ASSOCIATION PROGRAMS

Phi Beta Kappa alumni associations have reported a year of varied and increased activity during 1971-1972. The associations, some fifty in number in different parts of the country, sponsor programs which support and encourage the scholarly and humanistic traditions of the liberal arts.

The Phi Beta Kappa Graduates in New York and the Phi Beta Kappa Alumni in New York joined in the successful emergency campaign to avert the financial crisis which threatened to close the 42nd Street New York Public Library. One of the world's great research facilities, the Library, contrary to popular belief, is "public" in making its services available free to all who depend almost entirely on private contributions. By canvassing their memberships, both associations enrolled a substantial number of Friends of the Library and raised several thousand dollars for its support. Two members of the Society, Richard W. Couper, president of the Library, and historian Barbara Tuchman were among the prime movers in the drive to save the institution.

Other associations have continued their long-established programs of honoring outstanding high school students in their area. The Detroit Association held its twenty-fourth honors convocation in May at which 1130 high school seniors with grade point averages of at least 3.7, attending 101 public and parochial schools, received awards.

Associations also provide scholarships for high ranking college students on both the undergraduate and graduate levels.

The Northern California Association has for many years provided several scholarships to Phi Beta Kappa members needing assistance as they pursued graduate studies. The Southern California Association has an international scholarship program which provides grants to foreign students studying for advanced degrees at universities in Southern California.

Programs at association meetings have increasingly reflected concern with cur-

(continued on back cover)

1972 SIBLEY FELLOWSHIP AWARD

Margaret Charlotte Ward, a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University, is the winner of the 1972 Mary Isabel Sibley Fellowship. The $6,000 award was given this year in the field of French Language and Literature. Miss Ward's doctoral dissertation will be a stylistic analysis of the medieval French lyric. In her study she will apply the newer structuralist linguistic approaches and will emphasize the significance of the vernacular language taken on its own terms. A student not only of Old French but of several other medieval languages, Miss Ward hopes to trace the influence of Celtic sources on the French lyric. It is by means of such comparative studies, she feels, that the place of medieval literature in early Western European tradition can best be understood.

Miss Ward received her B.A. from Wellesley College and her M.A. from Harvard. She will spend her year as a Sibley Fellow at the "Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisation Médiévale," in Poitiers where she has already studied last summer. She has also studied at the University of Zurich. In addition to tutoring in French and German, her language skills have enabled her to work as a teacher on the Blackfoot Indian Reservation, as the supervisor of a French children's camp and as a State Department intern on the Moroccan desk.

Miss Ward is the twenty-fourth woman to receive the Mary Isabel Sibley Fellowship. It was established with funds bequeathed to Phi Beta Kappa in the will of Miss Isabelle Stone and is named in honor of her mother. The terms of the bequest state that the fellowship is to be awarded in alternate years in two fields: Greek language, literature, history and archaeology and French language and literature. Through skillful management of the principal, the size of the annual stipend has risen from $1500 to $6000.

A survey has recently been made of past holders of the Sibley fellowship. Most have continued to follow careers in college teaching and research, rising in academic rank and publishing a wide range of scholarly articles and books. Next year, for the first time, a fellowship alumna, Professor Helen North of the Classics Department of Swarthmore College, will serve on the selection committee.

The award for 1973 will be offered for Greek studies. Candidates must be unmarried women between 25 and 35 years of age who hold the doctorate or who have fulfilled all the requirements for the doctorate except the dissertation. They must be planning to devote full-time work to research during the fellowship year which begins September 1, 1973. Further information and application forms may be obtained by writing to the Mary Isabel Fellowship Committee, Phi Beta Kappa, 1811 Q Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

Serving on this year's Award Committee were Professor Bernard Weinberg of the Department of Romance Languages and Literature of the University of Chicago, as Chairman; Richard McKeon, Professor of Greek and Philosophy at the University of Chicago; and Professor Robert Champigny of the Department of French and Italian at Indiana University.
Most people accept as true the sentence with which Aristotle begins his Metaphysics: “All men by nature desire to know.” What is not so readily accepted is the fact that “knowledge” is not a univocal concept and that our human ways of knowing, as well as the kinds of knowledge that result from them, may be deceptively multiple and various.

Specifically I should like to raise the question of whether what is loosely and generally referred to as “the humanities” may not constitute a way of knowing which is not only distinct from but superior to that kind of knowledge which is so often assumed to be no less than the very paradigm of knowledge, that is science. What I shall do is attempt to bring into focus a type of knowledge that is distinctively and decisively humanistic, as contrasted with the all-too-familiar sort of knowledge associated with modern science and technology.

First, though, just what are the humanities? I propose to take the term “humanities” to refer to three primary disciplines: history, literature, and philosophy.

With respect to history, my view is that one does not study history to acquire any mere parcel of names and dates, or even of economic forces and cultural changes, but rather, as Sir Henry Savile wrote in the preface to his translation of Tacitus in 1591, because “there is no learning so proper for the direction of the life of man as Historie.” It is no less than in and through the study of history that we are able to learn what it is to be human and what the true values in life are, what we are to live for and how we must conduct ourselves, if we are to achieve that distinctive excellence that fits us as human beings. In short, what is here being suggested is that the humanistic and, if you will, the humanizing, knowledge that comes from history is a moral or ethical knowledge. For as Bolingbroke once remarked—admittedly not an authority distinguished for his own morality, but still one worth listening to—“history is philosophy teaching by examples how to conduct ourselves in all the situations of private and public life.”

Nor is that all. For what is further implicit in what is here being claimed for that humanistic and moral knowledge that comes from history is that it is indeed a knowledge. The judgments upon human folly and human wisdom which, as historians, or even as mere students of history, we pass on the characters and events of history—these judgments are not just our own arbitrary personal assessments which we bring to the facts, as it were, from the outside, and which are but our way of adorning or dressing up the facts. No, they are judgments that are determined by the facts themselves.

So much, then, for history. But what about literature? Surely, everyone would concede to literature a place, if not actually pride of place, among the humanities. Still, can literature be reckoned among the humanities on anything like the same grounds as history? Can we be said that literature—poetry, the novel, plays, screenplays, etc.—represents a significant humanistic discipline for the very reason that the study of literature yields not just a knowledge of man and of the human condition and situation, but also a knowledge which, by that very fact, is normative and ethical with respect to human excellence and to what men ought to do and be? Surely, the answer must be “Yes.” Is not a novelist like Kafka trying in The Castle or The Trial to bring home to us in a haunting way just what our human situation is like? And yet, mutatis mutandis, is not Jane Austen trying to do much the same thing, to expose through the touch of her irony the pride, for instance, of some and the prejudice of others? Or what about Jonathan Swift? Is it possible to read Gulliver’s Travels or A Modest Proposal without recognizing that what is being laid bare for all to see is nothing less than human folly and human hypocrisy, our own no less than all men’s.

We must of course guard against a misunderstanding that may arise in connection with our thesis. No one any longer believes—if any one ever did—that the study of literature, is but a way and means of ethical or moral instruction, as if the purpose of all literature were a purely didactic one. This is patiently wrong-headed. Literary excellence, one may want to argue, is not a matter of philosophical or ethical truth, but of aesthetics: a poem may be something quite autonomous, and estimable solely for the aesthetic pleasure that it gives, it being quite irrelevant what the poem says, or even whether it says anything, not to mention whether what it says is true, and particularly whether what it says is true ethically.

Rather than attempt to argue the substantive issue, we shall say that in so far as we are seeking a rationale of the humanities that will serve to justify them both educationally and culturally, we will reckon literature to be among the humanistic disciplines only to the extent that it is such literature as does represent a moral judgment upon experience, quite apart from such other values and character as it may have. Granting that history and literature are to be regarded as staple articles in the humanities, just because of the ethical significance which they have for us as men, unfortunately that significance seems anything but univocal. Rather it is more like a confusion worse confounded. Clearly, the ethical import of Macbeth is radically, if not totally, different from that of Joyce’s Ulysses. And as for historians, we need but cite Macaulay’s—or to make it rather more contemporary, Mr. Trevor-Roper’s—testimony as to what would constitute the “full flowering of a rich and noble humanity” to realize how different would be the view of some other historian such as Clarendon.

To such criticism, the obvious answer is that the resources of history and literature are not enough; that philosophy is required as well. The peculiar business of philosophy and more especially of that branch of philosophy known as ethics, is precisely to determine, as over against the seemingly endless variety of conceptions of the good life and of how as human beings we ought to live, just which conception is the true one.

Since Aristotle, philosophers of ethics have sought to determine the Supreme Good since this knowledge is of “great practical importance for the conduct of life.”

Now whether Aristotle was right or not in his final judgment that the Supreme Good for man is to be associated with the life of contemplation, at least his judgment represented no arbitrary choice or decision, but rather a deliberate conclusion arrived at only after the most careful argument and consideration of evidence. His conclusion can only be rejected in the light of still further evidence and argument, thereby confirming the fact that ethics is indeed an affair of knowledge, being in this respect at least not unlike the sciences, where it is recognized as a matter of course that conclusions can be considered as first established, and then later as having been superseded, on no other basis than that of proper and sufficient evidence.

To apply this principle to our contemporary situation I might cite a recent article in The Sunday New York Times Book

Professor Veatch is a member of the philosophy department of Northwestern University. This article is based on a talk he delivered before the chapter at Marquette University.
Review, entitled "Poetry in the Sixties — Long Live Blake! Down with Donne." The choice suggested between Donne and Blake is no mere choice between rival conceptions of prosody and poetic diction, but rather a choice between two quite radically different life-styles.

The choice is ultimately an ethical choice. Indeed, the reviewer makes the point that those earlier poets whose model was Donne were under the spell of the New Critics. But this spell, he says, was thoroughly shattered by Alan Ginsberg. And "Ginsberg's original contribution," the reviewer observes, "was a note of hysteria that hit the taste of the young exactly. He spoke for the spiritually disenfranchised numbers of wretched young people from middle-class homes, who had grown up after World War II — weeds of an affluent society. They flocked to his readings; they had found someone who spoke aloud for them; more than this someone who gave them a way to live — ragged and bearded — without feeling ashamed, and even with pride. Hemingway created the lifestyle of the Lost Generation; Ginsberg created that of the Beat."

So it is, that a choice between poets is no less than an ethical choice, a choice between lives. Moreover, if such a choice is not to be blind and arbitrary, it had better be made in the light of something like a genuine ethical knowledge and understanding, just such knowledge that the true humanist aims at, and that the humanities as a pedagogical and scholarly discipline are intended to convey.

However, one might say, it is all very well to invoke philosophy, and more particularly ethics, as the only proper means of adjudicating between the incredibly multifarious and conflicting ways of life that are disclosed in human history and heralded in human poetry and song. But can philosophy, acquire itself of such a function? Is there such a thing as a science of ethics that would enable us to make a reasoned and intelligent determination as between ways of life, much as, say, the sciences of medicine and engineering enable us to decide between the right way and the wrong way of treating various diseases, or the right way and the wrong way of building bridges and highways?

I suggest that this most persistent and deep-seated challenge to the very possibility of a humanistic type of knowledge of the kind we have been urging derives its force not from any direct criticism of such knowledge, but rather from the cliché that such humanistic knowledge is not at all scientific knowledge as we understand the term, plus the highly suspect inference that since humanistic knowledge is not scientific, it is not a legitimate type of knowledge at all.

It will be illuminating to contrast humanistic and scientific knowledge in action, so to speak, with reference to a test case which may check this inveterate and uncritical tendency of ours to write off humanistic knowledge altogether, as if it were not properly knowledge at all when compared with that one finds in the sciences. The test case that I would propose has to do with the common employment in the humanities of so-called philosophical or literary classics. It will hardly be disputed that the traditional and even continuing way of studying either literature or philosophy is in terms of what people have generally called classics, even though these are no longer the classics of Greece and Rome. It is hard to imagine even the most up-to-the-minute contemporary philosopher who does not spend a great portion of his time and effort over the texts of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, or Bergmann. And why? Because the philosopher in question is convinced that the text he is studying is in some sense or other a truly classic one, — that is, one that stands out from others just in virtue of the decisive excellence that it is presumed to have.

Or again, suppose that in a course in contemporary literature the instructor assigns something of Alan Ginsberg, or Susan Sonntag, or Eldridge Cleaver. The instructor's choice of authors is guided by considerations of the superior excellence of the writers selected — perhaps not excellence absolutely, but excellence of a certain kind and in a certain genre. It is evident that the authors selected, by the very fact that they have been chosen, are being treated as classics, whether the actual term be used or no.

Contrast, though, the sciences. Would it be wrong to say that in the sciences there just aren't any classics at all — or at least not any that we might call operative classics? To be sure, it is easy to point to any number of great works in science that have been literally epoch-making in the history of science — Newton's Principia, Darwin's Origin of the Species, Einstein's special and general theory of relativity. Even though such works have been incomparably decisive in the development of science, can it really be said that they have ever been used and studied by scientists in the manner of classics? How many contemporary physicists, for example, have read and proceeded to reread and even to return time and again to the texts of Einstein's papers on relativity in the way in which, say, almost every young philosopher in the present-day analytic tradition finds himself going back again and again to Wittgenstein's Tractatus or to his Investigations?

Now this is not to deny that it has become increasingly fashionable in recent years to take the history of science more seriously. Many scientists of the highest reputations have done a great deal toward making not only scientists themselves, but even the general public, much more conscious of the history of science, and of the startling revolutionary achievements of the great men of science.

All the same, has this new-found interest in the history of science had any marked effect upon the actual discipline and practice of science? Does the ordinary chemist or biologist or geologist or physicist feel that a first-hand acquaintance with the work of Avogadro, or of Mendel, or of Lyall, or of Galileo is absolutely essential to his proficiency and the fruitfulness of his work in his particular scientific discipline? In other words, an interest in scientific classics and in the history of science generally is not an interest that is proper and pertinent to science as such, but rather, like any other interest, in history, is a humanistic interest: it bears fruit in a deepened and broader understanding of man and of man's characteristic human achievements; but it contributes nothing, at least not directly, to the advancement of science itself.

Why, though, — and here our main question returns to plague us — why is there this difference between the science and the humanities, in that the pursuit of the one would appear almost invariably to involve a study of classics, whereas to the other, classics are a matter of comparative, if not of complete, indifference? In answer to this question, we shall hazard an explanation in terms of a contrast between humanistic knowledge and scientific knowledge which, I am afraid, is far from being the currently fashionable one, or even one that many have heard of, and which yet may prove ultimately to be the only sound and defensible one.

First, then, as to humanistic knowledge, we assume in literary no less than in philosophical works, the concern of the author is to "tell it like it is." That is to say, a poet such as Alan Ginsberg, no less than a Dante or Sophocles, is a man with something to say, and what he has to say has to do with the truth about ourselves as human beings and our human predicament. Not only that, but the poet, and to a lesser degree perhaps the philosopher too, does not merely wish to tell it as it is, but also to move us to respond to that truth appropriately.
As students of the humanities, we acknowledge ourselves to be but men who want to know and understand what the score is, and what we can expect in the way of a life on earth, as well as how we can make some sense of our lives and avoid making utter fools or knaves of ourselves. We turn then for instruction to just those works that we have been calling classics — that is to say to those men who as writers have "told it like it is" and whose words have the ring of truth.

It is painfully obvious that no set of classics, however chosen, ever speaks with but a single voice or purveys a single truth. Thus if Blake no less than Donne, or George Herbert no less than Aristotle, are all equally classics, how can one possibly say that through classics, and only through classics, do we come to know the truth? Is it not the case instead that many truths, rather than the truth, and many truths diametrically opposed and even contradictory to one another. — in other words, downright errors no less than truths — these are what are mediated by any study of classics, whatever such classics may be and however chosen?

Humanistic knowledge cannot be attained merely by swallowing key truths in formulas and capsules. There is no way of either coming to know or continuing to know what the truth is about reality and about ourselves, without at the same time becoming ever more sensitive to and understanding of the ways of error as well.

Why would there seem to be nothing quite comparable to this in science? Why is it that scientific knowledge is apparently indifferent to such things as might be called classics, whereas humanistic knowledge finds its only proper nourishment and sustenance directly in the classics? We shall no longer accept as a truism that the reason science has no truck with classics is because science is concerned only with objective facts, whereas the humanities are concerned rather with our subjective human responses to the facts and with the literary and artistic embellishments that these entail. Our thesis is, if anything, just the opposite: it is precisely because science is not really concerned with knowing the nature of things, or the way things are, that it finds itself indifferent to anything on the order of classics, whose sole justification for being classics is just that they do open our eyes to the truth and to what is our true human predicament, set down as we are in the midst of things and encompassed by a reality that is not of our own making.

If such a thesis sounds utterly paradoxical, even fantastic, let us qualify it a bit by conceding that, no doubt historically, science has not been so indifferent to achieving knowledge of the real, as it would now appear to have become. Not only that, but we concede that many practising scientists are not aware of the radically non-realistic orientation that their discipline has come to have, and hence may think of themselves in their role as scientists as being concerned simply with trying to observe and to describe the facts as they are. Yet when one considers the distinctive character of the modern scientific enterprise, as this has been brought into focus by recent philosophers of science, then one begins to see that the real thrust of the scientific enterprise is not aimed at anything like a knowledge of reality or the nature of things at all. Oversimplifying somewhat, one might say that there are at least two dominant features or factors that have been operative in the methodology of science that have made this result inevitable, — one is what might be called the nature of scientific data; and the other the nature of scientific hypotheses, theories and explanation generally.

First, as to the data. Surely all of us, nonscientists no less than scientists, know that although the entire fabric of science is erected on the data of observation and experiment, such data as they function in science are hardly the data of our ordinary experience. Rather they are those bare, but presumably public and reproducible data such as pointer-readings, impressions on a photographic plate, etc. In this sense what may be considered to be given to the scientists as data are not all at all the things of our everyday experience — tables and chairs, men and mice, night and day, winter and summer, sunlight and clouds: rather the only properly acceptable data of the scientist are more like those bare sense data which the philosophers of 25 years or so ago were wont to make so much of — momentary patches of color, of sounds, of odors, of tastes, etc.

What's more, these properly scientific data prove to be singularly uninformative, particularly when it comes to anything suggestive of ordered patterns or causal laws in terms of which the things and events in nature could possibly be made intelligible. Ever since Hume it has become something of a truism that no causal connections can ever be observed to hold between the data of sense: and as for inductive inferences from such data, these just don't seem to have any properly logical warrant of any kind.

What, then, has been the result of this seeming frustration in any and all efforts to find meaning or intelligibility in the data of experience, or at least in such data of experience as the scientist may properly accept? The answer is to be found in the fact that a factor of the modern scientific situation which we mentioned above, the factor of scientific hypotheses and theories. For in effect what the scientists have tended to do is that, not being able to find meaning or intelligibility in the actual facts and data of science, they have, as it were, fabricated and imposed a kind of intelligibility upon the data from the outside in the form of scientific theories and hypotheses. Thus Sir Karl Popper, the distinguished contemporary philosopher and logician of science, quotes with favor and even with some furbishing of the text on his own part, a well-known passage from the Preface to the second edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason:

When Galileo let his balls roll down an inclined plane with a gravity which he had chosen himself; when Toricelli caused the air to sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a column of water of known height: . . . then a light dawned upon all natural philosophers. They learnt that our reason can understand only what it creates according to its own design: that we must compel Nature to answer our questions, rather than clinging to Nature's apron string and allow her to guide us. For purely accidental observations, made without any plan having been thought out in advance, cannot be connected by a . . . law — which is what reason is searching for.

Moreover, the very logic of this conception of the nature of scientific theories and hypotheses, and of the objectives they serve tends to have consequences that far outrun anything that either Kant or Popper would seem to have realized. For if a scientific hypothesis be not in any way derived from the facts or data of observation, then even supposing such a hypothesis to have been pretty well corroborated and borne out by empirical test and experiment, it can scarcely be concluded from this that the hypothesis is to be regarded as properly an account or description or reflection of the facts or of the way in which things are. It simply provides a convenient and useful ordering device with respect to the manifold sensory data — an ordering device, be it logical or linguistic or mathematical, which the human mind or the mind of the scientist devises for the purpose helping him get about, as it were, among the data, associating them one with another, making predictions from certain ones to others, and thus putting them to various calculable uses. As C. I. Lewis, a perceptive philosopher of a generation ago, very tellingly put it, a scientific hypothesis is really but an intel-

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reading recommended by the book committee

humanities

GUY A. CARDWELL, RICHARD HARTER FOGLE, ROBERT B. HEILMAN, FREDERICK I. CROSSON, LEONARD W. DOOR, FREDERICK B. ARTZ, LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN, E. W. COUNT, ANDREW GYORGY, ANDREAS M. KAZAMIAS, LOUIS C. HUNTER, RICHARD BEALE DAVIS

J. T. BALDWIN, JR., KIRTLIEY F. MATHER

GUY A. CARDWELL


These valuable books are less superficially encyclopedic and more rigorous than are the works that ordinarily have been relied on as introductions to their subjects.

The Olmec World. Ignacio Bernal. Translated by Doris Heyden and Fernando Horcasitas. California. $12.50.


Bernal's is the first full, authoritative treatment in English of the earliest great civilization of Mexico; illustrated. The von Winning and Feder volumes are primarily lavish Bilderbücher. Von Winning's text is minimal, but the notes on plates are good. Feder, who was curator for the great Whitney exhibition of Indian art last winter, supplies adequate textual matter.


This monumental, handsomely produced collection of letters presents the lives and minds of members of a plantation family, 1854-1868.


The Singleton Inferno is masterful in all respects. The bilingual Valéry is one of what will be a series of fifteen volumes, a splendidly ambitious project in translation. The bilingual Perse will be indispensable for most readers. All of these books are convenient to use and are impeccably produced.


Pierre. Herman Melville. Editors as above. Historical Note by Leon Howard and Hershel Parker. Northwestern-Newberry. $15. $3.50.

The total body of Melville's writings will appear in fifteen volumes. Texts are established in accordance with strict bibliographical principles.


The writer by necessity draws upon physical artifacts and official papers for his interesting, quantitatively oriented analysis of family life during the first two generations at Plymouth.


"Baroque" is on the way to becoming as standard a term for identifying a period as is "Renaissance." This skillful comparative study discusses themes, genres, topics, and authors.


The events that brought France into something like its present territorial being are well and readily analysed here. This is one of ten proposed popular volumes by scholarly authors on great events and personalities in history.


Among the excellent essayists included in this anthology are Elizabeth Bowen, Anthony Powell, Francis Steegmuller, and Pamela Hansford Johnson. Delightfully illustrated. Proust is well served.


Glazer has made a useful collection of all Kafka's shorter fiction. The handsome picture book about Kafka and his city provides, incidentally, an informative text.

Also recommended:


social sciences

The Singleton's is a monumental, lavishly illustrated, lavishly produced collection of letters, but all of these books are inconvenient to use and are not adequately produced.

natural sciences

Lawrence H. Chamberlain


Bricolage is the art of making do with the tools at hand. The term, as employed here, deals with the U.S. Supreme Court's use, in constitutional interpretation, of traditional legal concepts which are no longer relevant under existing social and political conditions. The work is at once an illuminating exposition of present operating realities in such areas as civil rights, inequality, new forms of dissent or protest, and an incisive critique of judicial efforts to fashion modern equipment equal to the new demands of society.


As the title suggests, this symposium is concerned with the contemporary vitality and viability of our political and legal institutions. To those disadvantaged, to the young and disillusioned, to those who have become disilluisioned by the abuses or inequities of our system, the utility of such traditional concepts as law and order is now subject to challenge. The essays in this volume range from pedantry and rarefied abstractions to vibrant, iconoclastic realism; the quality and clarity of writing also varies. The composite is rewarding.


The author's premise is that the politics of the seventies will be not a projection but rather a rejection of traditional themes, which he presents in a previously unexplored case upon his conviction that the middle class of our political spectrum—the stabilizing element because of its own persistent stability—is in the process of disintegration and that the already discernible fissures will break wide open. He notes the close parallel between the Hoover era and two previous periods—the tendency in both instances to assume that old attitudes and practices are adequate to meet all needs.

The Case for Participatory Democracy. C. George Benello and Dimitrios Roussopoulos. Grossman. $15.

For those who have wondered about the positive or operational aspect of the New Left or Radical Left—as distinguished from its negative (oppositional) posture—this symposium will be illuminating. The concept of participatory democracy is certainly not new, but it acquires expanded dimensions and enhanced relevance in the new context: some of the tactics of the exponents of radical democracy become more comprehensible.


President Hoover's administration, now forty years behind us, has not received the attention it deserves. Its achievements have been over-shadowed by its failures. Professor Schwartz has drawn upon the rich and steadily growing body of memoirs to provide a detailed account of Hoover's uneasy relations with Congress. Not surprisingly enough, he fared as well if not better when the Democrats gained control than he had when both houses were Republican.

SUMMER, 1972
Over the past thirty-five years (since 1937) American political scientists have reserved some of their sharpest criticism for the General Accounting Office and its head, the Comptroller-General. For an up-to-date, balanced, and informative treatment of a subject that deserves but does not often receive dispassionate analysis, this book is recommended.


Civil disobedience, a term that brings to mind such names as Thoreau, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, is subjected to careful, sympathetic examination by a professor of philosophy. The treatment is detailed, technical, though not pedantic. In an era where dissent is endemic and frequently violent, this analysis, which is actually a primer for non-violent protesters, performs a useful function.

The Oppenheimer Hearing. John Major. Stein & Day. $8.95.

J. Robert Oppenheimer died in February, 1967 without regaining the security clearance denied him in December, 1953. This account of the hearings of the Atomic Energy Commission and the events preceding and following those hearings is set forth in detail with exhaustive documentation. The author, an English historian, though clearly sympathetic to Oppenheimer, presents a balanced report of this confusing episode.

FREDERICK B. ARTZ


Now the definitive work on Savonarola.


A penetrating study.


LOUIS C. HUNTER


Elmer Sperry: Inventor and Engineer. Thomas Parke Hughes. Johns Hopkins. $15. The American Business Corporation: New Perspectives on Profit and Purpose. Edited by E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Herbert C. Morton and G. Neal Ryland. M.I.T. $10. The two biographies are major contributions to the literature of business history. If, as asserted, the corporation is to the 20th century what the church of Rome was to the Middle Ages, then Pierre S. du Pont, in effect founder of Du Pont as a vast chemical combine and promoter of General Motors, ranks high among the priesthood. Less well known is Sperry who with his extraordinary inventive talents combined with managerial and promotional skills bridged the gap between Edison and the electronic age; splendidly illustrated.

The volume on the American Business Corporation, a synopsis of some twenty authors representing academic, professional, and managerial outlooks, is rather heavily weighted on the side of those who see business enterprise as a benign and beneficent institution: "Profit has become a measure . . . but it is no more the end."


A summary and largely descriptive account of an economic system more admired than emulated. With their bid for imperial grandeur three centuries in the past, the Swedes can dedicate their energies to less illusory goals.

The Automobile Industry Since 1945. Lawrence J. White. Harvard. $12. The American Automobile: A Brief History. John B. Rae. Chicago. $2.95. An economist and an historian take a not too jaundiced look at the axis of our way of life, one which reinforces, we are editorially informed, "the characteristic tendencies of American civilization."

The Post-Industrial Prophets: Interpretations of Technology. William Kuhns. Weiright & Talley. $6.95. An excellent introduction to such leading figures in the interpretation and evaluation of technology, ecology and communications, as Mumford and Ellul, Wiener and Fuller, Innis and McLuhan.


Focusing on the city with its varied and complex institutions, the eleven young scholars, political and other social scientists and products of the East Asian Institutes which have sprung up on every side during the past two decades, present an extraordinarily detailed and passionate view of a vast society in course of surprisingly orderly and non-violent upheaval. To a generation of Americans, reared in the Anglo-Judaic tradition and officially dedicated to counter-revolution, here is food for thought not too readily digested.

To those who have placed their hopes upon the processes of democratic change, largely on the political level, in India, Frankel's careful first-hand study provides no great cheer. Western technology has again triumphed and the spectre of famine has been exercised by the now demonstrated rootless of the high yield varieties of food plants. But the results, as some observers earlier anticipated, have been to exacerbate rather than to ameliorate social tensions. This study tends to confirm what many has feared: the vast majority of India's rural masses — small farmers, tenants, share-croppers and landless laborers — are virtually excluded by technical and capital requirements from participation in the benefits of the new agriculture. In the absence of effective preventive action on a massive scale, a vast dispossession of people from the land is in prospect with the cities quite incapable of cushioning the shock. Here, as in the case of rising unrest and polarization and of political radicalization as the condition of the landless, actual and prospective, deteriorates.

Also recommended:


The Necessary Majority: Middle America and the Urban Crisis. Robert C. Wood. Columbia. $5.95.


KIRTYLE F. MATHER


The Limits to Growth. Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens III. Universe Books. p. $2.75. Alike only in that each is directed toward the delineation and correction of conditions and trends inimical to a long and pleasant future for mankind as an inhabitant of the earth. Each deals with the obdurate questions: what should our guidelines be as we plan ahead?

First is a symposium, introduced by the senior editor, consisting of 23 discussions, originally commissioned by Radio Free Europe and based on unscripted interviews. In it the art of dialogue and disputation comes to rich fruition. Among the discussants are such eminent intellectuals as Arnold Toynbee, Werner Heiseberg, Louis Armand, Dennis Gabor, Herbert Kahn, and Gunnar Randers.

Second is an encyclopedic tome comprising the record of the conference on ecological aspects of international development convened by The Conservation Foundation and Washington University's Center for the Biology of Natural Systems and held in Arlie House, Washington, D.C. in December 1968. Most of the 50 case studies included here involve grave ecological mistakes, seriously
upsetting the complex natural systems of the regions into which modern technology was intruded. Obviously, better guidelines are needed.

The third book strongly recommends a basic principal whereby planning for the future may be made more realistic: recognize and accept the limits to growth, stop equating growth and progress. It is the first account for general readership of “Phase One of the Project on the Predicament of Mankind,” conducted by an international team under the leadership of researchers in System Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for The Club of Rome, an informal international organization growing out of a meeting held in the Accademia dei Lincei in Rome in April 1968. This well-documented, succinct and perceptive report leads one to expect that The Club of Rome will have an admirably constructive influence upon man’s adjustment to his environment.

The New Prometheus. Robert S. de Ropp, Delacorte/Seymour Lawrence. $7.95.

A fascinating critique of the creative and destructive forces in modern science, the men responsible for unleashing those forces and how they did so, as well as an appraisal of the probable or possible consequences of their having done so. The forces so brilliantly described range the whole way from subatomic energy to those involved in techniques for making fundamental changes in human personality. You will not agree with every detail of the author’s judgments, but such a book would not be worth reading were it not controversial.


A competent, detailed survey of the practical benefits accruing or about to accrue for earth dwellers from the vast expenditures in space research and exploration. Much interesting information is presented to substantiate the claim that the American taxpayer is actually getting a good return from the tax dollars thus invested.


A highly commendable anthology of 39 well-selected excerpts from scientific literature, assembled under four headings — “The Beginnings of American Science, The Nineteenth Century, The Early Twentieth Century: Prestige and Morality, and The Middle of the Twentieth Century: Big Science” — each with a worthy introduction by the editor, as well as bibliographical and other notes pertaining to the particular articles. It is an unusually significant contribution to the history of science and a rich source of information concerning many of the problems that have confronted scientists in America during the last 300 years.


According to Fred Hoyle’s Foreword, “Invisible Astronomy” is a good designation for the “third phase” of astronomical research (the second phase is astrophysics) and its dawn pressges a new major stream of astronomical development that may lead to an understanding of the evolution of galaxies comparable to our present understanding of the evolution of stars. This lucid book will serve admirably to introduce the layman not only to radio astronomy but also to cosmic ray and particle astrophysics and ultra-short-wave astronomy.

The Night Country. Loren Eiseley. Scribner’s. $7.95.

Once again, in his inimitable style, Loren Eiseley has given us a collection of reflective essays, some of them autobiographical, some of them whimsical fantasies, all of them fascinating and thought-provoking.

EARL W. COUNT


Late Professor of Anthropology at Frankfurt, once Director of the Basel Ethnological Museum, the author was a short-lived and high-minded scholar. This is his post-humous legacy: an intelligible and simple outline of the culture history from the islands’ archaeology, and a statement of the distinctive though blended cultures from their vital art-pieces in numerous museums. The book as such strives to do them, not a minimally-tolerable justice, but an optimally-feasible credit, and there is a happy magnificence.


A life’s experience and writing of the Eskimo are summed up. They are set amid Nature’s most drastic dictates anywhere to man — where wresting food and warmth demands unremitting vigilance and genius, where the codes between person and person must be no less direct and realistic; and, where the universe lies beyond a forlorn touchability yet must be touched, perforce ritual and myth step in. The self-effacing author, no less of stature than others of his kind whom he appreciates and consults at need, also reconstructs the Eskimos’ provenance from their archaeology. His tale is as strait-limed as the world he has known, and in its way quite as cogent. Appended is a (posthumous) essay by Diamond Jenness, on the Eskimos’ present “hour of crisis.”


Three southern Bantu, one Hamito-Semitic cultures searching to restate their identities against a world of values and anti-values far more inchoate than their ancient traditions had ever conceived. The “pagan” Bantu experienced missionary training; the Amhara are hoarily, aberrantly “Christian”; each has its own story of European armies and politics. To “modernize” for enrichment — or for a bastard? or for both? Drama and Novel are literary innovations, imitative at first in every way, but bumbling farther; poetry, no new thing, explores new form and content; myth themes may persist, reinterpreted, and they accept exotic grafts. There is understandable immaturity, and much gifted promise, but disheartening roads ahead. Occasionally a genuinely great opus is thrown up; for instance, the Xhosa Mofolo’s Chaka. The author is Professor of Comparative Literature at Liège; his essay becomes him.

(continued on back cover)

SUMMER, 1972
BOOK REVIEWS (continued)

A well-documented ethnography, from the days of their strength in the 16th century to the days of their disintegration, which is the present.

Indian Man: The Life of Oliver LaFarge. D'Arcy McNickle. Indiana. $7.95.
A remarkable and worthy man, and a remarkable account; for the author, a Flathead Indian and anthropologist, writes of an effective and dedicated white friend of the Indian.

The RgVedic "soma" is a tenacious enigma; here at least is evidence, widely rooted, uniquely well researched, that it was the inebriating though non-alcoholic decoction from the (dried?) northern Eurasian fly-agaric, familiar to the folk of that domain. The author speaks with botanic authority; he enlists a critical review of explorers' and anthropologists' accounts, and linguistic-literary evidences from the Indic and Iranian. Colored and black-and-white illustrations.

Cities of Vesuvius: Pompeii and Herculanum. Michael Grant; photographs Werner Forman. Macmillan. $10.00.
By all odds, these are the world's most famed and most tragic "ghost towns." Here is the history of their spectacular annihilation, of the mountain that still is not to be trusted; of the life and times dug forth so far. The photographs (some colored), the many floor-plans, the maps are treasurable; the writer a master of his trade.

We could imagine Sister Inez of the Benedictines, a veteran anthropologist interested particularly in the life of the child within the family, sitting and saying these things to a circle of us, far into the night.

WHY THE HUMANITIES (continued from page 4)

lectual or "conceptual go-cart" that enables the scientists to "get over the intervals" between the sensory data.

If scientific theories are no longer to be regarded as sources and means through which we as men can come to a better understanding of the nature of things, if as theories they are not even supposed to disclose the truth about things, but only what might be called the truth of our human predictions, manipulations, and devices for the control of nature, then it is little wonder that scientific treatises in which theories of this sort are presented and expounded can hardly function in the manner of classics. For the excellence of theories so conceived is not to be gauged by their approximation to the truth, or by the insights which they offer into the nature of reality, but only by what we might call in the crude sense their pragmatic consequences. Consequently, once a theory comes along that works better than its predecessor, then that predecessor, so far from being able to attain the status of a classic, can hope for no better fate than death and discard. Indeed, if theories or explanations in science are to be respected, not for their being testimonies to human understanding and insight into the nature of the real, but simply for their being testimonies to human inventiveness and ingenuity, then it stands to reason that it will be only the latest and the most ingenious invention that will count, all others being but so many outmoded devices that no longer work. As such, they may be either simply consigned to the dust heap, or else treated as mere museum pieces in the history of science, but of no further use whatever in science itself.

Returning to the Aristotelian theme with which we begun: "All men by nature desire to know" — may we not now add, "Yes, but it makes all the difference just what sorts and varieties of knowledge it is that men desire." For if they want to know what the score is, or what their true condition as human beings is, or what they as men can and ought to do about it, then let them turn not to science but to the humanities — and if not to the humanities as they presently are in their somewhat fallen state, then to the humanities as they properly ought to be, that is as those particular disciplines whose responsibility it is to mediate a knowledge of things as they are, and of the things that matter most, and, one is tempted to add, a knowledge that is no less than knowledge of good and evil.

ASSOCIATION PROGRAMS (continued from page 1)

temporary educational and civic problems. Associations as well as chapters may participate in the Phi Beta Kappa Associates Lectureship. The Lectureship maintains a roster of outstanding speakers, available through the Washington office for speaking engagements at such special occasions as honors convocations and annual membership dinners.

Lists of the 1972-73 speakers will be sent in the fall to the secretaries of all Phi Beta Kappa groups, and all requests must be channeled. Requests for engagements should then be directed to the Lectureship Committee, 1811 Q Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.