Posters displayed throughout the campus announced the coming visit of Jeremy Kagan, at age 27 Phi Beta Kappa's youngest Visiting Scholar, and one of nine Scholars lecturing throughout the U.S. during the 1972-73 academic year. "The Phi Beta Kappa chapter at Trinity College proudly presents a preview of The Love Song of Charles Faberman, a feature film by Jeremy Paul Kagan — Thursday, March 29, 10:00 A.M., O'Connor Auditorium — Mr. Kagan will be present for discussion after the film."

In the seventeen-year history of the Visiting Scholar Program, the panel members have represented various fields in the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences, but 1972-73 included the first Visiting Scholar in filmmaking, and introduced to the campus a novel public lecture, the preview of a just completed feature film. During the past year, the Visiting Scholars made 85 campus visits, taking with them their expertise, as well as a combination of qualities — genuine enthusiasm about their fields, a vital interest in undergraduate students, and the ability to communicate with the general student body as well as the specialist.

Months before the two-day visits begin, a network of communication is set up between the local Phi Beta Kappa chapters, the co-sponsoring departments, the national office, and the Scholars. This planning effort has yielded a variety of schedules, all carefully worked out to make the best use of the Scholars' time on each individual campus, and all emphasizing the importance of an arrangement whereby the visitor spends most of his time with students and faculty informally and in classes. The last week of the Visiting Scholar engagements this spring will find the Scholars participating in a variety of activities: Huston Smith will examine the coming world civilization with students from The College of Wooster; a seminar will be held at Wheaton College with Leo Marx discussing "Apocalyptic America: Moby Dick as Prophecy;" at the University of North Dakota Wheeler North will give a public lecture on underwater forests and man; and Jeremy Kagan will take a look at the aesthetic and cultural qualities of American celluloid and where they are heading with University of Florida radio and television students.

These last engagements bring to a close the 1972-73 campus visits and open the way for a preview of the 1973-1974 Visiting Scholar panel:

MARIE BORROFF, poet and literary scholar, has been at Yale University since 1959. She is editor of the Twentieth Century Views volume of criticism of Wallace Stevens, and author of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: A New Verse Translation.

JOHN C. ECCLES is Distinguished Professor of Physiology and Biophysics at SUNY at Buffalo. In 1963 Sir John was awarded a Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine for his discoveries of the nature of excitatory and inhibitory synaptic action on nerve cells.

KENNETH G. ELZINGA, associate professor of economics at the University of Virginia, will be a Fellow in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago during 1973-74. In 1970-71 he was economic advisor to the head of the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department.

RENEE C. FOX is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and recipient of the E. Harris Harbison Gifted Teaching Award. She is chairman of the department of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, and also professor of sociology in the departments of psychiatry and medicine.

JAMES L. GIBBS, JR., is dean of undergraduate studies and professor of anthropology at Stanford University. He has been a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and a recipient of the Danforth Foundation's Harbison Prize for Gifted Teaching.

RUTH BADER GINSBURG, professor of law at Columbia University, is coordinator of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project and is on the board of directors of the National...
THE NEW INTEGRITY
by Walter Kaufmann

IN OUR TIME one concept of integrity is being replaced by another. This development is at the heart of the contemporary revolution in morality. The old idea was closely linked to justice, while the new integrity involves autonomy. (Autonomy consists in making with one’s eyes open to objections and alternatives, the decisions that give shape to one’s life).

What is at stake is not merely one virtue. One can have courage and yet be a monster. But it is generally felt that a person who has integrity cannot be immoral, and that whoever is moral cannot lack integrity. Integrity is taken for the whole of morality or, as the Greeks put it, the sum of the virtues.

The Greeks also called this sum of the virtues “justice.” Now that justice is dying, a new concept of integrity is emerging. It also claims to be all of morality. Actually, what passes for integrity today is a confused and callow notion that cannot be considered on a par with the classical conceptions of the ancient Greeks and Hebrews. It makes more sense to treat this messy and brash brat like Shaw’s Eliza; she needs cleaning up and must be taught some manners.

What I call the new integrity may be seen as the goal of some recent developments, but I do not believe in it — or in anything else — because I take it to be the wave of the future. . . .

The crux of the current crisis in morality is that integrity is no longer associated with the just man and an integrated, harmonious personality. This old conception is giving way, and now our first association with integrity is honesty. Intellectual integrity is a synonym of intellectual honesty. A “just man” is a mild archaism or a Hebraism, but it is no longer uncommon to call a man honest by way of suggesting not a particular virtue but the sum of the virtues.

An “honest woman” is an idiom that suggests an altogether different context, but actually it illustrates the same development. What is meant is not that she never lies but rather that she had lost her virtue and her moral reputation, and that by marrying her some man has restored these priceless possessions to her and “made an honest woman of her.” The moral judgments implicit in this usage are archaic, but “honest” is here used in the sense of “virtuous.”

When Abraham Lincoln is called “Honest Abe,” what is meant is not that he could never tell a lie (that was George Washington) but that he was what Plato and the prophets would have called a just man. Thus honesty is now often considered the sum of the virtues, as justice was formerly.

What is meant by honest? Let us distinguish three different conceptions of honesty. The first two use the name of honesty in vain.

The classical American misconception of honesty is that the word is a synonym of sincerity. What is at stake is not merely the misuse of a word but the overestimation of sincerity. While sincerity is preferable to insincerity, it comes nowhere near being the sum of the virtues; it is not even a cardinal virtue. Small children tell all sorts of charming falsehoods with sincerity and might be said to be this side of the distinction between honesty and dishonesty. Many clergymen and politicians proclaim falsehoods with sincerity and might be said to have low standards of honesty; they believe what they say while they are saying it, but only a little while earlier they knew that it was false, and questioned a few hours later they no longer insist that it is true. They cultivate the gentle art of mouthing falsehoods with conviction.

The typically modern misconception of honesty consists of confounding honesty with frankness. This makes honesty even easier to attain. One tells people what one things of them and assumes that extreme rudeness is proof of moral superiority. Both these misconceptions are extremely popular because they place virtue within the reach of all. Even if one is extremely partial to frankness, one has to admit that this misunderstanding is born in part of the desire for instant virtue; what is wanted is moral superiority without any fuss or trouble.

True honesty, like courage, admits of degrees. Manicheans use the ploy of asking, are you calling me a coward? Or a liar? And they assume that if their critic hesitates to do that, it follows that they are courageous, or honest. They presuppose that one is either honest or a liar, either courageous or a cowardice or courage in either case. The liar corresponds to liars; these terms are applicable only in extreme cases. We may act more courageously on one occasion and less courageously on another, without having merited the epithet of cowardice or courage in either case. The liar corresponds to the coward, and “honesty” should be used like “courage” to designate a high standard.

What is involved in honesty — or high standards of honesty — is apparent as soon as we reflect on the case of the person who says frankly and sincerely what he himself knew to be false only a little while earlier. Or consider a person who says what in fact he has never known to be false, although it is false and he himself would know this if only he had taken a little more trouble. Neither of these two people has high standards of honesty. Why not? High standards of honesty mean that one has a conscience about what one says and what one believes. They mean that one takes some trouble to determine what speaks for and against a view, what the alternatives are, what speaks for and against each, and what alternatives are preferable on these grounds.

This is the heart of rationality, the essence of scientific method, and the meaning of intellectual integrity. I shall call it the canon. We have seen what speaks against some alternative conceptions of honesty. Now let us consider some objections to this conception.

It may seem that a canon cannot properly be called a virtue. How can “the essence of scientific method” be presented as an explication of honesty? This objection can be met. The canon takes the form of a series of imperatives. These imperatives define the essence of scientific method. But the practice of a method can become a habit or, as people sometimes put it, speaking rather loosely, it can become “instinctive.” And virtues are habits. They can be acquired and developed by practice.

Confronted with a proposition, view, belief, hypothesis, conviction — one’s own or another person’s — those with high standards of honesty apply the canon, which commands us to ask seven questions: (1) What does this mean? (2) What speaks for and (3) against it? (4) What alternatives are available? (5) What speaks for and (6) against each? And (7) what alternatives are most plausible in the light of these considerations?

Walter Kaufmann, professor of philosophy at Princeton University, was a 1971-1972 PBK Visiting Scholar. This article is excerpted from Chapter Seven of Without Guilt and Justice: From Decidophobia to Autonomy published April 1973 by Peter H. Wyden, Inc.
Now it may be objected that doing all this is rather difficult. But has it ever been a condition of virtue that it required no great exertion? On the contrary, next, it may be said that all this is not only difficult but in many cases quite impossible and at other times out of all proportion to the significance of the issue at hand. This is a serious objection and requires an important qualification of the conception presented so far.

** * * *

Honesty does not entail pedantry. A pedant devotes so much time and energy to trivial matters that he lacks sufficient time and energy to investigate the questions that bear on the most fateful decisions. . .

Honesty entails a sense of proportion, in two ways. First, the pedant is not really a paragon of honesty. He deceives himself. He prides himself on his scruples in small matters, but he shuts his eyes when it comes to big decisions. A person with high standards of honesty will ask such questions as these: What is the meaning and what are the implications of this issue and that? What speaks for giving so much time to this one that I shall lack the time for that one?

Second, honesty requires us to proportion the firmness of our beliefs and claims to the evidence. When he holds a view without having given much thought to the pros and cons and to alternatives, an honest person realizes how tenuous his position is. Whoever has high standards of honesty will not say that he knows something, or even that he believes it strongly, unless he has looked into the matter and found good grounds for his views, and unless he has also considered objections and alternatives. Failing that, he will either suspend judgment or admit to himself and, if the occasion arises, to others that his belief is tenuous. . .

Those who live up to these criteria exemplify intellectual integrity. But what I shall call the new integrity requires one additional quality. For one could apply the canon scrupulously, but only on the intellectual level. One might not put into practice what one believes. One might say: This alternative stands up under scrutiny, and that one does not: nevertheless I shall act in accordance with the view that does not stand up. Those who have the new integrity have intellectual integrity and also live in accordance with it. Thus practice is integrated with theory.

The consideration of alternatives is crucial but often neglected. Those who comply with this part of the canon have to do what even a great many scholars would rather not do: spell out what speaks against rival views. It is pleasanter to cite other scholars by way of paying homage to their acute insights. But the new integrity requires us to be clear about the defects of significant alternatives.

Obviously, the new integrity goes beyond any ordinary conception of honesty. Even when honesty is not confused with sincerity or frankness, it is compatible with the admission that one did not take any pains to investigate a question and therefore does not know the answer. A person can possess high standards of honesty but very little self-confidence, courage, or humility. (Humility is the fusion of ambition and humility, which I consider a cardinal virtue, along with courage, love, and honesty.) He may be lazy and reluctant to exert himself. But what I call the new integrity involves not only high standards of honesty but also enough courage and humility to apply the canon to the most important questions facing us. Thus the new integrity involves autonomy, but the two are not identical because autonomy would be compatible with lying. . .

It will be noted that I do not consider honesty the sum of the virtues, but only one of four cardinal virtues. Those who do not have high standards of honesty and never give much thought to the seven questions of the canon may be very decent people for all that. They may be courageous in many ways, help others unselfishly, and never cheat anyone. This point is hard to get across because so many people assume vaguely, but falsely, that honesty or integrity is the whole of virtue. Hence people may admit regretfully that they are not very courageous and that after all few people are. But if you suggest that their standards of honesty are not very high, or that they leave something to be desired as far as the new integrity is concerned, they may never forgive you.

Yet the new integrity is not the whole of virtue; nor is autonomy. The desire for only one cardinal virtue is the desire for a panacea. As long as there are several cardinal virtues, they may occasionally come into conflict with each other. Thus a teacher in a totalitarian state may be pulled in one direction by his regard for honesty, in another by his love for his family.

Love is exceedingly corruptible and often does the devil's bidding. Love has no scruples about tempting us to be dishonest, less courageous, less humble — even to be cowardly and to lie. Yet if we renounced love for that reason, clinging to the three virtues that on the whole are mutually compatible, we should have to condone a cruel lack of concern for others.

Autonomy is not a panacea that saves us from conflicts and hard choices. On the contrary, autonomy consists of considering alternatives and objections to our preferences. Yet an autonomous person might lack love. Any claim that all who are rational and use the canon would end up with the same code — mine would be moral rationalism. Love is compatible with rationality, but it is not entailed by rationality. Of course, we can stack the cards and load our definition of rationality. That is the essence of the moral rationalist's strategy. Thus one can claim that rationality entails an impartial concern for all human beings, and that all partiality to ourselves is therefore irrational. To anyone brought up on the ethics of Kant, that may actually sound plausible. Of course, he did not speak of love in this connection but of the categorical imperative, and those who follow him in our time speak of justice. Either way, the concept of rationality is loaded illicitly.

Those who apply the canon do not have to come to the conclusion that we ought to act in accordance with an equal concern for all human beings; nor need they conclude that all partiality to ourselves is irrational. They might actually conclude that it is impossible to act in accordance with an equal concern for all human beings, and that it is quite rational to give some priority to one's children, spouse, parents, friends, or pupils — and even to oneself. I have to see to it that I get some sleep; I cannot be equally concerned that everybody else does.

Nor is it clear why we should feel, or act in accordance with, equal concern for all human beings. Why should we be so partial to the human race? If we do not believe that God created man in his own image and that man is more like God than like any other animal, this partiality to man becomes questionable. Kant tried to find a basis for it in man's rationality, but again it is far from clear why reason should require us to feel an equal concern for all rational creatures, but no comparable concern for those not so gifted. If we encountered beings from another planet, could reason really tell us whether we owed them as much concern as we owed our fellow men, or more, or less? Can reason tell us where the cut-off point...
should be, regarding those who do not act according to the

canon, or regarding idiots, infants, or embryos? Equal con-
cern for all beings is clearly quite impossible. In short, we

must make choices, and reason cannot tell us what we ought
to choose.

My view is that the adoption of love as a cardinal virtue is
tenable, but not required by reason; that a social conscience
is desirable though not entailed by rationality; and that, in
brief, autonomy is not enough . . .

Most existentialists' exhortations to resoluteness and com-
mitment extol integrity in the classical sense. By choosing
with your whole heart you are supposed to become integrated.
Your life crystallizes around a project and becomes whole —
even if the price you pay should be the new integrity.

Typically, it is assumed that because reason alone cannot
prove that we should choose this project rather than that,
reason is irrelevant when it comes to fateful decisions. Once
that is granted, the way is clear for one or another of the
strategies of decidophobia (the fear of fateful decisions);
one may choose a religion or a movement, for example. But
what reason and the new integrity can do is crucial: safe-
guard us against decisions and commitments that anyone who
asked the seven questions would not make.

When we apply the canon to alternatives, we consider not
only logical consistency but also what speaks for and against
each, and we evaluate the probable consequences of this de-
cision and that. The moral irrationalist, on the other hand,
chooses one alternative resolutely, without even asking how
it is likely to affect various people, and he feels no need to
examine with some care objections and significant alternatives.

An illustration may help. Suppose you consult a doctor, and
his reasons and the evidence cannot establish conclusively
what is the cause of your ailment. Imagine that he frankly
admitted this and then offered to flip a coin or to pluck the
petals of a daisy: to cut or not to cut, to cut or not to cut . . .
This would be a paradigm of irresponsibility. What you would
expect him to do is to invoke the canon. Then the most plausi-
bility hypothesis — or one of the most plausible — would be
chosen tentatively, not with the dogged conviction that, once
we have chosen it, we have to stick with it, as if that were
the essence of integrity.

The deciophobia objects: But there is not time for all this:
such investigations might take years, and by that time the
patient, if not the doctor, will be dead. Of course, it would
be irresponsible to ignore the consequences, and to keep
thinking up new possibilities without any regard for the time
factor. But even if there is very little time, a responsible doctor
will not pluck the petals of a flower or assure the patient that
the most important factor is that the doctor who makes the
decision is sincere or resolute. He is responsible insofar as he
applies the canon as much as time permits; and what speaks
against some laboratory tests and some other medical proce-
dures is precisely that there is not time enough.

Suppose the case were quite dramatic, and the question were
whether to amputate a leg. It might not be necessary, but if
we waited until we could be absolutely sure of that, the pa-
tient might well be past saving. The responsible procedure
would still be to run as many tests as time permits, to weigh
the pros and cons to the limits of one's ability, and then to
act (let us assume, to cut) as skillfully as possible, without
the bad faith that, because the die is cast, one must feel cer-
tain that one has elected the right course. If the surgeon finds
out in midoperation that it was unnecessary to cut, he obvi-
ously should neither insist that it really was necessary nor

throw up his hands in despair and let the patient die. All he
can do at that point is to minimize the damage.

Responsibility is not accompanied by any warrant that every-
thing will turn out well. If it does not, all we have is the
small comfort that at least we have acted responsibly, with
integrity. To make matters worse, irresponsible actions some-
times succeed. But that success is no proof of integrity, that
the wicked often flourish, and that disaster does not prove a
lack of integrity, was known to the Psalmists and the author
of Job.

Given a large sample and a long period of time, respon-
sibility succeeds much more often than irresponsibility. That
is why we want physicians to act responsibly. That is why
scientists and engineers are trained to check and double-check
their hunches. It is no different in politics. Occasionally,
reckless gambles will succeed, but those who continue to place
their trust in them generally come to grief before long; and
the great statesmen of the past have been thoughtful men
who weighed alternatives with care. That includes great revo-
lutionaries like Lenin, who studied and wrote books about
philosophy. Marx spent most of his later years at work in the
library of the British Museum. He felt strongly that it was
not enough to interpret the world; he wanted to change it.
But the more important the changes are that one would like
to bring about, the more indispensable becomes the canon.

Irrationalists may argue that this rational approach was used
by some of Lyndon Johnson's best-known advisers on Viet-
am policy — with disastrous results. But the advisers' stun-
ning lack of moral judgment stemmed from their Manichean
faith that "the free world" represented decency and humanity,
no matter what means it employed, while "the enemy" repre-
sented the foes of freedom and was therefore beyond the pale
and worthy of the torments of hell. So firm was this faith
that one did not give sufficient weight to what spoke against
the policies one favored, and the President's insistence on
"consensus" compounded this failure. It is not enough to
appoint one man the devil's (!) advocate, as Johnson did,
and then to go through the ritual of having him offer objec-
tions before the predetermined "consensus" is implemented.
This procedure was very different from the method that I
advocate, and it invited wishful thinking.

The classical conception of integrity was compatible with con-
formity. Some of its greatest proponents actually believed
that it entailed or presupposed conformity, for example, Plato
and Hegel. The new integrity is incompatible with conformity.
. . . Those who live by the canon reap alienation, and their
nonconformity is resented . . .

One might suppose that there is at least one kind of community
in which the new integrity is a way of life and in which the
canon is so widely accepted that it constitutes a glorious coun-
terexample: the academic community, or at least professors
if not students. This is not the place to document timidity, con-
formity, intolerance, and the lack of high standards of honesty
in academia. Woe unto the man or woman who does not
belong to the right school of thought! Nor would it be profit-
able to use professorial book reviews as an illustration, for
that subject is so vast that we should be distracted from our
central concern here. But consider meetings of committees,
academic departments, the faculty as a whole, or meetings
that are attended by large numbers of students, too. A con-
siderable amount of courage is required to raise objections or
suggest alternatives that others plainly do not want to hear,
and it is extraordinary how often that which is not gladly
heard remains unspoken. Some professors, of course, are
luminous examples of integrity — as are some lawyers, writers.

(continued on back cover)
ROBERT B. HEILMAN
Has dignity, vitality, variety. A 50-page glossary of proper names.

Argues convincingly for the baroque as a "period" existing between, and distinguishable from, Renaissance and Neoclassicism. A scrupulous new edition that remedies the omissions and other defects of its predecessors. Witty, warm, worldly in experience but firm in sense of propriety. Fanny Burney, who knew everyone, comments vividly on a broad social scene.

Beginning a scrupulous new edition that remedies the omissions and other defects of its predecessors. Witty, warm, worldly in experience but firm in sense of propriety. Fanny Burney, who knew everyone, comments vividly on a broad social scene.

A welcome paperback reprint of the 1947 authoritative work on science fiction from the 17th century to World War II.

Painter and poet never met but corresponded on many subjects with spontaneity, liveliness, and self-revelation occasionally intimate. Excellent editing.

Carlyle and Dickens. Michael Goldberg. Georgia. $10.
Goldberg makes a thorough study of the relationship in all its aspects. Gold's "radical moralist" sees the human heart, not social structure, as the source of evil, and applies a hard-nosed Christianity that makes self-knowledge prerequisite to a genuine charity-bleness. Georgia does a good job of production, Minnesota a poor one.

A brief biographical sketch and a perceptive essay on the strange reversals and contradictions in this youthful exponent of the Gothic imagination in its Satanic phase.

Biographical and historical materials support a more critical essay. Balanced, sensible, authoritative.

War-time experiences of the first commissioned short-story-writer in the R.A.F., and some observations on post-war years as a versatile fictionist.

LEONARD W. DOOB
The Coming of Age. Simone de Beauvoir. Putnam's. $10.
A truly encyclopedic account of what we know or think we know about the aged and the most diverse ways in which they have been treated historically and in various societies. The writer's ax is hurled at us for not recognizing and respecting a status we cannot avoid unless we perish prematurely. The warmth and eloquence of her pleas, however, do not interfere with her impeccable scholarship. Yes, really, it is the author of "The Second Sex."

Halfway through the Tunnel. Barry R. Berkey. Philosophical Library. $7.50.
A Molly-Bloom type of monologue by a neurotic woman with sexual, familial, and interpersonal frustrations clearly outweigh the somewhat pathetic gratifications she ekes out in "mere bits and pieces." "I want," she says, "to be able to integrate what goes on in my head with what goes on in my gut, so it's a total thing." The document, cast into a literary mode, is derived from a year of sessions with her fifth psychiatrist who, we infer from her own words and from the fact that thereafter she "stopped therapy," did not help her escape from herself and her background. "Pam is Everyman," the writer says. Maybe yes, maybe no. I hope not, though she does express crudely and subtly some of our problems.

A loosely organized, most provocative collection of published and original articles describing and, more often than not, praising the many distinctive verbal and nonverbal modes of communication evolved by American blacks both unconsciously and consciously to preserve their identity and to provide realistic and emotional security. A single example: according to David Dalby (University of London), slaves or their descendants attached African meanings to some English words whose pronunciation was similar in their own language back in Africa. Thus dig, resembles the Wolof deg which means to understand and appreciate, hence the Afro-American expression, "I dig it," has nothing to do with excavating.

A detailed, thoughtful, sufficiently sprightly report of a four-month investigation of the assumptions, theories, procedures, therapies, and results of contemporary Soviet psychiatrists, particularly those concerned with children. Non-psychiatrists may not be thrilled to know which drugs the Russians use in treating their patients, but they will find general topics of intriguing interest. From a socio-anthropological viewpoint, why do Soviet psychiatrists by and large reject compelling speculation which tends to be so widely embraced by their American counterparts? In what ways are the roles of psychiatry in the two countries similar and dissimilar? What can we learn from them, what can they learn from us?

The deservedly well publicized, shock-producing account of a Ugandan tribe whose members, for example, "would watch a child with eager anticipation as it crawled toward the fire, then burst into gay and happy laughter as it plunged a skinny hand into the coals"; who literally steal food from the mouths of the aged and the sick; who defecate publicly without shame; who do not bury their dead; and so on—on and on. The author, a reputable anthropologist, has written a melodramatic description of their behavior and beliefs, and he has given a general impression of the unrelenting way they have "disposed of virtually all the qualities that we normally consider are just those qualities that differentiate us from other primates." Two challenges emerge: these people "survive without seeming, if we are honest, to be greatly different from ourselves in terms of behavior"; and those qualities we have "are not inherent in humanity at all, they are not a necessary part of human nature."

An engaging, stimulating, competent tour de force by a humanist who has seized the widely known, ethnocentric concept of "the authoritarian personality" originally promulgated by a group of psychologists on the basis of research in California during World War II. First, he has broadened and attempted to codify the operational meaning of the term and related communication devices. Then he offers it as a not too procurstean bed into which he dumps characters as diverse as Hung Sui-tshuen, Jonathan Edwards, Josef Goebbels, part of Tom Watson, possibly your mother and father, and maybe you. Many more than one of the sparks must be considered illuminating. Before a long approach with a numerous notes, the book offers self-consciously profound opinions about our own society.

For the general reader as well as the student of its field, this is the best historical survey I have come across. Its focus is on the ways in which successive increments in understanding the historical context of the NT have modified the kinds of questions which can be legitimately addressed to the text. It does not attempt to summarize the detailed content of the changes in interpretation, but traces rather the sequence of heuristic methods which have become appropriate: philosophical and grammatical, literary criticism, oral context and form criticism, Judaic and Roman histories, comparative religion. The transitions in approaches and the reasons for them are clearly delineated.


Liking this is not usually recommended in this section, given our division of labor. But these tales are not ordinary literature, both because they are not pure fiction and because they utterly transcend, by their power, their simplicity and their extraordinary perspective the normal mode in which art renders present human experience. Their vision is of life seen not merely in the shadow of death, but the most transcendent, most death, as the binocular complement of a normal awareness. Wiesel was an inmate of Auschwitz and Buchenwald as an adolescent, and his telling of that experience has the dreadful fascination of sheer horror. The tales have been published separately before, but are here gathered together for the first time.

RICHARD BEALE DAVIS


Hall’s is a history of the New England clergy and their beliefs, differing from Perry Miller and duiller in the telling, but worth consideration. Sprunger’s book concerns the theologian who was the foremost seventeenth-century Puritan Rambist and whose ideas influenced tremendously his brethren in New and Old England. “He participated in the New England way in everything short of actually immigrating.”


All three have done books which will fascinate the cultural historian and musicianist by two of the foremost students of early southern music. The first is a comprehensive history, the second a history with scores and texts of songs.


Two books which will fascinate the student of colonial life and early national regional and general culture.


Three books look at colonial administrative-political problems from opposite sides of the Atlantic. Hutson’s does not present a new idea but a new analysis of causes in a single province. Henrete’s is also an analysis, which elucidates the connection between British domestic politics and imperial programs during the first half of the eighteenth century.


The latest volume in the New American Nation series fills a gap in the comprehensive account of the early continent the general editors have already presented in several other useful volumes.


Three books throwing various kinds and intensities of light on the colonial Chesapeake area. Daniels’ book will be of some use to scholars, but it does demonstrate the remarkable effects, or representatives, of one blood line in early America. Fontaine’s invaluable journal is absorbing reading for any colonialist. LeMay’s study is the most original.
TWO MOUNTAINS
This sequence in the memoirs of Great Britain's former Conservative Prime Minister covers the critical years of 1959 through 1961. The theme is set early: "A careful reading of histories and memoirs makes me feel that the power of a Prime Minister has steadily grown. Although he is only primus inter pares, the very complexity of affairs leads to concentration of authority in his hands." Although carefully documented, the mende is connected uneven. The abortive Paris summit meeting of 1960 is excellently discussed; President Dwight D. Eisenhower comes through realistically. The continent of Africa looms large, but the late President John F. Kennedy does not emerge quite as clearly as one would expect.
This is a succinct and well-written summary of five decades in the evolution of Anglo-American military strategy. The author is obviously a man of many facets: novelist, travel writer, critic, broadcaster, and professional historian. As a panoramic view of shifting Anglo-American fortunes the book traces in an interesting, synchronized manner the decline of the British lion and the inevitable ascendance of the American eagle. It is a well-documented study with a particularly comprehensive bibliography.
The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare. Ladislav Bittman. Syracuse University Research Corporation. $9.95.
This study is devoted to a detailed, analytical discussion of the subservient and secret Intelligence services and operations of selected Eastern European satellites. While each Eastern European country is categorized in terms of its "deception" activities, the study concentrates on the "disinformation" warfare of Czechoslovak Intelligence. The author was one of the "disinformation" specialists of Czechoslovakia working for years in the service of Soviet political warfare. While the book is interesting and well documented, the author's true identity remains a mystery. Ladislav Bittman is obviously a pseudonym.
The Voices of the Silent. Cornelia Gerstenmaier. Hart. $10.
Originally written by a German specialist and superbly translated into English, this comprehensive book includes a series of case studies in the Soviet treatment of writers, artists, and scientists. It documents in great detail both the "cultural masochism" of the USSR, as well as the intellectual rebellion against it. To this reviewer, The Souls of Black Folk and Malalik cases were the most relevant and frightening. The only flaw of this important work is its over-documentation. The last 240 pages are all documents. Recommended for specialists in the field.
Paul Avrich, Professor of Russian History at Queens College in New York, brilliantly analyzes in this work the four great popular Russian revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries. Combining a Cossack mutiny with social revolution, religious protest, and anti-colonial resistance, the most fascinating of the four was Pushkin's mass revolt, the last and greatest of the popular rebellions. All four case studies are in effect forerunners of Russia's 20th century revolution, the upheaval of 1917. The book is excellently documented.
Eyewitness: A personal account of a tumultuous decade. Robert Payne. Doubleday. $10. This autobiographical sketch by a prolific journalist and experienced wartime correspondent covers the climatic years of 1937-1946. Lively and interesting, the book is also somewhat uneven. The most important sections deal with the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek on the Mainland of China and the rise of Mao Tse-tung. "A Dinner With Mao Tse-tung" is probably the most insightful chapter. An interesting book for popular readership.
J. T. BALDWIN, JR.
Beautifully illustrated with color photographs. Text concerned about "more than three million miles of rivers and tributaries" and about dams "which destroy a living river and its valley." There is still time to save the untamed, the undammed, the unpolluted rivers.
The first section is an excellent compilation of information about plants used by North American Indians (and colonists) for treating a whole range of human ailments which are catalogued under sixty-four headings. Many of the remedies were doubtless effective for the purposes designated; others most certainly were not. This is true of native medicines the world over. Some of the plants found their way into the United States Pharmacopoeia, but after a time many were dropped. Some are currently under scientific study and are important to the understanding of the pharmacological chemistry of plants.
The second section deals with the most important wild and cultivated Indian plant foods by emphasizing the Indian preparations and recipes — for example: "The Iroquois had at least twenty-three different recipes for maize." Included are one hundred forty-four good illustrations, an unusual and helpful list of references, and English-Latin and Latin-English plant indices.
The author is a surgeon and a most perceptive individual; he is both artist and scientist. This book, a superb contribution to art and science, happily unites the two. Twice it has been my privilege to be in the field with him and to observe him photographing orchids in situ and dissecting and drawing their flowers still attached to the plants.
In a little time one can learn much about this historic river. Though the style falls short of the level that the author seems to have set for himself, this is a good book.

(continued on back cover)
BOOK REVIEWS
Exploring the Ocean World. Edited by C. P. Idyll. Revised Edition. Crowell, $14.95. Nine authors have made this book which should be in all libraries, for it fires the imagination about various aspects of oceanography — "a composite of all the basic sciences" — and incorporates an amazing amount of information. The five oceans cover more than seventy percent of the earth's surface, and their floors are endless frontiers for study and exploration. One can but envy the young men and young women who will have the opportunity to face this challenge of the unknown.


At the invitation of the Director of the Tanzania National Parks, the author spent three years in the Serengeti grasslands studying the lions — as well as the leopards, the cheetah, the wild dog, and other predators — and their prey. The result could only be an absorbing report, replete with many data that accrued from twenty-nine hundred hours of observation. Field biology at its best. An account of the structure of the lion pride, the relationship of females and males and cubs, the hunting patterns, lions recognized as individuals, etc. The conclusion: "predators are an integral and essential part of the ecological community. They help maintain an equilibrium in the prey populations within the limits imposed by the environment ... predators are the best wildlife managers."

VISITING SCHOLARS
(continued from page one)
Organization for Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund.

HARRY B. GRAY is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, and was recipient of the American Chemical Society Award in Pure Chemistry in 1970. He is professor of chemistry at California Institute of Technology.

CHARLES V. HAMILTON is a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation during 1972-1973, and professor of government and Ford Foundation Professor of Urban Politics at Columbia University. He is author of Minority Politics in Black Belt Alabama and The Black Preacher in America.

CHARLES ROSEN is on the faculty of SUNY at Stony Brook. A pianist and writer on music, he is author of The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, winner of the 1972 National Book Award for arts and letters.

PHILLIPS TALBOT has been president of The Asia Society since 1970. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1961 to 1965, and as Ambassador to Greece from 1965 to 1969.

THE NEW INTEGRITY
(continued from page four)
doctors, and men and women in other walks of life. But they pay the usual price. . . .

Are both the old and the new integrity partial? Do we really need both? Fortunately indeed are those who have both, but those still striving to develop the new integrity cannot afford to be overly concerned about the classical integrity. Those intent on harmony and serenity will dull the cutting edge of the new integrity. Seeing how it entails alienation, they will seek refuge in the strategies of deciphobias. But those who attain the new integrity may find eventually that the old integrity is coming to them, too.

THE KEY REPORTER
PHI BETA KAPPA
1811 Q Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20009
Return Postage Guaranteed

Second class postage paid at Washington, D. C.