to feel welcome by the established residents. It is customary in the French culture that new arrivals take the first step and show their desire to become a part of the community. For several tours of duty, the French and the Americans alike waited for the other nationality to follow the only custom each considered "natural", and, since what was natural for one wasn't even thought about by the other, they waited in vain, each becoming more and more certain that it was an object of contempt and dislike on the part of the other. What broke the vicious circle was pure chance: the American officer about whom the story is told was an amateur gardener; seeing his neighbor pottering in the garden across the fence, he walked over and asked about seeds and fertilizer. The Frenchman apparently took this conversation for the overture for which the town had been waiting, and acted accordingly.

How can such misunderstandings be avoided? The main step in the direction of understanding is less a somewhat passive observation of other cultures, than the acquisition of a consciousness of the customs of one's own culture. We do many things of which we are hardly conscious because we assume our patterns of action to be "natural", the only ones possible. In fact, arbitrary or almost arbitrary conventions govern our lives; in many cases these conventions are fully subconscious, to such an extent that thorough scientific research is needed to bring them up to the surface.

As E. T. Hall has shown in his excellent book on The Silent Language, even body postures are full of meaning, and such meanings are as characteristic of different cultures as are the languages they use. For example, there is in each culture something called the usual conversational distance, which almost all observe, but of which almost none are consciously aware. In the American culture, it is about as great as they come, around 21", and Americans often feel crowded by foreigners from cultures where the distance between free-standing people engaging in conversation tends to be smaller. This feeling of being crowded is a vague, undefined discomfort: to dominate it one would need to be aware of what causes it, that is to say of the concept of conversational distance, and of the possibility (implied in the concept itself) of variations in this subconscious convention. Bringing such conventions into consciousness is the first step in overcoming the misunderstandings due to them.

Let us make the situation clearer by going back to the case of the American officer in France. If, instead of doing what comes naturally and expecting some sign of welcome from the French, the Americans concerned had verbalized their own customs, by saying "in America the established residents break the ice," it would have probably occurred to them to complete the paradigm by adding to it the form "possibly, in other countries it is the newcomer who breaks the ice"—this on purely theoretical grounds. Once having gained the awareness of such a possibility, they would have doubtlessly found out without difficulty that it corresponded to the French reality.

A generalization from this example might be as follows: by bringing one's own customs from the subconscious to the conscious, by verbalizing them, one often becomes conscious of their relativity. The description of a custom is open to modifications which suggest the possibility of other customs.

It may be worthwhile to determine the standing of such an operation in logic: it consists in the passage from action to the description of such action, and from the description of one type of action to the description of a paradigm of cognate types of action, or again from object to statement about the object. This amounts to reaching for a higher level of abstraction.

The cross-cultural misunderstandings described so far were relatively minor. Similar types of analysis yield similar types of results when applied to major differences in cultural patterns; this will be illustrated below by cases bearing on culturally preferred patterns of logical inference.

Soviet representatives at international conferences often use the qualifiers "correct" or "incorrect" to describe political positions or proposals, where Western representatives would use words such as "acceptable" or "inacceptable". The expressions used by the Soviet delegates are precisely those which one would use to qualify a student's solution of a problem of mathematics; the expressions used by Western delegates reflect not judgment on the basis of supposedly objective criteria, but the right for a state to accept or reject proposals. Soviet delegates in international bodies speak of the right solution, not preferred solutions: for example, the Soviet, Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegations at the meetings of an advisory committee on housing asked the committee to go on record to say that the right solution for housing problems anywhere was prefabrication; on the contrary, the U.S. delegation argued that the preferred solution for each country depended on local conditions. Many observers (Custine, a hundred years ago, was one of them) have noted that appeals to reasoning or principle have a stronger effect on Russians, while appeals to facts and concrete details tend to impress Americans.

Nor is the "theoretical" or verbal bent confined to Russians. J. P. Giffin found in Latin America a "tendency to feel that the job is finished when written expression has been given to ideals, through the composing of constitutions, party declarations, and statutes, while systematic, determined efforts to translate the verbalized ideals into reality often are wanting." (Social Change in Latin America Today)

What can be opposed to this theoretical bent in the approach to the solution of social problems is the belief or the attitude that these broad questions are not amenable to strict theoretical reasoning, that intuition provides at best preliminary hypotheses, and that what ought to be done can be derived inductively from the consideration of particular cases, individual preferences, and such facts as are provided by concrete experience. This, by and large, is the attitude prevalent among the English speaking nations.

An important point about such cultural preferences for one or another type of logical inference, is that (as in the case of social convention) they are largely subconscious. This is
shown by the following study, which also provides another example of the general tendency towards either the theoretical and the abstract, or the pragmatic and the concrete, which was discussed above.

The minutes of the Security Council of the United Nations are published in English, French, Russian, Spanish and Chinese (even though the texts in the last two languages are not complete). They consist in the original of the speeches delivered in one of these languages, and of their translations in the other four. Needless to say, the translations are carefully prepared and checked for accuracy by both the U.N. Secretariat and the various delegations involved. It may therefore be assumed that such divergences as persist among them represent either linguistic necessities or stylistic preferences irrelevant—or seemingly irrelevant—to the subject-matter of the discussion. They thus represent (if anything) either subconscious preferences as to the "best way" of putting things, or the even more subconscious influences of the language system upon the thought of those who speak it. The question of whether or not these divergencies are in any way meaningful can be partly answered by (a) seeking whether divergencies appear in patterns, and (b) whether the patterns in question parallel in any way other cultural or national traits.

Two such patterns will be mentioned here, both concerning the Russian and the English versions. (1) There are frequent inversions between subject and nominative predicate, in such a way that where the English says "A is Z," the corresponding Russian appears as "Z is A"; (2) there are frequent inversions between what appears in the principal clause and what appears in a subordinate one, particularly where the sentence is such that the subordinate clause may be easily omitted: if A appears in the principal clause in English, Z is likely to appear in the subordinate clause in Russian.

Now, all the A's—the phrases emphasized in English—refer to relatively concrete, particular entities; all of the Z's—the phrases emphasized in Russian—refer to relatively broad and general items.

For example, "the question is now before the Council to decide" (original English), from which the reference to the possibly distant decision of the Council can be easily dropped, while the immediate fact of the procedural situation is emphasized, becomes in Russian the literal equivalent of "the question now standing before the Council, the Council is to decide," from which the immediate fact of the "concrete" procedural situation can be omitted, while the ultimate idea of the Council's responsibility is stressed.

Just as in the earlier example, the English emphasizes the tangible and the immediate, while the Russian stresses the idealational level.

How could one summarize briefly (even at the risk of some oversimplification) the two cultural currents exemplified by the Russians and the Latins on the one side and the English speaking nations on the other? One might say that the first group tends to place its trust in intuitively grasped premises from which it proceeds by deduction, while the other one tends to base its certainties on perceptible particulars from which it proceeds by induction.

This, as it was said above, amounts to different preferences in the area of basic patterns of logic, and is bound to affect some of the most fundamental beliefs people hold about the world in which they live. No wonder that there is conflict in the world!

What aggravates the situation still further is that emotional overtones are hard to avoid. An African leader said once that the greatest difficulty in reaching mutual understanding between Africans and Americans is that the latter consider it self-evident that individualism is good, and that political action ought to favor its development: "For you," said he, "individualism means freedom, for us it means loneliness."

Yet a paradigm of a higher order must be found. There are three reasons for this:

(1) The history of the evolution of knowledge—of science and philosophy—shows that neither an intuitive-deductive nor an empirical-inductive approach is sufficient. Neither can account for the fullness of what we know. In fact, every culture manages some sort of synthesis between the two, and it is only in the confrontations between cultures that their dominant traits emerge, and that the obstinacy with which each holds on to such traits becomes evident.

(2) It is only the derivation of a broader understanding within which each cultural preference can find its place which gives hope for a genuine resolution of conflicts.

(3) The last reason is a personal one— affecting every human person. Man needs certainty, faith, righteousness. He can accept the relativity of some, but not of all of his beliefs. He can admit that some, or even many, of the "oughts" to which he conforms are due to custom or even fashion, but he must believe that some other ones are the expression of absolutely binding moral principles. If he did not believe that, not only would he feel that others have no reason for trusting him; he would also feel incapable of trusting himself. In consequence, the only way for him to accept downgrading in the name

(Please turn to back cover)
in the intermediate future. This will be exploited politically. Unrestricted Chinese nuclear weaponology will pose in the long run very serious problems for American policy and world peace.

Russia After Khrushchev. Robert Conquest. Praeger. $4.95.
Mr. Conquest, a former British Foreign Service officer, believes there are built-in weaknesses and instabilities within the USSR that may yet produce even more startling upsets and changes. Mr. Wolfe, a Rand Corporation officer, concludes that Soviet leadership is still undecided how far to go in detente and communication with the West; how much stress to put on missiles versus armies; how far to press deterrence. Though crises may recur, the author hopes the East-West struggle can be managed without nuclear war. In the Labedz volume a group of authorities assess the likely effects of factionalism, polycentrism, and on-going Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Also Recommended:
The Dimensions of Diplomacy. Edited by A. J. Johnson. Johns Hopkins. $3.95.

MARSTON BATES
This is a collection of lectures and articles, and of testimony given to Congressional Committees, on such topics as the role science should play in our society, governmental support of research and education, education in general and in relation to scientific development, and problems of disarmament. Dr. Wiesner's experience as science advisor to President Kennedy gives him a perspective shared by few scientists, and he is always interesting and thought-provoking.

Dr. Scheinfeld's You and Heredity, published in 1939 and followed by a New You and Heredity in 1950, have been successful popularizations of the complex subject of human genetics. He has now completely rewritten the book, much more than doubling its size, to make an almost encyclopedic survey of the genetic and environmental influences shaping the human animal. He takes up diseases, social and psychological effects, human evolution and races, as well as more conventional genetics. His information appears to be up-to-date and authoritative; it is painlessly and sometimes amusingly presented.

There are many biographies of Darwin, but he remains a puzzling character, with his constant illness, his caution and procrastination contrasting with his great achievements. Huxley and Kettlewell are better equipped to interpret him than almost anyone else, and they have done so in a book lavishly illustrated with appropriate photographs and drawings.

I should think anyone who liked detective stories would like this book—it is full of mysteries and their solutions. It is the history of the development of scientific methods in detective work, from the days of Alphonse Bertillon and his measurements of physique, and William Herschel, who discovered the usefulness of finger prints. A big book, it is written in a swift and easy style, and full of odd bits of interesting information, new to me at least.

Menagerie Manor. Gerald Durrell. Viking. $3.95.
Durrell writes delightfully about his adventures in collecting animals around the world; and now he has written an account of the zoo he established for these animals on the island of Jersey. This book may be of less general interest than his previous ones, but I liked it because I have a small zoo of my own—monkeys, hummingbirds, lizards and the like in my greenhouse—and I can sympathize deeply with the problems. I don't understand how animals get along in nature with no one to look after them.

Miss Carrighar likes animals and has written several successful books about them. Here she reviews the recent work on animal behavior by ethologists like Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, making a very readable synthesis, though tending toward cuteness at times. I particularly liked her chapter on animal play, a subject much neglected by psychologists.

A fascinating book for anyone, whether he is pro- or anti-snake: archeology, mythology, ethnography (who eats snakes), magic and medicine, show business, anatomy and classification, how to treat snake-bite, sociology (27 per cent of 11,960 children named the snake as the animal they disliked most; spiders came next, but they won with less than 10 per cent of the sample). Lavishly illustrated.

In recent years a number of excellent field studies have been made of such primates as baboons, gorillas and chimpanzees, often
with quite unexpected findings which are of great interest because of their possible bearing on the origins of human behavior. The leading students of the subject have here collaborated on an authoritative and readable summary of their work.


This is the second book in a series planned under the general title of "The World Naturalist," the first to be published being an excellent account of The Natural History of Birds by Harold Oldroyd. The plans for the series make it look as though it would be a valuable contribution to our understanding of natural history. In the present volume, Dr. Colbert surveys what we know about the fantastic creatures of the Mesozoic and their puzzling extinction at the end of the period. There are lots of jaw-breaking words, but there is also an abundance of clarifying illustrations.


Two books by Sir Alister Hardy, on plankton and on fish and fisheries, are here bound together to make a readable, authoritative and beautiful introduction to life in the oceans. Even the sea creatures set get permission.

ROY F. NICHOLS

The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type. Christopher Lasch. Basic. $6.95.

American society has been formed by people who were to a great degree activated by discontent and by a desire for improvement. These enterprises have included Puritans, Patriots, Abolitionists, Populists, Progressives and now the "New Radicals." Their motivation has been similar, their methods in many ways identical, and their language and their ideas have been largely determined by the times in which they lived. This is a brilliant discussion of the post-Progressive Era generation which should be required reading for today's intellectuals or those who want to know what they are like.


The Civil War inaugurated a period of inflation which not merely affected the economic life of the people, but more particularly their politics. The principal campaign issues of the remainder of the century were shaped by it. There was a new struggle for power being waged and a new conflict between good and evil. As usual in any contest involving ethics and interest there was much that did not appear on the surface and much work has had to be done to bring it into view.


The politics of the epoch of Jefferson and the Virginia Dynasty despite the so-called simplicity of the good old days was in reality complex. Though political parties in the modern sense had not been organized there was a factionalism based on sections, interests and persons operating in a young society confused by the fact that the world was at war for a quarter of a century. These books throw new light on these matters, much neglected until recently, because so many thought that Henry Adams had said the last word.


American society has been particularly intriguing because its environment and its politics have produced individuals who have made a profession of being attractive. Many of them have made a career out of it, somewhat called influence peddling based upon a capacity for high powered persuasion. Sam Ward was one of these fascinating, complicated characters, about whom as types we know too little and should know more. What is the distinction between a genius and a charlatan?


This career could only have happened in the United States and in the Civil War. It illustrates the indescribable confusion which was a basic cause of that unfortunate war. This book would supply material for an excellent chapter in a book someone should write on Eccentrics in American politics.

Also Recommended:

Meriwether Lewis, Richard H. Dillon. Coward-McCann. $6.95.


LEONARD W. DOOB

Beyond All Reason. Morag Coite. Lippincott. $4.50.

"I lay now quietly on my bed and died;" "I was inside out and upside down;" "I met the devil in a restaurant"—an honest, flattering attempt by a former patient in England to describe and understand such experiences which plagued her during schizophrenic episodes and then to find salvation and sanity for her kind. Anyone failing to recognize similar strains in his own life may well be suffering from a delusion requiring psychiatric attention.


A hit-and-miss-and-run historical account of how intellectuals in the West have been affected by, and have themselves affected their milieu. The theme is so obviously challenging and exciting that the heterogeneity of the semi-intriguing materials and the unevenness of the commentaries and analyses proffered here can and must be graciously overlooked.


Based upon experimentation, empirical investigation, anecdotes, and theorizing, a vividly serious account of how people (mostly Americans) have reacted to hurricanes, a film on subincision in an Australian tribe, fallout shelters, Cuba, Hiroshima, Project Mercury flights, prison camps in Korea and China, the Nazi occupation of Denmark, cancer, and severe cardiac infarction. Men may be hateful and cruel to one another but, under conditions of stress, they can be bravely resilient.


The adduction of unstartling, inciting insights into mankind in general and nursing as a profession obtained by examining fragments of the lives of a dozen nurses in New York City. The book was commissioned for volunteers being interviewed for five rather orthodox psychoanalytic, one-hour sessions and to submit to a battery of psychological tests. These non-patients who unobtrusively and alone cope with their personal problems are separated from patients who seek psychiatric assistance by a line that is almost invisible but incredibly and, yes, mysteriously significant.


By means of self-confessed "oversimplification, overgeneralization, and the propounding of value-laden statements", a fact-filled, rousing defense of the thesis that developing countries can achieve nationhood and economic growth without becoming authoritarian. Would it not be miraculous if any of us could actually decide and then inform policy-makers whether such a proposition is the expression of mere ecnootism or a valid summary of social-science and historical research?

Ancient African Kingdoms. Margaret Shinnie. St. Martin's Press. $4.95. A gentle, non-'controversial,' sagacious account of the city states in Africa which emerged, before European penetration, as early as the 20th century B.C. (Kush) and as late as the 19th century A.D. (Borns). A full account of very restricted data consisting of archaeological artifacts, preserved documents, and oral tradition (accompanied by excellent, intriguing photographs and drawings) may certainly be envied by behavioral scientists who, collecting almost unrestricted data in the present, dare not collate their own findings so succinctly and clearly.


A psychiatrist's declaration that the alleged characteristic differences between the sexes are inevitable and hence produce correspondingly different ways of perceiving, comprehending, and coping with the familial, physical, and metaphysical aspects of living. Evidence emerges largely from subjective, ingenuous dissections of prominent men (e.g. Descartes, Goethe, Sartre) and their mothers and wives. Obviously the hoary theme itself must be reviewed again and again by anyone who has ever had or been a parent or who has ever loved or been loved—and this particular review is saluted because it is so highly stimulating and exasperating.
Rome and Reunion. Frederick C. Grant. Oxford. $5.

A sympathetic Anglican view of the Second Vatican Council and a realistic appraisal of the problem of Reunion. Professor Grant writes with a zest and originality which only a cultivated scholar can bring to the discussion of such topics. The book is one of the very best commentaries on the Council.


Written for the general reader, this account of the "life, times and works" of a first century historian is a fascinating exercise in the art of making the fruits of learning available to many. Quotations are deftly woven into the text.


Though this is a book of revised lectures, it is unified by what for English readers at least is a novel theme. Professor Kristeller reviews succinctly the thought of well-known figures—Petrarch, Pico and Bruno—as well as that of others who are relatively obscure. The result is a clearer view of the role of philosophy in the Renaissance.


Among the interpid Jesuits who strove to regain Britain for the Church of Rome none was a more arresting figure than Garnet. This is a carefully documented but readable biography based on expert knowledge of the period and on all available sources of information about Garnet himself.

The Latter-Day Saints in the Modern Day. William J. Whalen. John Day. $5.95.

This readable, somewhat journalistic account of Mormonism as it was and is discusses with reasonable objectivity such matters as the doctrine and practice of polygamy, the Mormon ethical code, and the relationship between the rites of the Temple and those of Masonry.

The Arts of the Beautiful. Etienne Gilson. Scribner's. $3.95.

Professor Gilson's delightful little book out-


A reprint of Mr. Bentley's 1948 selections from this astringent and unavoidable organ of British critical opinion.


This well-conceived book deals with D. G. Rossetti, Swinburne, Pater, Wilde, Lionel Johnson, and Symons.


Six essays on literature, originally delivered as radio talks for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

A Natural Perspective: The Development of Shakespearean Comedy and Romance. Northrop Frye. Columbia. $3.75.

A revision of the Bampton Lectures, delivered at Columbia University in November, 1963. Considers the comedies "as a single group unified by recurring images and structural devices."


Hesse's novel dates from 1919, Mann's introduction from 1947. The present publication represents part of a concerted effort to place Hesse more fully before an American audience.


The first full-length study of Hesse in English.


Intended to provide "a series of critical studies in depth of the main movement of English poetry between Pope and Keats." Contains a selected bibliography of Professor Pottle's scholarly writings.

The Common Pursuit. F. R. Leavis. New situations; but the most interesting sections are those that set forth Friedenberg's own observations and preoccupations. One can take issue with certain of his formulations—I myself have difficulty with his persistent tendency to overvalue adolescent pretentiousness and proletarian self-consciousness—but there is no denying the incisiveness of his commentary.

Children and Politics. Fred I. Greenstein. Yale. $5.

How do children feel about political authority? How do they come by their political information? What is the content of their political learning? Professor Greenstein asks these and other questions, using as subjects 659 children between the ages of nine and thirteen in the New Haven, Connecticut, schools. Paraphrasing Lasswell, Greenstein states the problem of future research as "Who learns what from whom under what circumstances with what effect?"


One out of every five American dollars in technical aid is now being channeled into educational programs. Yet, our knowledge about the precise role of education in facilitating social and economic development is grossly inadequate. The papers that constitute these volumes represent the efforts of "area specialists" in the social sciences to develop the accurate information and systematic theory on which effective policy must be based.

They Closed Their Schools. Bob Smith. North Carolina. $5.95.

Integration at Ole Miss. Russell H. Barrett. Quadrangle. $4.95.

Two engrossing accounts of educational change in the old South. The first, by a former Nieman Fellow, reports the crisis occasioned by the decision to close the public schools of Prince Edward County, Virginia, in 1939. The second, by a professor of political science at the University of Mississippi, reports the crisis surrounding the admission of James Meredith in 1962. Barrett, incidentally, was Meredith's major...
Eighteenth Century Grand Lodges were being set up with state jurisdiction and authority to grant charters to junior or inferior lodges within the state. The Grand Lodge of Virginia was organized on October 13, 1778. A pattern, then, was forming of which the Masonic members of the new Society at William and Mary would have been aware.

The plan came before the meeting of the Society on May 8, 1779, and preparatory action was taken... On June 12, a draft of the proposed Charter Party was presented, and after several meetings for consideration and amendment it was adopted on July 5. Additional amendments were made on July 11 and December 4. On this latter date charters were formally voted for branches at Harvard and Yale...

From this... examination of evidence it should be clear that though the central character of Phi Beta Kappa at William and Mary was the conventional one of a college literary society, its history was shaped importantly by Masonic influence. It was under Masonic influence that other "meetings" were authorized. And it was also under the influence of the developing pattern of Masonic Grand Lodges having jurisdiction within a State that the original Φίλοι and Ζητητα for Harvard and Yale became Αλφάδες, with authority to establish in their respective States Junior or Inferior Branches.

---

Across the Cultural Barrier

(Continued from page four)

of cultural relativity some of his national idiosyncrasies, is to replace them by universally human truths.

The way for telling the contingent from the necessary, the intra-cultural from the pan-human, is (again) the search for a perspective within which the self appears no more important than the other and for verbalizations which make one see one's own customs as forms of a paradigm which includes also the customs of others.

Such a statement sounds very abstract and divorced from life; let us, therefore, illustrate it by an example.

A number of years ago a meeting was arranged to bring together a group of American college professors on their way to India, where they were to teach in Indian universities, and a group of professors returning to the United States from similar assignments. The purpose was to enable the new group to take advantage of the experience of their predecessors.

The great difficulty, said the returnees, was to gain the respect of Indian students. Indian intellectuals are used to taking positions of principle, rigidly and dogmatically, and defend them against all comers. In comparison with this attitude, the open-minded, undogmatic, searching approach of the American social scientists appeared to them wishy-washy and uninteresting. Students didn't know where they were going, easily lost interest, and ultimately respect.

A suggestion was made: the professors should begin their courses by stating, forcefully and dogmatically, their position of principle: to eschew all dogma, to keep an open mind, to avoid rigidity and look at all the facts before reaching any conclusion.

It worked every time. The letters from the new group teaching in India were enthusiastic; the problem had been solved.

This story, when told to Americans, invariably elicits laughter. It all seems such a trick! Yet if one looks at it more closely, one discovers its seriousness: what the new group of American professors did was to state explicitly their concern with truth, a principle by which they had been implicitly guided all their lives.

Verbalization, as it has been pointed out, is often all that is needed.