ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES

Phi Beta Kappa graduate associations are groups formed by members of the Society on a geographic basis. The first association was founded in 1877 by alumni members living in New York City. Led by Elihu Root and others, it helped to organize the United Chapters in 1883. During the early years of the twentieth century, associations existed not only in the United States but in several foreign cities as well. A 1900 meeting of an association in Constantinople was reported to the Turkish police as a gathering of a subversive society with a secret Greek name.

Graduate associations are relatively informal in organization and program. At present there are over fifty active groups with memberships that range from over 900 to twenty or thirty. All report some regular activity such as an annual dinner meeting with a speaker or a program of honoring area high school students who have outstanding academic records.

Several associations arranged special programs this year in honor of the bicentennial of Phi Beta Kappa. Among the programs were the Alpha Kappa Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa, a reception for Council delegates to be given by William and Mary President Thomas A. Graves.

This drawing of the Wren Building was made for Phi Beta Kappa by Thomas E. Thorne, chairman emeritus of the art department at the College of William and Mary. The historic structure will be open at a reception for Council delegates to be given by William and Mary President Thomas A. Graves.

HISTORIC COUNCIL PROGRAM

A record attendance of over 500 delegates and guests is expected for the December 3-7 Bicentennial Council at Williamsburg, Virginia. Almost every chapter of Phi Beta Kappa will be represented at the meeting, which will combine regular Council business and a number of special events.

Final details of the program have now been announced. The Senate Book Awards dinner will take place on Friday evening, December 3. At a luncheon on Saturday, December 4, the Phi Beta Kappa Award for Distinguished Service to the Humanities will be presented. Among events scheduled for the December 5 anniversary date, are the initiation of new members by the Alpha of Virginia and the Council Reception and Banquet.

Speakers at various functions during the Council include Attorney General Edward Levi at the Anniversary Banquet; David Mathews, Secretary of HEW; Daniel Boorstin, Librarian of Congress; Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences and three recipients of Bicentennial Fellowships — Peter Cleck, Lawrence Levine and Leo Marx.

The oratorio commissioned by the Society, "To Form a More Perfect Union," will have its premiere on December 4. It will be performed by the Chorus of the College of William and Mary under the direction of Frank Lendrim. Musicians and dancers from the college community will also participate.

Because of the considerable expense involved in making possible a fitting anniversary celebration, a committee of concerned Phi Beta Kappa members, under the chairmanship of Dr. Carroll Newsom, has created a special bicentennial fund. This committee has
The Founding Fathers, it is worth remembering during the brouhaha of the Bicentennial, never intended to found anything. The British sometimes called them Oliverians, and the word fitted because, like Oliver Cromwell, they were reluctant revolutionaries. A long series of governmental measures, in the decade between the Stamp Act and Lexington, gradually impelled them down the road to rebellion. In the end they took up arms not to be free from the mother country — they did not reach that decision for more than a year — but to defend what they had come to consider their rights as subjects. Their concept of those rights, a far cry from the British concept, developed slowly but surely under the impact of what the crown and parliament did. The political initiative rested throughout with London. The colonial response was often raucous, occasionally paranoid, but always response.

The initial motive behind the government's measures was wholly understandable. In the long and costly Seven Years' War Britain had won Canada, the Mississippi valley, and Florida; the national debt had soared; and the expense of governing and protecting the new territories was an added burden on the taxpayer. If the colonies would not voluntarily shoulder a fair part of that burden, and experience had shown that they would not, the equitable course was to tax them by authority of the crown-in-parliament. This was a rational solution, suited to the age of rationalism, and it produced a revolution.

In the late eighteenth century rationalism and revolution went hand in hand, and this is no accident. Established institutions, consisting of people, do not work solely in rational ways. Take for example a college faculty. Understanding how it functions requires knowing where power resides, and where does it? With the persons, one would suppose, who control the money for salary increases — with the dean, in all likelihood, and the department chairman. But the supposition is too simple. A dean's or chairman's power depends not so much on his position as on him, on his relationship with his colleagues and the student body, on what committees he must work with and how they behave, on local traditions that subtly bound the role expected of him. None of these factors can be precisely defined, some cannot even be explained in logical terms; yet the system works in its own muddling fashion, and few muse on principles of academic government. Attempt to rationalize the system, to spell out the chain of command so as to give every one in it an exact allocation of power, and what happens? Principles appear; definition of power evokes definition of rights. The students assert theirs, the tenured professors theirs; the janitorial staff goes on strike. The college, in short, is in revolution.

The attempt to rationalize the British empire began with financial measures. But in an empire, as in a college, financial control is inseparable from other forms of power, and opponents of taxation oppose the authority that taxes. Parliament took almost a decade to drive this truth home to the colonists, partly because old loyalties died hard and even more because the measures emanating from London were so wildly inconsistent that they did not carry, until near the end, the message of a fixed policy. The government did not have one as ministries came and went; it advanced, retreated, advanced, retreated, as it blundered down the road to Lexington. Ministers made no attempt to remedy their ignorance of colonial opinion, and time after time the American reaction caught them by surprise.

The first occasion was the Stamp Act. No one in England seems to have anticipated the excitement those stamps would generate. The act was repealed the next year, but parliament covered retreat by asserting its right to tax. To the colonists this meant that the legislature had blundered, rectified its blunder, and then proclaimed its freedom to blunder again. It did so a year later in the Townshend Acts, which imposed American import duties, strengthened the customs service to cut down smuggling, and provided for royal salaries to free local officials from dependence on their legislatures. The response was less spectacular but more co-ordinated than the riots against the Stamp Act: merchants bound themselves not to import British goods while the duties remain in force. Two years later all but a few were repealed, and the nonimportation agreements lapsed.

By 1770, half way through the momentous decade, the British government had begun to turn the colonists into rebels. It had revamped the machinery of empire in the Townshend Acts; it had then abandoned the revenue it hoped for but, by retaining a few duties, had continued the grievance. This reiteration of principle had the disastrous effect of forcing the colonists to find principles of their own. They started to question the right of parliament not only to tax them but to legislate for them at all; that right had no legal basis, they argued, and was a century-old usurpation. This argument was to an Englishman historical and legal poppycock. The more acceptance it gained in the colonies, the more fundamental the cleavage between them and the mother country. For fundamental issues, once raised, will not go away; and the political process offers no means of resolving them.

After 1770 Lord North's administration hoped that they would go away. For three years it did nothing more provocative than provide royal salaries for a few colonial officials, particularly in Massachusetts; and it could not have chosen a worse place to experiment. The leaders of that feisty province were no longer content to deny parliament's legislative authority; more and more overtly they attacked the executive authority of the crown. They interpreted the colony's charter to suit themselves, and the Massachusetts' House of Representatives was soon using it to claim an inalienable right to pay the governor's salary.

When Benjamin Franklin, agent of the House in London, obtained and sent to Boston some letters that Governor Hutchinson and Lieutenant Governor Oliver had written years before, urging the government to take a strong line with colonies, they produced a wild furor; and the House petitioned to have both men removed from office.

Meanwhile the North administration was inadvertently reopening the issue of taxation. The purpose of the Tea Act was to help the East India Company by reducing the price, and so increasing the sale, of its tea in
America; but the method involved retaining the Townshend duty — one of the few still in force — when the tea reached America. No one in London, not even Franklin, realized that tea was as explosive as stamps eight years before. But then no one in London, not even Franklin, fully understood the Bostonians. They saw Hutchinson's sons and relatives made consignees for the tea, and their hatred of the Governor and the Townshend duty fused. The result was the Tea Party.

News of it reached London just before Franklin, as agent for the House of Representatives, appeared at a hearing before the Privy Council on his constituents' petition for Hutchinson's and Oliver's removal. The Solicitor General delivered a long speech, in which he ignored the grounds of the petition in order to heap invective and scurrility on Franklin. This public humiliation was unwise, for its victim was the most distinguished American alive. Two decades earlier Immanuel Kant had called him the modern Prometheus, and shrewd politicians do not countenance the dumping of verbal garbage on a Prometheus. The episode was a measure of the ministry.

That ministry blundered unawares into the tea crisis and, when Boston defied it and the fate of tea ships elsewhere indicated dangerous unanimity along the seaboard, was left with an unpalatable choice, to conciliate by another retreat or punish Massachusetts and risk arousing the other colonies. The first course was not politically feasible, given the mood of the British public and the power of the East India Company in parliament. But the second was playing with fire, which was equally bad politics: punishment threatened a civil war, for which Englishmen were no more prepared than they were for retreat, and war would cost money; fighting the colonists was scarcely the way to raise revenue from them.

Whitehall elected to punish on the cheap. The Intolerable Acts closed the port of Boston and abrogated the provincial charter, that new Ark of the Covenant; but no preparation was made to meet resistance. "Force was sent out not sufficient to hold one town," in Edmund Burke's biting words; "laws were passed to inflame thirteen provinces." The force, in Boston, was indeed not sufficient to hold it; and everywhere else royal authority was unsupported. News of developments in Massachusetts not only inflamed the other provinces but brought them together in the first Continental Congress. Its members ignored the fact that it was unconstitutional, for by now the imperial constitution had met the fate of Humpty Dumpty; and such horses and men as the king had in America were nowhere near Philadelphia. When fighting broke out, royal government along the seaboard crumbled like a sand castle when the tide comes in.

The rebellion began, like the rebellion of the south eighty-six years later, with a massive and uncontested victory for the rebels. The colonists achieved actual independence long before they declared it.

One British contribution to bringing on the war, then, was the repeated assertion of parliament's right to tax and the repeated failure to implement the right. This wobble, which scarcely deserves the name of policy, did not produce the intended revenue but did produce grievances, particularly in Massachusetts. It taught the Americans that, if their resistance led to repeal of one measure, an equally obnoxious one would follow. It also taught them the power of common action, which developed from spontaneous riots to the institution of the Continental Congress. The development was an educational process, and Britain was the inadvertent teacher. By asserting her right she led the colonists to assert theirs in more and more sweeping terms, until the argument reached the point — as arguments that get to fundamentals usually do — where all communication broke down.

Whitehall contributed to the breakdown by its imperviousness. It operated within a closed world, and formulated measures for America without any information about Americans except what came from colonial governors, who were normally at loggerheads with the governed, and such other informants as happened to get the ear of officialdom. No minister, except for a time Lord Dartmouth, seriously attempted to understand why the colonists behaved as they did. The attempt might have failed; the point is that it was not made. The colonists were given no explanation for what to them were arbitrary acts of government, and when they remonstrated their petitions were rejected, again without explanation. Their rising anger is understandable. Their spokesmen expressed it in a way that generated anger in return; Sam Adams and his friends would have tried the patience of a saint. If North's ministry cannot be criticized for lack of sainthood, it can be for complacent ignorance.

In the spring of 1775 it faced the task of recouping a political disaster by military means, which took time to prepare. During that time, the fifteen months after April, 1775, the reluctant rebels in Philadelphia shook off their reluctance and reached the point of no return on July 4, 1776. Once independence was declared, the hope of wiping it out by political means was a will-o'-the-wisp; although it intrigued London for years and had some slight effect on policy, British military mistakes were what squandered the fruit of battles won and, in the end, sapped the will to fight.

The war had two distinct phases. The first three years were a civil war, analogous in many ways with the later one in this country: in both the rebels' defensive aim was to hold what they had and wear down their opponents' determination; in both the power rebelled against had almost uncontested control of the sea, but the strategy that evolved focused on land operations to segment the area of rebellion and reduce it piecemeal. In the Civil War this strategy succeeded. In the War of Independence it failed, and in failing brought on the second phase, a world war fought in Asia, the Caribbean, and Europe as well as in America. The British were defeated only in America, where their planning invited defeat over and over again until the invitation was accepted. That was their final contribution to our independence.

The war started in earnest in the New York campaign of 1776. The city was a sound objective: an army based there and supported by the navy could strike into the interior by way of the Hudson, or east along the coast, or west to the Delaware. The commander-in-chief, Sir William Howe, had a formidable force of about 30,000, British and Germans; and his brother, Lord Howe, had an ample fleet. The prospect for the Americans was grim. Political reasons impelled Washington to defend New York, and his inexperience obscured the full impossibility of the job. He had some 19,000 men, most of whom could be called soldiers only by courtesy. (The Spirit of '76 produced troops who could scarcely
have won any war.) Numerical odds were only part of the danger; geography added the other part when Howe landed on Long Island and made for the Heights of Brooklyn. Washington had to defend them, for they commanded New York across the river. He therefore divided his army between Long Island and Manhattan, although navigable water separated the two and the Royal Navy was on patrol.

The British had the opportunity of a lifetime. At first they exploited it brilliantly by routing the Americans in the Battle of Long Island, but Howe permitted the remnants of the defeated army to escape to Manhattan. There they were out of the frying pan into the fire: they were trapped on the island by Lord Howe's ships. If Sir William had seized the only exit, over the narrow Harlem River, Washington and his men would have had the choice of surrendering, being killed, or trying to swim away. The effect on the rebellion can only be imagined.

Howe chose instead a course that served the American cause. After long delay he landed north of New York, moved inland and slowly cut off the enemy, then maneuvered out of the island, up to White Plains, westward over the Hudson (while the navy did nothing), and across New Jersey to the Delaware. The American army remained intact. When Sir William established posts on the Delaware manned by Germans (who had small chance of gathering news of the enemy across the language barrier) and with no adequate support, Washington capitalized on his sloppiness. The victories of Trenton and Princeton revived what had seemed to be a dying cause.

Meanwhile London was planning what it expected to be the final campaign. New York now offered a southern base, and Canada a northern, for a giant pincers movement, one army marching southward from the St. Lawrence to the Hudson near Albany, the other moving up river from Manhattan to co-operate with it. The British would then hold a line from Canada to New York; the rebellion, cut in two, would fall apart. This was the expectation held out by the scheme's architect, General Burgoyne, who was also commander of the northern army; but neither he nor any one else seems to have asked precisely what he was to do with that army. Force his way to the Hudson — and then get food from New York, or disperse his troops to guard supply lines to Canada? Even if he somehow supplied himself, how were he and Sir William to "hold" a line from the St. Lawrence to Manhattan? Establish posts like those overrun on the Delaware, or wander up and down with the main armies to counter rebel incursions? The whole plan bristled with such questions, which no one thought to raise.

The only chance of success lay in co-ordinating Burgoyne's plans with Howe's. But this again no one thought of doing, least of all the commander-in-chief. He designed his own campaign with no knowledge of, or interest in, what his junior colleague was planning, and decided to take the bulk of his army by sea to attack Philadelphia.

One arm of the pincers was moving in the wrong direction. Burgoyne was left to his own devices, and his goal of reaching Albany, dangerous enough in itself, was robbed of all purpose. Trying to cut the rebellion in two was now like trying to clap with one hand.

The government approved this strategic imbroglio, and contented itself with expressing to Howe the hope that he would be back from Pennsylvania in time to co-operate on the Hudson. Whitehall did not know its man. Sir William's maximum speed was that of a snail out of training. He spent weeks in sailing to Pennsylvania, roundabout by way of the Chesapeake, and weeks more in securing Philadelphia; by early October, when the northern army was in desperate straits and needed help from New York, he ordered troops from that garrison to join him in Pennsylvania. Burgoyne capitulated, and six months later France allied with the United States. The success of Sir William's campaign helped mightily to lose Britain the war.

French intervention, followed by Spanish, put Whitehall in an unprecedented dilemma. The Bourbon fleets in conjunction threatened the security of the British Isles and the trade by which the islanders lived, yet a protective concentration of naval forces at home imperiled armies in America and possessions overseas. A possible solution, to blockade the enemy squadrons in port, worked before and did again during the French Revolution. But it required daring, which was in short supply at the Admiralty. The First Lord, obsessed with the fear of invasion, insisted on keeping the home fleet at full strength; and he and his advisers never seem to have weighed the possibilities of blockade. They drifted into waiting to see what the enemy would do: when the French sent a detachment from Europe to some destination overseas, (continued on back cover)
reading recommended by the book committee

humanities
GUY A. CARDWELL, ROBERT B. HEILMAN, FREDERICK J. CROSSON
EVELINE C. REED, JOHN R. MOORE, ERIC D. LEE, BRUCE STRAUSS

social sciences
EARL W. COUNT, RICHARD BEALE DAVIS, LEONARD W. DOOB, ANDREW GYORGY, MADELINE R. ROBINTON, VICTORIA SCHUCK, JAMES C. STONE, ELLIOT ZUPICK, RUSSELL B. STEVENS, RONALD GEBALLE

natural sciences

ANDREW GYORGY

Professor Denitch has made a major contribution to the study of the murky field of contemporary Yugoslav politics. This reviewer was particularly impressed by the lively chapter on “The League of Communist and Social Mobility,” as well as the fascinating discussion of “The Institutionalization of Multinationalism.” Indeed the problem of ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia, as the author rightly observes, is one of the most profound ideological problems for that country.

Professors Bociurkiw and Strong have added a great deal of original research and tremendously useful information to our general knowledge of religion in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. One of the outstanding features of this comprehensive publication is the broad linkage of religion to such issues as Soviet foreign policy, socio-cultural change, and the inner workings of current Communist movements in Eastern Europe.

The diplomatic papers of Ambassador Biddle make fascinating reading even 30 years after they were originally penned. Ably edited by a team of three younger scholars, this is a useful and lively contribution to our often uncertain knowledge of the Polish-German conflict of 1937-39 which set off World War II.

Dr. Leslie C. Tihany, a native Hungarian and subaltern of a distinguished career diplomat in the American Foreign Service, has written a comprehensive and exciting book on the historic background of the much-tortured nations of East Central Europe. The book is indeed an “in depth” review and analysis of both history and politics. To this reviewer, the important chapter on “Centripetal Nationalism,” as well as on “The Coming of Socialism” were the most valuable and relevant. Although deeply immersed in the distant historic past, Dr. Tihany has a great deal to contribute to a better understanding of the current status and future expectations of East-Central Europe. Discussions of a Danubian Confederation are particularly challenging.

One of the most distinguished and articulate of contemporary Soviet specialists, Edward Crankshaw, has written a brilliant narrative of a century of high but controversial achievement in the Russian imperial realm. As a distinguished member of the London Observer, the author has rich personal experience in the Soviet Union and is the author of 19 books dealing with Russia. Such chapters as “The Impact of Terror” are masterpieces of style and historic research.

Moscow Farewell. George Feifer. Viking. $10.
George Feifer, educated at Harvard and Columbia Universities, has been a regular visitor to the Soviet Union at least for the past 12 years. His lively and exceedingly well written books, both in the fields of fiction and non-fiction, have contributed immensely to our better understanding of the “mysterious East.” Feifer and his Russian-born wife are acute and sensitive observers of the Soviet scene. This is an exciting auto-biographical addition to the author’s previous books on the Soviet Union. In a hostile environment, the Feifers have done amazingly well in promoting “peaceful coexistence” in a social sense.

FREDERICK J. CROSSON

Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration. Tracy B. Strong. California. $15.75.
A book which sets itself the ambitious goal of taking Nietzsche seriously, i.e., considering that his reasons for believing Western culture to be coming to an end are correct and trying to ascertain what he anticipated the next development could be, Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy as a cognitive enterprise is compared interestingly with Wittgenstein’s view that rational justification is finally grounded on a Lebensform. But Strong admits, indeed insists, that Nietzsche stands or falls with the doctrine of eternal return, and he is less than successful in articulating it with a clarity sufficient for it to bear this weight. Nevertheless he has read Nietzsche closely and passionately, and one cannot fail to profit from such an interpreter.

Puritan’s Progress. Monica Furlong. Coward, McCann & Geoghegan. $8.95.
Puritanism produced little art, but John Bunyan’s famous allegory was enormously influential and widely admired into this century (Edward Shaw proclaimed him superior to Shakespeare). This is a well-done popular biography which does not displace Roger Sharrock’s, but which is readable, balanced and by no means hagiography.

The first (and an excellent) translation of a masterful work on Aristotle’s theory of categories which guided the young Martin Heidegger into the question of being. Although Brentano’s first book, it displays a confident and penetrating knowledge of the texts of Aristotle and a clarity of exposition which has few peers. It requires close reading, but is accessible to the general reader with interest and patience. A particular note is his deduction of the categories as a coherent system, in contrast to Kant’s view.

All Things are Possible. David Edwin Harrell, Jr. Indiana. $10.95.
Two waves of “Great Awakening” have stirred religious enthusiasms since WW II, and they are chronicled in this objective and interesting historical study. Both began on the fringes of society, but the second one, the charismatic movement, has penetrated all of the established churches. It was preceded by a remarkable burgeoning (ca. 1948-60) of revival campaigns centered on healing, and Harrell’s documentation of the literature of the movements provides a thought-provoking image of religious psychology and commercial exploitation.

Three times scripture met philosophy, and this large posthumous volume is Wolfson’s account of the third encounter (the first two he treated in Philo and in The Philosophy of the Church Fathers). “Kalam” designates the early school of Islamic thinkers who attempted to analyze philosophically the major concepts of the Koran: God and his attributes, creation, free will, etc. Six such concepts are examined extensively, tracing their dialectical development and the influences of earlier Greek, Jewish and Christian writings, with superb work of scholarship and a fine envoi for a singular man of learning.

A book-length set of lectures, assembled from four sets of class notes taken in a Cambridge course of 1939. An early version of what later became his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, the lectures are worthwhile not only for their subject-matter but as illustrating viva voce Wittgenstein’s manner of philosophizing. Alan Turing was in the class and his comments stimulate a good deal of the discussion.

AUTUMN, 1976
European Drama of the Middle Ages. Richard Axton. Pittsburgh. $5.95. Axton is especially interested in the secular origins of drama usually considered primarily ecclesiastical. His sensible, unpretentious account has more than a specialist appeal.

Crowell's Handbook of Elizabethan and Stuart Literature. James E. Ruoff. Crowell. $13.95. This is a well-executed reference book on a special but very extensive field (1558-1660).

Young Thomas Hardy. Robert Gittings. Little Brown. $10.95. A brilliant, yet orderly and urbane study of the transmutation of Hardy's personal history into poetry and fiction.

Lord Byron: Accounts Rendered. Doris Langley Moore. Harper & Row. $17.50. Doris Moore here works primarily from bills, receipts, and financial records and turns such materials into a biographical account both substantial and sprightly.


The Hesse/Mann Letters: The Correspondence of Hermann Hesse and Thomas Mann 1910-1935. Eds. Anni Carlsson and Annette Michals. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Harper & Row. $10. Mann will rank as an outstanding letter-writer of his day—a formal but never pompous recorder of numerous personal, political, literary, philosophic, historical, and aesthetic interests; firm in principle, devoted in friendships, reflective, generous. He and Kerenyi write about Kerenyi's ideas on myth, and parallel matters in Mann's novels (1935-55). The Hesse/Mann letters, changing from careful and courteous to warm and easy in the latter 1930s and '40s, add a good deal of the personal and political to the literary.


The Legend of Krishna. Nigel Frith. Schocken. $7.95. Studies and translations continue to enlarge our still limited knowledge of eastern literature and myth. Ms. Shih provides the first full account of the some 170 plays of the Yuan period (1260-1368). The last days of the following Ming dynasty (1368-1644) are chronicled in the extraordinary poetic-operatic historical drama, The Peach Blossom Fan (1699). Frankel translates 106 poems dating from 1000 B.C. to 1400 A.D. and skillfully applies new-critical methods of explication and provides them. Frith creates a fascinating mythical tale by combining the major legends of the divine Krishna, along with some imaginative re-creations of his own, in a coherent saga that draws on the methods of moral fable and farce, epic and romance. The uniquely Indian is interfused with parallels to western myths.


Eugene Onegin. Aleksandr Pushkin. Trans. Vladimir Nabokov. 4 vols. Rev. ed. Bollingen Series LXXII. Princeton. $60. Nabokov has revised his translation of a great Russian verse novel to make it conform more closely to his principle of unformed literary style. The American version of a Byronic tale has its own literary distinction, and the two volumes of commentary are rich in scholarly and critical illumination.

RUSSELL B. STEVENS

Open Sea Mariculture. Joe A. Hansson. Dowden, Routh. $24. For years, hydroponics was the darling of the high school science fairs and emerged time after time as the proposed solution to a society's food supply problem. Mariculture—the managed production of food in the oceans—has come to take its place. The questions are much the same—is it practical? is it economically feasible? is it of general applicability? and so on. Firm answers are not to be found in the volume here reviewed, I think, but it does provide a large amount of information and speculation that serves at least to bring the discussion up to date. One hopes that the specialist can evaluate a given proposal, but any reader will find much to think about.

The Story of Pines. Nicholas T. Mirov & Jean Hasbrouck. Indiana. $6.95. The era of specialty magazines, which is so clearly upon us, is matched more and more by "specialty" books devoted to a single rather limited topic which serve as useful introductions to subject matter not within the reader's previous close examination. One mode, The Story of Pines serves as a good example. The professional botanist will find in it a few new bits of information but little of substantial value. To the non-botanist, however, there is a sampling of morphology, physiology, economic botany, ecology, paleontology, folklore and other matters, all with the preceding thread. A different way of looking at the material, true, but a most pleasing one.

Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety. William W. Lowrance. William Kaufmann. $4.95. This relatively modest paperback, of some 175 pages, is already in a second or third printing and has been reviewed by a number of people, mostly favorably. Nonetheless, it deals so soberly, simply, and straightforwardly with an issue that has generated a troublesome amount of heated rhetoric that it deserves still further attention. Dr. Lowrance, as an Alfred P. Sloan Fellow at the National Academy of Sciences, spent the better part of his time for more than a year trying to arrive at some acceptable definitions of acceptable risk. In my view he has come very close to reaching his goals in a number of ways. If enough people set aside their preconceived convictions and read this statement fully and carefully, it may yet be possible to deal with the issue rationally.

Penguins: Past and Present, Here and There. George Gaylord Simpson. Yale. $10. G. G. Simpson seems—and any who know his works would tend to agree—incapable of writing a dull book. Whether one cares initially about penguins or not, this little gem is a delight to read, though the price, even in these days seems a bit high for 142 small pages. Simpson is, of course, primarily a paleontologist, and begins in that vein, but he continues on into the present and summarizes much that is known of this curious group of birds. The style is dignified, yet informal and at times even chatty; it seems very much as though the author cared deeply not only about penguins but about his readers.

Sociobiology: the New Synthesis. Edward O. Wilson. Belknap. $20. Professor Wilson without doubt one of the very distinguished and able scientists of his generation. On the strength of this alone his new and monumental work on sociobiology deserves serious attention. It is a detailed, scholarly work that can be undertaken only at the cost of very considerable amounts of time and thought. The book is big, but troublesome dimensions; it fits neither on the shelf nor table. But it contains a wealth of detail as to the nature and development of social organization in the animal kingdom and attempts to elucidate the factors that have led to these phenomena. Wilson does not shy away from including the human species in a relatively short final chapter, a venture that has led to his being savagely attacked by colleagues who—or so it seems to me—find the conclusions reached at odds with their own political and social values. The reader is urged to examine this treatment of the biological basis of social man on its merits, in tune with the remainder of this major scientific work.

Here on the Island. Charles Pratt. Harper & Row. $15. Pleasant reading, handsome photographs, and a considerable dollop of nostalgia characterize this sympathetic account of the way of life on a Maine island whose residents are adjusting to a new sociological and economic reality. There is no pretense of professional analysis nor of lofty theorizing on the issues addressed.

ROBERT B. HEILMAN

THE KEY REPORTER
LEONARD W. DOOB


A valiant, challenging tour de force which would "show that man's natural and inevitable urge to deny mortality and achieve a heroic self-image are the root causes of evil." The thesis enabled the author, an anthropologist, to analyze provocatively religion, the horror of war, the metaphysics of history, the history of man, and some of the central ideas of psychoanalysis and Marxism. Although such a sweeping contention obviously cannot be conclusively validated, it merits a respected place alongside other doctrines — determinism, libido, culture, materialism-idealism, and aspects of theology — that would explain our miseries and hence ourselves.


A generously inclusive account of how human beings everywhere have conceptualized the necessarily interrelated problems of good and evil. The topics are wide-ranging, with of course special emphasis given to the great religions; but trolls, witches, spirits, giants, and faires are not neglected. The writing is graceful, the scholarship impressive and unobtrusive, and the perennial problems posed within philosophy, metaphysics, and theology emerge with chilling clarity.


A textbookish, neo-sprightly summary of what we know and especially what we do not know about American voters and the leaders they elect and reject for sensible or nonsensical reasons. Commandingly concrete studies are emphasized, even though they provide only the barest, actuarial clues to the future. Critical attention is paid to those current, flamboyant fads modestly termed psychohistory and psychobiography.


A fascinating description of the enfant sauvage who was captured in South Central France in 1797 and of the patient cedures of the Church. Detailed life histories of the possessed and the exorcists, it is suggested by the author (a former Jesuit Professor in Rome and a scholar in various fields), do not account for all that is reported or allegedly transpires during the agony of the "Ritual." Skeptical readers will find a dramatization of the problem of evil, others will appreciate its theological roots but may agree that "the puzzle remains" and indeed demands more controlled investigation.


A detailed, necessarily labored, not always detached analysis of the protocols provided by 16 famous Nazis (including Goering, Hess, Papen, Ribbentrop) as they responded to the 10 Rorschach ink blots while in solitary confinement awaiting trial. Interpreting Rorschach responses is an art, not a science: the clinician has no definitive code book to guide him, but must rely on experience, commonsense, and intuition. In this instance, the two authors —a psychotherapist and a political scientist— present all the Rorschach data collected by the prison psychologist as well as their own reasoning which leads them to risk the diagnoses. Above all, they conclude, these men were not "banal" in Hannah Arendt's sense, but tended to be "psychopaths" whose murderous impulses could find expression in the social context Hitler created with their help.

RICHARD BEALE DAVIS

Atlas of Early American History: The Revolutionary Era 1780-1790. Eds. L. J. Cappon, Barbara B. Petchenik, et al. Princeton. $100; after December 31, $125. With a meticulous and thoroughly documented text and varied and fascinating maps, the greatest graphic project ever attempted to explain the United States of the Revolutionary period should interest all Americans. Its editors deserve our gratitude and admiration, as do the institutions which participated in its production.

The Oldest Revolutionary: Essays on Benjamin Franklin. Ed. I. A. Leo Lemay.

Joscelyn, Eds. J. C. Guilds and Stephen E. Meats. South Carolina. $27.50 ea.

Nevius' little book is one of the most refreshing of our growing number of studies of Cooper. It is concerned primarily with the method of conceiving his landscapes; that is, his aesthetic. The delightful collection of critical and biographical essays on Glasgow includes estimates and recollections of such distinguished scholars as Howard Mumford Jones and C. Hugh Holman. The two new volumes in the well edited Simms edition contain uncollected and/or unpublished stories worth the attention of the student of nineteenth-century American literature.


The central theme of this volume of the Johnson Papers seems to be the transition of the Future President from southern unionist to American patriot, from persuasive debater to grim coexist. It includes some platitudinous but intelligent speeches which, incidentally, show considerable self-acquired learning.

Johnson for this reader becomes a more attractive figure than he is in the earlier volumes. The Potter history, completed by his colleague Don E. Fehrenbacher, is a magisterial, beautifully written account of the tragic and stirring period before Fort Sumter. Analyses of men and motives are superb in their clarity.


Owens' book is compassionate, perceptive, with sufficient detachment in presentation to make it convincing as well as highly informative. Though one may quarrel with Professor Rose's choice of selections in a few instances, especially her use of outdated editions, this is a useful addition to the accessible documents of black slavery in this continent.
asked members of the Society, taken from a limited sampling, to contribute $500 each to the fund. Contributors have been designated Bicentennial Fellows. They will be honored at the Council Banquet and will each receive a replica of the original silver Phi Beta Kappa medal of the Alpha of Virginia chapter.

The response to this special appeal has been gratifying. Members of the Society who wish to join in becoming Bicentennial Fellows may get in touch with Dr. Newsom through the Washington office at 1811 Q Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20009.

ASSOCIATIONS (con.)

Society's Bicentennial. The Chicago Area Association conducted an open forum discussion series on the theme of improving the quality of life. The Detroit Association sponsored a series of six lectures on the American concept of freedom in cooperation with Wayne State University and the University of Michigan. The Puget Sound, Washington, group held a Bicentennial Concert which included a program of American music.

The International Scholarship Program of the Phi Beta Kappa Alumni in Southern California, begun in 1948, presented eighteen grants to graduate students from abroad during the past year. A relatively new association in the Houston, Texas, area has also set up a scholarship fund and has awarded sixteen $500 scholarships to high-ranking high school students.

The activities of the associations are supervised by a Committee on Associations of which Senator William F. Stinespring is chairman. A majority of associations will be represented at the Bicentennial Council.

the Admiralty tried to determine how many ships were involved and where bound, in order to dispatch an equivalent force to parry the threat. This policy not only surrendered the initiative to the enemy; it also presupposed correct intelligence, speedy preparation, and favorable winds—in other words—luck. A policy that depends on luck invites disaster.

From the spring of 1778 Sir Henry Clinton, Howe's successor as commander-in-chief, operated under the Damoclean sword of French sea power. Late in 1779 he apparently decided to ignore the danger, for he embarked on a campaign in the south that dispersed his armies more widely than ever: one was in New York, one in South Carolina, and before long a third was on the Chesapeake, each open to attack from the sea. In 1781 the sword fell: a superior French fleet procured Cornwallis' surrender. Lord North resigned, The King, after threatening abdication, agreed at last to American independence.

The story of how Britain bumbled into a war and then bumbled through it to defeat reveals one common characteristic in her leaders, intellectual mediocrity. Before 1775 they showed precious little imagination, or curiosity about colonial opinion, or awareness that means are related to ends; otherwise the end originally intended, to raise an American revenue, could never have led to the end achieved, a war that was sure to be costly and not sure to be won. After hostilities began, the policy-makers in Whitehall and in the field and at sea showed the same kind of mediocrity: they did not formulate clear objectives or analyze the means of achieving them.

Howe's ostensible objective was to win; his means, occupying territory that proved to be untenable, brought him no nearer his goal. Burgoyne had the murky objective of cutting the rebellion in two, and his means were preposterously inadequate. Clinton's objective should have been to hold on until the Bourbon menace was dealt with and he could be substantially reinforced; instead, with the government's approval, he opened his southern offensive. The Admiralty's objective should have been to contain enemy sea power; but its planners, fixated upon securing home waters, lapsed into passivity and left defense overseas to the improvisations of the moment. The Royal Navy performed brilliantly in the previous war and in the next ones; but during the War of Independence the heart seemed to go out of it, and it behaved like a sick whale.

Perhaps Britain could not have avoided the war. Probably she could not have won it. If her leaders had been able to take thought, nevertheless, they might have added a cubit to her stature. They failed her, and served us, because they were what they were, pedestrian men with no touch of the grandeur of the elder Pitt a few years before, or even of his son a few years later. One theory of history, that great men mold events, has for a corollary another, that when little men hold the reins events run wild. That is what happened when Britain lost her colonies, and one of the shrewdest observers in England saw that it was happening. Edmund Burke, on the eve of the war, gave his countrymen a grim and unheeded warning: "Great empire and little minds go ill together."