
In presenting the Gauss Award, Lewis P. Simpson, chairman of the prize committee, said, “Joseph Frank offers a brilliant historical and critical reconstruction of the complex character of Dostoevsky’s early career. In so doing he defines the chief motives that he will explore in subsequent volumes of what unquestionably will take its place as one of the major literary biographies of our time. But Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849 is more than a prelude to later phases of the novelist’s career. Through the breadth of his inquiry — at once systematic, acute, and meditative — Professor Frank develops a bold emphasis on Dostoevsky’s spirituality and its implications in the social-cultural dimensions of post-Napoleonic Russian literature and literary life. He succeeds not only in correcting and transcending the narrow but influential Freudian interpretation of the novelist but ultimately in suggesting the growth of a profound intimacy between modern history and modern literary art.”

Dr. Frank, professor of comparative literature at Princeton, also directs the Christian Gauss Seminars there. In his response upon receiving the award, he gave a moving account of the many ways in which the influence of Christian Gauss, the late literary scholar, had touched his life.

Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 was characterized by Emerson Committee chairman Richard Schlatter as follows: “This is a book that seriously shakes accepted views about the unity of the French nation by demonstrating that the peasant masses, until very late in the 19th century, neither read or spoke French nor identified themselves in any serious way with the national state and its activities. Mr. Weber’s reconstruction of the realities of peasant life is an example of social history at its best, based upon meticulous scholarship and superseding anything that has been written in this field. This work is filled with intriguing detail about markets and fairs, feasts and festivals, the ways in which the folk imagination transformed political and economic realities into proverbs and tales, the role of music as a vehicle for bringing city tastes to the village, and the importance of

popular almanacs. Weber describes the crisis at the end of the century when local cultures died as a result of the relentless march of modernization.”

Professor Weber, a native of Romania, studied at Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, and received his graduate degrees from Cambridge University. He is the author of several other books on Europe and European history.

In The High Frontier: Human Colonies in Space, Dr. O’Neill develops his theory of high-orbital manufacturing facilities and space colonies. When citing the prize-winning book, Peter Hilton, chairman of the Science Award Committee, said, “The author, a distinguished physicist on the faculty of Princeton University, first presented his concept of a space colony in 1969. Since then, without in any way diminishing his research effort in his major field of high energy physics, Professor O’Neill has been steadily refining his ideas on the colonization of space, so that today he can present a very convincing argument for the possibility and desirability of establishing human communities in orbit between the earth and the moon; and he has even persuaded NASA to fund research into the planning of orbital manufacturing facilities. He has written an enormously stimulating and exciting book, refreshingly optimistic and splendidly informative; his imaginative yet disciplined speculations

(continued on back cover)
STEREOTYPES — THEIR USE AND MISUSE
by Philip H. Rhinelander

It is generally agreed that of all human capacities and accomplishments, the most significant and distinctive is the capacity to make and use symbolic systems, notably languages. However, like all human capacities — or at least most of them — this one is ambivalent. Language provides a vehicle for communication which is not otherwise available, but in so doing, it provides also an occasion for confusion and misunderstanding. As half-truths are often more dangerous than outright falsehoods since the error is less obvious and their surface plausibility lends them weight, so partial but incomplete communication can be more misleading than an outright failure. Where both parties know that they cannot understand, or have not understood, each other, neither is deceived, and, if they wish to proceed, new channels will be sought. But where there is an appearance of understanding, resting upon a merely verbal concurrence without any deeper comprehension, the misapprehension goes unnoticed, and uncorrected. If language is a form of currency — and I think the metaphor is useful — it is, like other currency, subject to Gresham’s law: cheap and inflated currency drives out sound currency. Thus, the more we tend to rely in our thinking and talking upon catch-words, slogans, and popular jargon, the harder it becomes to deal thoughtfully, intelligently, and critically with our pressing problems.

Some thirty years ago, George Orwell wrote an essay on this point, entitled Politics and the English Language. His point was that the devaluation of language in our day and the increasing tendency in public discourse to substitute familiar but threadbare catch-words for critical inquiry signifies a similar devaluation on our basic political understanding. After arguing that ‘‘the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language’’ he went on to assert broadly that

‘‘Political language — and with variations this is true of all political parties from Conservatives to Anarchists — is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.’’

I would add merely that in the three decades since Orwell wrote, the situa-
tion has got considerably worse, and that the infection has spread from the political realm to virtually all other sectors, including ethics and morals.

Most philosophers today are aware of the difficulties caused by the vaguenesses and ambiguities of language and the need for clarification. But there are two difficulties. Unlike Socrates, they do not conduct discussions with ordinary citizens in the market-place challenging their accepted beliefs, but tend to treat questions of meaning as if they were technical matters to be grasped only by those having a specialized background. Thus the grosser popular errors remain untouched. Secondly, a substantial number of professional philosophers tend to direct their fire primarily against philosophical language (notably the language of metaphysics and theology) rather than against what is called ‘‘ordinary language.’’ Thus, like the guns of Singapore, which faced the sea rather than the land, the most important frontier is left unguarded. While they are prepared to hold rival philosophical flotillas at bay, the rear is left open to infiltration from Madison Avenue and other specialists in the art of rhetorical manipulation.

This brings me to the matter of stereotypes — including stereotypes about stereotypes. Because the point has been drummed into us by repetition, we have come to accept the view that stereotypes are bad things: but very few of us have stopped to inquire why they are bad or what the remedy is. This lack of comprehension is shown clearly in the fact that most of the people who complain with the greatest justification that they have been victimized by stereotypes do not seek to eliminate stereotyping but set about creating new stereotypes of their own to deploy against the old ones. This process clarifies nothing; it merely confronts one set of misconceptions with an opposite set, thus increasing the confusion, while obscuring the issues.

What is a stereotype? Why are stereotypes bad? The simple answer, I think, is that stereotypes are half-truths which [as I noted earlier] are often more dangerous than outright falsehoods because they have an aura of plausibility concealing their untruth. This is why they are persistent. The best analysis I know was made twenty years ago in Gordon Allport’s book, The Nature of Prejudice, written in 1954, the year of the famous Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education where compulsory school segregation was held unconstitutional. Allport argued that prejudice (including race prejudice) rests on an overgeneralization which is immune to evidence or criticism and which has the effect of reducing all individuals to pre-conceived types. There are three key elements: (1) an over-generalization (attached usually to a model of some sort), (2) which is false in some degree, and (3) which is immune to correction.

There are several points to notice. First, a prejudiced over-generalization can be positive as well as negative. That is to say, there can be blind and irrational prejudice in favor of some group or cause as well as against it. In fact, positive and negative prejudice often go together. Hitler’s belief in the superiority of the Aryans, for example, involved a complementary belief in the inferiority of all other races. These were, in effect, two sides of the same coin. But this need not always be true. One can have a disposition to favor or trust certain kinds of people without necessarily being hostile to others.

Second, the most serious practical effect of a prejudiced stereotype is that the individual person or the individual cause is not judged on his, her, or its individual merits but is categorized on a general basis without regard to the actual, particular circumstances. It is chiefly for this reason that stereotypes have worked injustice to minorities and women. If you assume, for example, that members of minority groups or women generally are unqualified for the higher positions in industry or the professions, the result is either to prevent those individuals who are qualified from obtaining entry and advancement or to put such obstacles in their way that it takes superhuman ability to surmount them. However, it must be remembered here, that this situation can occur on both sides of any issue. Thus the radical activist or the rhetorician who believes that all white males are ‘‘sexist’’ or that all white Americans are ‘‘racist’’ is engaged in prejudiced stereotyping just as much as the male chauvinist who proclaims the inferiority of women or the Mississippi red-neck who believes that all blacks are lazy. In either case, the particularity of the individual is ignored: all members of a class are typed indiscriminately according to a model which might, perhaps, hold good in a few cases but which is false for many or most.

Professor Rhinelander, of the philosophy department at Stanford University, delivered this talk at the June, 1977 initiation ceremonies of the new eBK chapter at the University of Santa Clara.
Third, and most important, what characterizes the prejudiced mind is a refusal to look at contrary evidence or to admit contrary argument, in short, a refusal to admit the possibility of error. Thus prejudice is not merely a matter of belief but of the way beliefs are held. It involves an attitude characterized by arbitrary blindness which may be willful or may be a matter of habit. But in either case, there is irrationality here.

I make this point because it seems to me crucial, yet it is often overlooked. If you believe that basic moral and political values are wholly irrational in any case — that our attitudes are shaped entirely by emotions, desires, or interests which are produced for us and in us by forces beyond our control and that they are immune to any kind of rational direction — then you should have no objection to prejudiced or stereotyped thinking. On the contrary, you should accept it and expect it. You should, if you wish to be consistent, line up squarely and firmly with Thrasymachus who argued in Plato's Republic that justice is nothing but the interest of the stronger. You should accept without qualms the view that, in the last analysis, only force counts in the real world — either physical force, or economic force, or the force of individual or class interest, or perhaps the force of history. You should conclude that all talk about justice or human rights or the intrinsic worth of the individual is merely a pious smoke screen — a kind of intellectual charade engaged in by academic types as a game played simply for their own amusement. And if you believed that, you ought not to be here at all, because universities like this one and an honor society like Phi Beta Kappa are committed to the belief that rationality does count in the world, and not merely in the form of technological inventiveness but more importantly as casting light on the meaning and goals of human existence. I am not saying that rationality is everything, but only that it is a vital element, that the life of the mind is something that must be pursued and encouraged not as a mere cultural adornment but for the good of mankind.

It is this faith in the value of rationality that most clearly distinguishes what we call the Western tradition from other cultural traditions, many of whom do not share it. Moreover, it is intimately tied to our belief in the intrinsic value of the individual human being — which many other cultures do not subscribe to either. The connection lies in the fact that, just as it is the concrete human individual who is born, lives, breathes, struggles, loves, aspires, encounters triumph and tragedy, and finally dies, so it is the individual mind that thinks. I think it is correct to say that the whole long tradition of natural law and natural rights, upon which our own constitutional democracy is founded, reflects a persistent faith that there is — or that there can be found or devised — a system of laws which will commend themselves to thoughtful persons everywhere by their inherent reasonableness rather than by force. This faith presupposes that above and beyond immediate passions and interests, individual human beings also have a capacity for rational understanding.

Thus the vice of slogans and stereotypes lies chiefly in the fact that they are intrinsically irrational, regardless of the issues to which they relate or the particular causes which they may be designed to support. Of course, all of us are fallible, and all of us employ stereotypes on occasion. But the truly educated mind ought to oppose them resolutely and should be ready to amend its own thinking whenever it finds itself employing them for serious purposes.

I am convinced that we are quite ready to condemn slogans and stereotypes as prejudiced and irrational if and when they are used against us, or against causes we support, but we have got in the habit of tolerating them when they are invoked on our own side of the issue. Such conduct is plainly inconsistent. If we oppose blind irrationality as dangerous, we should oppose it everywhere. On the other hand, if we really suppose that all thinking on moral, political, or religious issues is always prejudicial, then we should accept it everywhere and give up attacking prejudice or irrationality altogether.

Before passing on to consider some examples of the kinds of slogans and stereotypes now current, it may be advisable to anticipate one objection. It may be argued that since human beings are not wholly rational, and indeed could never become so, and since feelings, emotions, desires, and aspirations determine most of our attitudes, too much preoccupation with rationality would be self-defeating. It could very easily inhibit action and become an excuse for apathy in the face of evil. As Bertrand Russell once observed, there is no way to demonstrate logically or scientifically that it is wrong to enjoy the infliction of cruelty. Thus, if we were to wait for this kind of demonstration, we should wait forever and allow manifest evils to go unchallenged for want of a fully rational proof that they were truly evil. The answer here is in two parts. First, the canons of scientific demonstration are not the sole measure of human rationality. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, it is a mistake to take the standards of proof appropriate to one particular field and to apply them as a universal standard for all other fields as well. "It is the mark of an educated mind," he wrote, "to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstrations from an orator." (Nic. Eth., I, iii.)

Secondly, although the ideal of rationality in practical affairs requires that we maintain open minds, an open mind need not be open at both ends. It is possible to commit oneself fully and whole-heartedly to a cause on the strength of one's present knowledge and convictions while still retaining the consciousness of fallibility. Gordon Allport (to whose study of prejudice I have already referred) argued in another paper that it is perfectly possible psychologically for the mature mind to combine tentativeness of outlook with firm commitment to chosen values. He wrote,

"...Since certainties are no longer certain, let all dogmas be fearlessly examined, especially those cultural idols that engender a false sense of security: dogmas of race supremacy, of naive scientism, of unilinear evolutionary progress. Let one face the worst in oneself and in the world around him, so that one may correctly estimate the hazards.

"Taken by itself such tentativeness, such insightfulness, might well lead to ontological despair. Yet acceptance of the worst does not prevent us from making the best of the worst. Up to now psychologists have not dealt with the remarkable ability of human beings to blend a tentative outlook with a firm commitment to chosen values..."

"A commitment is, as Pascal has said, a wager. ... We have the freedom to commit ourselves to great causes with courage, even though we lack certainty. We can be at one and the same time half-sure and whole-hearted."


WINTER, 1977-1978
This is from a noted psychologist, whose chief concern was with views of the human person as a functioning whole. I have always regarded it as one of the best summary descriptions of what a rational personality should be. He adds, incidentally, that where the attitudes of tentativeness and commitment are found together, one also finds another important attribute, namely a sense of humor. A sense of humor implies a sense of proportion, together with the ability to laugh at things you love, still loving them — including, of course, oneself. If this is true, it points, I think, to an important difference between a rational commitment and the kind of the same we associate with fanaticism. The fanatic is humorless; he cannot laugh either at his cause or at himself. To do so might imply uncertainty, and the "true believer" (in Eric Hoffer's sense of the term) cannot admit to himself any possibility of error. A rational conviction, religious or otherwise, is one which can admit uncertainty without being paralyzed by the admission.

I turn now to consider briefly some specific illustrations of the way in which popular slogans and stereotypes can become substitutes for understanding. They appear, because of vague associations, to have meaning — at least what is called emotive meaning — but in fact even this turns out to be elusive.

1. 'Liberation'

We hear a great deal today about 'liberation' in a variety of contexts. There is talk about the 'liberated' female, the 'liberated' male, the 'liberated' worker, the 'liberated' artist, the 'liberated' writer, and, of course, the 'liberated' homosexual. Obviously liberation is taken to be a Good Thing, and, of course, in many contexts it is. But liberation is not a quality, like height, or weight, or a condition, like happiness or peace of mind. Liberation is a relational term. It has meaning only if you specify (a) who is liberated, (b) in what respect, (c) from what, and (d) for what. Now in some contexts, these factors are quite clear, as when we talk about the abolition of slavery or freeing nations or peoples from colonialism. But as the term gets extended metaphorically, the meaning gets increasingly vague until, like Lewis Carroll's smiling Cheshire cat, the face has vanished leaving behind only the fading aura of the original expression. In this situation, 'liberation' can be invoked equally well on both sides of many issues, thus cancelling itself out.

The question of sexual freedom is a case in point. Sexual freedom — including freedom for homosexuals — is seen by its advocates as required in the interests of personal 'liberation' — in this case liberation from restrictions imposed by the culture and especially by the Church. Yet the argument upon which these supposedly "repressive" views were founded was itself based on the need for personal 'liberation' — in this case as Max Scheler described it: "a liberation of the highest powers of personality from blockage by the automatism of the lower drives." I shall not stop to argue here which view is right. My point is simply that talking abstractly about liberation proves nothing either way, since the concept can be (and has been) invoked on both sides. So also when Spinoza talked of "human bondage," he referred to men's bondage to their own passions, from which he believed rational men should always endeavor to free themselves. Today what Spinoza condemned as bondage is praised as the true measure of personal autonomy. As the context shifts, the concepts of 'liberation' and 'bondage' reverse their polarity.

I am not suggesting, of course, that liberation or being liberated is bad. I am saying only that if such terms are to have any ascertainable significance, one needs to look beyond them. Otherwise they function simply as ritual incantations, employed to avoid the need for addressing the underlying problems.

In this connection, I might note a further assumption which can add to confusions on this point. Many writers today either assert or assume that all socially imposed rules or norms are essentially repressive. This view stems in part, I think, from a tendency to take the criminal law as a model for all law (which involves, incidentally, a kind of stereotyping). This leads to the belief that the essential function of law is to impose restrictions upon individual conduct, supported by penalties forcibly imposed by government agents. Given the increasing spread of government operations, coupled with a serious distrust of governmental authority generally — a distrust which was nourished by the Watergate scandals and other evidences of malfeasance — it has come to be assumed that the law is not merely restrictive but seriously oppressive. This view is reinforced by the position of some existentialist philosophers who have claimed that it is a breach of personal authenticity — a kind of 'bad faith' in Sartre's terminology — for the individual to accept any general norms of conduct imposed externally by society. Although this point of view has some plausibility because it can be justified in certain cases, it leaves out of account the fact that some norms and laws can be enabling rather than restrictive, and the more basic fact that no community can exist at all without norms and standards of some kind, distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable behavior. The reason, as put succinctly by Dorothy Emmet, is that

"... in social life people sometimes compete and sometimes, for whatever reason, cooperate, and ... they could do neither effectively unless they could count up to a point on what others would do. These fairly stable mutual expectations, which are the conditions of purposeful action in any society, are only fulfilled where there are some generally accepted ways of behaving ..." (Rules, Roles and Relations, 11.)

If this fact is borne in mind, it may help to off-set the current feeling that society as such, and perhaps our own society in particular, is essentially repressive and that problems of individual self-restraint and self-control are of only secondary importance. In any case, where the older moralists and the Church stressed the primary importance for individuals of internal self-discipline as necessary to achieving personal integrity, many current writers (mistakenly in my opinion) equate integrity with autonomy and are thus led to suppose that personal integrity requires 'liberation' from externally imposed standards and rules. In this context, of course, personal responsibility is devalued, while society or government becomes, at the same time, responsible for most injustices yet an instrument of oppression if it endeavors to increase its control so as to cope with them.

2. 'Discrimination'

Because certain types of discrimination are unjust — notably discrimination against racial minorities — many people have come to speak and write as if all forms of discrimination were unjust. Thus the word 'discrimination' has come to be used, not only in the news media, but by some serious writers, as if discrimination were wrong in itself. To call something 'discriminatory' is a way of condemning it.

This is a very serious and dangerous error, because all knowledge, all

(continued on back cover)
MADELINE R. ROBINTON


Professor Drescher addresses himself to the problem of what caused the British to abolish slavery. Concentrating on the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, Drescher demolishes the theories current for over thirty years that it was a "humanitarian cloak covering economic interests" or the neo-Marxian position of Williams in Capitalism and Slavery which was based on the assumption of the declining value of both the slave trade and the West Indian trade. Drescher effectively shows that both at that time were in process of expansion.


These lectures delivered by the celebrated French historian are his reflections on his most recent work, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, of which one volume has been published. With a lucidity and simplicity of style he talks about the market economy not in abstruse theoretical terms but clothed in vivid down-to-earth detail, illuminated by agreement and disagreement with other historians and theorists who have worked in the field. Illustrated with delightful woodcuts of the period.


This collection of essays, urbane, wise and sophisticated, range from the ancient world to the contemporary and reflect Momigliano's probing mind, his erudition and breadth of knowledge, and his command of French, German, Italian, English and American historical studies as well as those of the classical world, Greek, Hebraic and Roman. Trained as an ancient historian at the University of Turin, he went to England in the 1930s, became professor at University College, London, and is now Alexander White Professor at the University of Chicago.


Although this book was originally intended for Arab readers, its author, a professor at the University of Rabat, Morocco, versed in European civilization, poses his problem in Western terms, making it comprehensible to the Western as well as to the Arab intellectual. Professor Laroui is concerned with the failure of the Arabs to come to grips with their history in western terms and to achieve a sense of reality. He explains the difference in the way the Arab looks at the past, at historic fact and its impact on the present.


This is a fascinating account of the October uprising in 1917. The story starts with the failure of the July rising and it is good narrative history. The participants come alive in the day-to-day developments. The interplay of individuals, the famous, Lenin, Trotsky, Kerensky, and the not so famous, and of parties is documented and skillfully handled to explain the successful seizure of power by so small a group.


This book by the holder of the Chair of the French Revolution at the Sorbonne and a leading Marxist scholar is not a simplistic history of the class struggle. It reflects his own discrimination and precision in the use of words and concepts. The complexity and divisions within the various social classes are clearly delineated. It is beautifully organized and asks the right questions which makes it a useful book for students. The translator has provided a detailed chronology and helpful notes.


These lively and thought-provoking essays, articles and reviews written over the years by the distinguished medievalist, Sylvia Thrupp, have been brought together to reveal her thinking in a coherent way on her research on medieval topics: social control, social attitudes, social change and historical demography — each section introduced by an outstanding medievalist — and on comparative studies. Her unflagging interest in comparative studies focused not only on historical treatment of similar subjects in different areas and in different times but also on the utilization of and the cross-fertilization by the various disciplines of the social sciences, and led her to found and edit Comparative Studies in Society and History.


For the medievalist and historian, the student, this book based almost exclusively on manuscript sources succeeds in giving the flavor of the period when Northern Europe was emerging from the devastation of the invasions and wars of the ninth century. Dr. Lutz concentrates on these various men as teachers even though many of them were active in the hierarchy; one, Gerbert, became a famous pope. She is concerned with what they taught, their relations to their pupils and in some cases their methods. How they collected their books and in some cases their handbooks and manuals and how they themselves were educated are vividly described by use of contemporary accounts.

RONALD GEBALE


During the past decade astronomical observations, physical measurements, laboratory investigations, and advances in theoretical physics have enabled scientists to develop a scenario for the events that took place during the initial stages of existence of the universe we know. After preparing the stage by providing brief descriptions of the large scale structure of the universe, the discovery in 1965 of cosmic radiation remaining from the early universe and the kinds of "elementary" particles and their interactions with radiation and each other, Weinberg follows the course of cosmic evolution during the time period of his title by working out the state of affairs in each of a succession of "frames." This clearly written book is intended for a reader who is willing to puzzle through some detailed arguments but who is not at home in either mathematics or physics. That reader will be surprised at the detail and consistency of the story, although a bit let down by the admission that the first one-hundredth of a second is still beyond present comprehension.


This polished book is in sharp contrast with and complements Weinberg's. It begins with a brief qualitative account of the early period of the universe, and leads rapidly into a description of the evolution of the earth and of life on the earth. In The Promise of Mars and "Life on Another World," Jastrow treats the philosophical significance of the Viking journeys. In his view, the tests for life that were carried out by the Mars-bound spacecraft suggest that "life or some process imitating life exists on Mars today." Jastrow places great emphasis on the riddles of creation which in his view destroyed the evidence needed for study of its cause and the origin of life, which remains beyond the capability of laboratory investigation to duplicate. Faith is as crucial a basis for science as for religion he holds.


... the only works known to me which are in the same rank as I (in logic) are Aristotle, Duns Scotus, and Leibniz, the three greatest logicians in my estimation ... " In his long life (1839-1914) Pierce worked not only in logic but also in several other branches of pure mathe-
mathematics, in probability in the theory of errors of observations, in econometrics, in astronomy, in nature (measured the length of the meter in lengths of light in 1879). He wrote on the nature of mathematical reasoning and developed a "new math" textbook for primary schools that was never published. His published works have previously been collected in print, and his philosophy of mathematical thought (he was a University of Cambridge). There exists a Charles S. Peirce Society, which the editor of the volumes noted here is a past president as well as being a distinguished writer on the history and philosophy of mathematics. These volumes make accessible Peirce's unpublished manuscripts for the use of scholars interested in evaluating Peirce's work more fully. For a more general reader they give insight into a man whose interests encompassed a truly broad spectrum of science and mathematics, who was in communication with many giant figures of nineteenth and early twentieth century mathematics and who wrote in a lively, entertaining style.

Applications of Energy: Nineteenth Century. Ed. R. Bruce Lindsay, Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, Stroudsburg, Pa. $32.

The second volume is the Benchmark Papers on Energy, picks up the story with an original translation by the editor of the initial sections of Helmholtz's great 1847 memoir "On the Conservation of Energy." It contains excerpts and complete papers by all of the giants of nineteenth century thermodynamics and energetics — Clausius, Lord Kelvin, Joule, Mayer, Maxwell, Lord Rayleigh, Ostwald, Gibbs, and Planck as well as others. Where necessary, the editor has supplied additional translations. The papers are divided into coherent groups, each with explanatory comment by the editor.


Do long division as the ancient Egyptian did, solve quadratic equations as a Babylonian, follow the beginnings of Greek mathematics, and tackle still famous problems in the ways of the ancients: work your way through Roman, Arabic, Indian contributions up to the practical arithmetic of the 1810 U.S. and the abstract foundations laid at the end of that century. Written as a textbook, this volume should have considerable interest for the person who is curious about the inscriptions on papyri, cuneiform tablets, ways of computation developed by other cultures and, more generally, the history of mathematics.

High school math is sufficient background.


An account of the observing, theorizing, and arguing that went on during the period from 1915 to 1940 and gave us the main features of our present view of galactic structure including, of course, our own Milky Way.

ELLIO T ZUP Nick


In this major study, two British economic historians make available to English readers, for the first time, the major fruits of the research carried on by European scholars on the economic development of continental Europe in the nineteenth century. In separate chapters devoted to individual countries, the authors analyze the social, economic, and political impact of development; the roles of specific industries, agriculture, banks, governments, international trade and international investment in the growth process; the causes and effects of internal and external migrations, cartelization and protection. Economists and historians will inevitably disagree with some of the analyses and conclusions. There cannot be many, however, who will not be in awe of the prodigious scholarship.


Despite its highly polemical, and sometimes acerbic, tone, this book should not be dismissed. The focus is on the political implications of the widespread acceptance in the advanced industrial societies of Keynesian ideas. The book's thesis is that Keynesianism has eroded the traditional constraints on government expenditure and has thus contributed importantly both to the growth of the state and to the two developments that threaten the future of democratic societies. The problem, which the authors do not adequately deal with, is how to get the best of both worlds: avoiding the political excesses of Keynesianism while retaining its economic advantages. Is there no way to save the baby while getting rid of the bathwater?


The collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1971 is one of the momentous developments in recent times. The books under review are some recent additions to the already vast literature on what went wrong and how we go from here. The DeVries volume is an official history of the International Monetary Fund in the five critical years preceding the collapse of the system. It is fascinating not only because of its insights into the impending crisis, but also because it is a marvelous case study of how international institutions operate. Bergsten's study can serve as a useful, if somewhat tedious, guide through the international monetary maze. The Williamson book has a narrower focus. It explores the reasons for the failure to reconstruct the system after its breakdown in 1971.

JAMES C. STONE


Jean Curtis has written a wise, thought-provoking book on what is currently one of the major trends in contemporary society — working mothers. Based on interviews with over two hundred women of various life styles across the country, Curtis has provided an example of the richness of qualitative data. She describes the daily conflicts and heartache faced by these women, where the source of conflict frequently rests with the expectations of "self as mother" which are not congruent with the realities of work.

Guilt plays a major role in the psychological hassles of the working mother. It is a frequent outcome because mothers more often than fathers are the "psychological parent." This parent is never off the hook in terms of perceived responsibility, whether at home or at work. Mothers not only must perform well at their jobs, but must not fail at home. As Curtis notes, "If the kids are in trouble, that's because the mother is working." Fatigue, the need for private-time, and the continual problem of child care arrangements, are the three most common problems of working mothers. None of these are easily resolved but supposedly worth the effort for the woman who is committed to working.

Curtis provides an interesting, descriptive typology of husbands too. This portion of the book, as well as the last section which gives advice to working mothers, is well worth reading but certainly not as powerful as the earlier chapters. If you want to understand the problems of this growing group of women — working mothers — and that's most of us, this is a must book.

A Comprehensive Framework for Instructional Objectives. Larry Hannah and John U. Michaelis. Addison-Wesley. $5.95.

In education these days, evaluation of curricula, programs, courses, is IN. Systematic planning is possible only when objectives are carefully and precisely written. The authors have prepared a practical and usable alternative to the many cumbersome taxonomies on how to write instructional objectives. They focus on the four categories of objectives of primary concern to teachers and curriculum-makers — content, intellectual processes, basic skills, and attitudes/values.


This is a succinct and thoughtful summary of a three-volume treatise, of which only the first volume has been published. (American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783. The second volume is Cremin's differentiation between education and schooling. Education is "the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit, evoke, or acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, or sensibilities, as well as any outcomes of that effort. By contrast,

THE KEY REPORTER
schooling is not the only agency of education along with others such as the family church, libraries, museums, factories, the military, radio, press, television. If you like this distinction, you will own Cremin's treatment of events from colonial to modern times.

On the Philosophy of Higher Education. John Brubacher. Jossey-Bass. $9.95. In this period of steady-state and declining enrollments among 18-21-year olds, Brubacher's why higher education question is timely. The heart of the matter is Brubacher's critique of the contemporary assumptions about the purposes of higher education at a time when he believes higher education is in a position of prime importance to society. Thus, the why question he poses has import for educators and lay persons.

Growing Up Suburban. Edward A. Wynne. Texas. $10.95. Since so much has been written about city children and city schools, it's refreshing to have a volume which treats our kids and our schools — middle-class kids in suburbia. This is a plea to return some fundamental ("old-fashioned") values and goals.

EARL W. COUNT

Etruscan Dress. Larissa Bonfante. Johns Hopkins. $17.50. Etruscan artists, from B.C. 650 to B.C. 100, attest that their compatriots dressed diversely, altered fashions over the duration, drew upon Near Eastern, Greek, Roman, "Hellenistic" design, yet remained creative. This well-researched study follows, "cut-and-paste" portraiture is not high fashion in current ethnography; in the present day it is worthy. For the life-cycle of woman is a reality, however abstracted; and the "popular" image of Americanin womanhood sorely needs curing. Its dignity matched the stature of the man's. The author follows through the life cycle and sweeps panoramically across the continent per phase. We have general descriptions interlarded with anecdotes and legends about real and quasi-persons.

Native Genius in Anonymous Architecture in North America. Sybil Mohly- Nagy. Schocken. $6.50. The author vindicates trenchantly Frank Lloyd Wright's proposition that vernacular architecture "is intimately related to the environment and to the heart-life of the people." (See her dedication.)

The Conflict Between the California Indian and White Civilization. Sherburne F. Cook. Eds.: Woodrow Borah, & Robert E. Heizer. California. $24.75; p. $6.95. A reprinting of 6 essays from Ibero-Americana (1940-1943). We expect of course no happy tale from this genre; the essays were excoriations on first appearance; they have stood up none the less. Though long unavailable, Cook's facts were deadly enough — he lied no cause. And gone is the romance of the Spanish era — the incurable diseases, the undesired changes of diet, the abuse of the women, social and economic wrenches. The people shrank drastically in numbers, even to extinction. Then came the Anglos... the survivors resisted, invariably to their compounded undoing. Today's remnant has not yet completed its adaptation to a white-man diet and life-mode.

Black Gods and Kings: Yoruba Art at UCLA. Robert Farris Thompson. Indiana. $18.50. That Yoruba art is powerfully articulate, we know; but Thompson has walked and sat in Yorubaland, and his meditations are the more telling for the wisdom-sayings and folktales they select. "The point of this volume is not to illustrate an important university collection so much as to extend the sense of a great black civilization... in Yorubaland... people, not objects, are the essence of art. The purpose of sculpture is to praise people and the gods with beauty. Yoruba, in brief, assume that someone who embodies command, coolness and character is someone extremely beautiful and like unto a god..." (p. 4 f). A deep essay in world-view through aesthetics that yet does not lose the scholar's touch.

Folklore and Nationalism in Modern Finland. William A. Wilson. Indiana. $10. What "folklore" means in European context is incomprehensible in an American. In re Finland — its enduring fate has been border-and-buffer between Occident and incompatible Byzantium-stepe. Thus, it was a folkloristic scholarship that led the groping dis-entanglement from a Swedendom (16th century et seq.), then the repudiation of a Russiandom (1809 et seq.), and continues to further national self-definition. Earlier scholarship romanticized a chthonic antiquity; as with the Occident generally, scientific canon has made for a richer reliability; latterly, folkloristics has served both leftist and rightist opportunism. The vital question: shall folklore be used "to study man or to control man?" (see p. 208)

Festivals of the Athenians. H. W. Parke. Cornell. $16.50. The expectably fine scholarship of this historian. The sources: literary, epi- graphic items, vase art and sculpture. Athens had no "sacred" vs. "secular" festivals. Some tended to be identified with particular clans; some, with women; some cult rituals were promoted by the city-state. As the latter declined, theatre and athletic games detached themselves and traveled on their own momentum, but the "mysteries" survived (notably, the Eleusinian) and participated in a larger and growing world.
provide a welcome relief from the current visions of gloom."

Entries for the Phi Beta Kappa book awards are submitted annually by both university presses and trade publishers. Books in each of the three categories are studied by a committee of six distinguished scholars; for the 1977 award, 90 books were entered for the Emerson Award, 88 for the Gauss prize and 30 for the Award in Science.

understanding, and all virtue, including justice itself, involve discrimination. Imagine, if you can, a person lacking all ability to discriminate. Such a person could not distinguish anything from anything else; experience, if we could call it such, would be a mere blur — what William James called a buzzing blooming confusion. He could not tell light from dark, up from down, future from past, friend from foe, truth from falsity or good from bad. He would be worse off than most animals, since, as Justice Holmes remarked in connection with the important distinction we make in law and morals between intentional and unintentional acts, even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked. (Common Law, p. 3)

Many distinctions can, of course, be questioned, but if we make none at all, we cannot discriminate between justice and injustice.

More specifically, the first requirement of any system of justice is that it should discriminate between the innocent and the guilty. To treat an innocent person like a guilty person is not to serve the interests of justice and equality, but to deny them. Again, all laws and rules of any kind discriminate among different kinds of conduct. A law against stealing discriminates against thieves. A law against drunken driving discriminates in favor of those who are sober. Thus it is obvious that the question in all cases of alleged 'discrimination' is whether the discrimination can be justified, i.e., whether there are reasonable and acceptable grounds for making it. Consider, for example, the case of Bakke vs. Regents of the University of California decided last September by the Supreme Court of California and now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. That well known case involves what is called 'reverse discrimination.' The issues are complex and extremely important. This evening I want to call attention only to one point. If a college or university has more applicants than it can accept — in the case there were more than 2000 applicants for 100 places — it is going to have to discriminate among them on some basis, since some will be taken while others are refused. So the question is not whether you will discriminate, but what grounds may properly be used in making the selection.

Notice that several grounds might be used. One might go on the principle of first come, first served, accepting applications in the order of receipt without any regard to qualifications. This would be normal and reasonable if one were, say, assigning hotel rooms or theatre tickets. But I think most of us would think this method unreasonable for university admissions. Again, one might make the choice by lot, among all applications received by a certain date. Here every applicant would have an equal chance. And this method would be appropriate, for example, in administering a draft law for military service. But again, one would hesitate to think this method of discrimination was suitable for university admissions. Why? Because most of us feel, I think, that academic qualifications ought to be relevant. Indeed, Bakke's claim seems to be that priorities should be determined solely on that basis. But this claim would, of course, result in discriminating against those with poorer academic qualifications regardless of other merits.

What emerges is the fact that discrimination is not wrong per se. It becomes wrong when, as, and if it is arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust. And this depends upon the circumstances and the context. Decisions here may be difficult, and much depends on wise judgment. But this brings us back to the initial point: there is no substitute for care and prayerful rational inquiry, weighing all relevant factors. Invoking slogans and stereotypes serves only to cloud the issues.

I could go on indefinitely, discussing other important words which have been so worn out or skewed by current usage that they have become substitutes for thinking rather than aids to inquiry. And there are many new verbal coinages, too, which are vague and evocative rather than helpful: terms like racism, sexism, elitism.

But I have said enough to suggest that the first task of rational inquiry is either to avoid such terms altogether, or to make sure that they be clarified. This requires looking behind the labels and the stereotypes to the issues. The main difficulty is that the more complex our problems become, the more pressure there seems to be to find simplistic solutions. Let us do our best to avoid yielding to that pressure.