NOTES FROM A VISITING SCHOLAR

by Leonard C. Pronko

When I was asked to participate in the Visiting Scholar Program of Phi Beta Kappa, part of my delight arose from a missionary zeal, and part from a natural curiosity regarding students and teachers engaged in the study of subjects similar to mine. As a partisan of non-realistic theater, and particularly as a performer and teacher of Japanese Kabuki, one of my goals is to waken audiences to the exciting possibilities in a theater that has little of the petty banality found in much of today's theater. I was happy, then, when all the schools inviting me chose the same subject for my public lecture—a Kabuki lecture-demonstration. I am not certain that I made any miraculous conversions, but I think I left a number of people somewhat enlightened. I was particularly satisfied when people told me enthusiastically that the program had opened up a whole new world to them, or when theater specialists admitted that they had always been bored by Kabuki but had suddenly discovered that it was meaningful and enjoyable.

Teaching Kabuki in theater workshops was a fascinating experience because it brought me into both psychological and physical contact with students who had

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TRIENNAL COUNCIL TO MEET IN BOSTON

The thirty-third triennial Council of the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa will meet on August 19–22, 1982, in Boston, Massachusetts. A highlight of the national meeting will be the presentation of the Phi Beta Kappa Award for Distinguished Service to the Humanities to historian Dumas Malone, the noted Jefferson scholar.

The Epsilon of Massachusetts Chapter at Boston University (pictured above) will host the meeting, and Boston University President John Silber will welcome the Council delegates at a reception. The major celebratory event will be the Council banquet on August 21, at which the principal speaker will be Radcliffe President Matina Horner. The Copley Plaza Hotel will serve as the headquarters for the meeting.

This Council will be convening ninety-nine years after the first National Council met in the Court of Appeals room of the Town Hall in Saratoga Springs, New York. There, twenty-three delegates representing thirteen chapters elected the first Senate, which included among its members Charles W. Eliot, Edward Everett Hale, and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Today there are 228 chapters and 44 associations entitled to representation in the Council.

As the legislative body of the United Chapters, the Council will consider and vote on the Senate's recommendations for the establishment of six new chapters. This vote will be the culmination of a process that started at the beginning of the triennium in 1979 with the submission of applications for charters to the Committee on Qualifications and proceeded with the committee's evaluation of the applicants and its recommendations to the Senate in December 1981.

The Council will also take up matters of Phi Beta Kappa policy and will elect officers and senators for the coming triennium. Nominated for president of the United Chapters is Catherine Stratemann Sims, formerly dean and professor of history at Sweet Briar College and for several years active in Phi Beta Kappa as chairman of the Committee on Qualifications, chairman of the Phi Beta Kappa Foundation, and vice-president of the United Chapters. The nominee for vice-president is Norman F. Ramsey, Higgins Professor of Physics at Harvard University and a member of Phi Beta Kappa's Committee on the

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AMERICA’S LIMITED POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
by Norman A. Graebner

For many Americans the world has come to seem singularly dangerous. Through much of the 1970s the prevailing view of the Soviet Union, despite its burgeoning lead in conventional and nuclear power, had been reassuring. Soviet leaders had argued effectively that the show of force along their borders in Western Europe and China was necessary because their military obligations were unique. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 demolished America’s complacency. That action persuaded the nation’s leaders and journalists alike that the Soviets were now prepared to project their mushrooming power far beyond their borders. President Jimmy Carter addressed the country on January 4, 1980: “A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world’s oil supplies.” Any Soviet moves into countries bordering Afghanistan, he warned, would endanger “the strategic and peaceful balance of the entire world.”

Several days later the President told a White House gathering that the “Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to world peace since the Second World War.” Ronald Reagan caught the post-Afghanistan alarms at full tide, embellished them, and rode them to victory. He entered office in January 1981 proclaiming the coming decade one of supreme danger to Western civilization. That mood of anxiety seemed to permeate American society. In an NBC–Associated Press survey of November 1981, 76 percent of Americans polled expected nuclear war within the decade.

What rendered Soviet aggressiveness especially disconcerting was the apparent weakening of the American commitment to international order. Beset with a loss of purpose, the nation seemed unable to define its interests, much less defend them. Its repeated acceptance of humiliation without even an expression of outrage appeared to symbolize its moral and physical deterioration.

That the position of the United States in world affairs deteriorated in the 1970s is not a matter of serious contention. But did the decline from the previous decade reflect some form of national failure or simply predictable changes in world relations over which the United States had little control? Some writers have pointed to America’s failure in Vietnam as the “hidden ulcer” in the country’s decline. Actually, America’s special place among the nations of the world slipped in the 1970s for reasons far more fundamental than the loss of a limited Asian war. Emerging from the global struggle unscathed in 1945, the United States inherited the earth, but by the mid-1970s every statistical measure revealed America’s decline from its postwar plateau. At mid-century the United States accounted for 50 percent of the world’s military expenditures; in 1975 only 25 percent. In 1950 the United States produced 60 percent of the world’s manufactured goods; in 1975 it accounted for half that percentage. In 1975, six European countries claimed per capita incomes higher than that of the United States. In many areas of modern economic life the United States no longer led the other industrial democracies. Without the capacity to project its power and influence to many parts of the globe, the United States seemed scarcely a superpower. Still, America’s relative economic decline reflected less a national failure than the remarkable success of the nation’s postwar policies in re-building war-torn Europe and Japan. Thus the decline of America as an economic giant was inevitable given the artificially predominant status that the United States enjoyed amid the ruins of 1945.

At the policy level the nation’s retreat was even more predictable. Washington’s postwar neglect of the historic limitations on American foreign policy would eventually demand reexamination. In areas of or on issues of potential dispute no nation has ever operated successfully outside the realm of its generally recognized national interests. The Founding Fathers defined those interests almost 200 years ago. For Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, it seemed essential that the United States maintain its political and military dominance of the Western Hemisphere. The nation, to maximize its security, would support the European balance of power, taking a stand against any country that, through its dominance of Europe, might endanger the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, the United States would seek to prevent the rise of a dominant power in the Orient. Finally, Hamilton understood, the United States would maintain a worldwide commercial empire. Because commerce, itself a peaceful pursuit, might lead to conflict, Hamilton urged the United States to maintain the necessary engines of coercion to protect its outlying interests. These varied concerns, historic and easily stated, guided the country through much of its history. When the United States pursued its limited interests with accuracy and diligence, the triumphs in diplomacy and war were often spectacular. When it failed to judge its interests with precision, the costs were invariably excessive.

Those early Cold War successes that measured the genuine triumphs of American postwar diplomacy conformed to the nation’s historic interests. In Europe the conditions had changed, demanding American efforts to rebuild the continent’s political and military equilibrium. Washington gained its objectives quickly because Europe’s specific challenges gave the economic and military supremacy of the United States a special relevance. The marvels of the triumphs of American policy coincided largely with what the nation’s power would buy at a time when that power was excessive: the economic rehabilitation of Western Europe and Japan, the promotion of international trade and investment, and the maintenance of a massive defense structure that underwrote the containment effort and played an essential role in Europe’s postwar political evolution. Even as American military power reinforced the division of Europe, its economic power, working through international agencies for trade and monetary stabilization, contributed to the world’s unprecedented prosperity. The ease whereby the United States gained its postwar position of unchallenged leadership in Europe and elsewhere exaggerated the notion that its new global posture reflected a permanent rearrangement of power. In the bargain, that American power had indeed become global. What contributed to the illusion of permanent supremacy even in Asia was the wartime destruction of all the imperial structures that had established the traditional boundaries of American influence. The war not only destroyed the power of Germany and Japan, it also

This article is taken from a lecture given by Norman A. Graebner, Stettinius Professor of Modern American History at the University of Virginia, as one of this year’s Visiting Scholars.

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presaged the final collapse of the British and French empires. Indeed, the United States after mid-century expanded to fill a worldwide power vacuum. As a result, Walter Lippmann observed (in a September 1969 article by Henry Brandon in The New York Times Magazine), "we flowed forward beyond our natural limits. . . . The miscalculation . . . falsified all our other calculations—what our power was, what we could afford to do, what influence we had to exert in the world."

What allowed this overextension of American commitments beyond Europe, at least momentarily, was the absence of indigenous pressures against the country's varied commitments and the assumption that threats of massive retaliation, if necessary, would protect those commitments from external aggression. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles assured the nation in January 1956 that the calm of East and Southeast Asia was simply a triumph of his strategy of massive retaliation. White House adviser Walt W. Rostow explained to his readers in The New York Times Magazine as late as June 1964 why American containment policies had held the line in Asia. "The military initiatives with respect to Laos and Vietnam," he wrote, ". . . would have had no serious effect on the course of events unless the Communist leaders concerned were convinced that, echeloned behind these limited demonstrations of force, there had been both the capabilities and the will to deal with every form of escalation they might mount in response, up to and including all out nuclear war."

Somehow that threat of retaliation to any level, including nuclear war, did not eliminate the subsequent need to dispatch over two million soldiers to Vietnam. Obviously the threat of massive retaliation was not the controlling element in Asia at all. No external force could prevent the increasing politicization of Third World societies and the creation of governments more anti-Western, nationalist, self-centered, and resistant to external influence than the former pro-Western, often aristocratic, regimes that they replaced. The 1970s brought anti-Western political upheavals to Iran, Ethiopia, Pakistan, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Nigeria. The world of Asia and Africa, in large measure, moved outside the realm of big power control.

That simple Cold War environment in which the possession of power was the key to success disappeared sometime in the mid-1960s. For a decade thereafter the United States government perpetuated the illusion of effective global power, based on the will to use it, by fighting in Vietnam. In that struggle the American commitment to resist communism in all its forms reached the dead end. After Saigon's fall in 1975 the United States remained the world's leading power, but by then the troublesome issues that captured the headlines challenged few traditional American interests and thus defied the exertion of will or even the creation of genuine policy. How could the United States curtail the violence, terrorism, infringements on human rights, international traffic in arms, and undeclared conflicts that threatened world stability? How could it relieve the problems of poverty or slow an arms race that was costing the world one billion dollars a day? Meg Greenfield, writing in Newsweek in February 1978, saw the dilemma that faced the country. "So what are we going to do about it?" she asked. "If the rulers of Cambodia embark on a policy of national genocide, if the Cubans take up [Soviet] arms in Africa. . . . if the Western Europeans vote Communists into office? Is there anything we can do in an era in which we have even better reasons to be alarmed for expressing the hope that Italy remain a democracy? If that is regarded as an act of aggression, it tells you something about our role as a 'superpower' in the post-Vietnam world."

The United States had approached the stage where it could neither admit that a certain event that happened abroad was not its concern nor act effectively when it was.

After Saigon's fall in 1975 the United States remained the world's leading power, but by then the troublesome issues that captured the headlines challenged few traditional American interests and thus defied the exertion of will or even the creation of genuine policy.

Already the central challenge to American policy was clear: How would it adjust to the reality of Third World assertiveness and the country's limited interest and influence in opposing it? President Jimmy Carter met the challenge by acknowledging America's declining world role and the diminishing strategic importance of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. His assumption that the Third World countries had interests of their own and the will to pursue them reinforced his determination to avoid simple anti-Soviet postures to perpetuate the status quo. In his Notre Dame University speech of May 1977 he rejected the traditional Cold War assumption that American interests were global. "Being confident of our own future," he said, "we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear."

For Carter the political, economic, and ideological potential of the Third World was sufficient to eliminate any serious Soviet threat. In a world of triumphant nationalism, American power had no legitimate or necessary use. In deserting the old commitment to global containment, the Carter administration accepted the growing Soviet presence in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia with general unconcern. Amid domestic ruminations about the administration's failure of nerve, the expanding Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa could only embarrass the President. Despite the accusations of weakness, however, Carter held to his policies of inaction. Following the Democratic defeat in 1980, Zbigiew Brzezinski, the President's assistant for national security affairs, asserted that the fatigue of Vietnam had prevented United States counteraction to ward off Soviet and Cuban assistance to Ethiopia; he never said what form that counteraction would have taken. Perhaps Carter's mistake lay less in his rejection of force than in his neglect of a confrontationist posture that might have maintained the illusion of power and will while cloaking the reality of limited intent. If any of his critics really wanted an American war in Africa, they never revealed it.

Strategically, the Middle East loomed more important than Africa, made so by its gigantic stores of oil, its central location astride the major routes to the Orient, and its proximity to the Soviet Union. After the Suez Crisis of 1956, the United States displaced the British and French to become the protector of Middle Eastern stability. To limit Soviet influence in the region, it offered aid to pro-Western regimes under the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, supported Israel against the Arab world in an otherwise evenhanded policy, and sought to transform Iran into a bastion of Middle Eastern security with heavy sales of sophisticated military equipment to the Shah. Washington's Middle Eastern policy faced its initial test in early 1979 when a Moslem revolution overthrew the Shah, an event that dramatized the vulnerability of American power in the Middle East. The Carter administration responded with a reassertion of America's global interests. The President advocated additional
arms sales to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel; otherwise he continued his policy of inaction. With the seizure of the American embassy in November 1979, Iran challenged American sensibilities but not American security. For Carter this again eliminated resorting to force.

Already facing open challenges to its will and prestige in the Middle East, the United States reacted to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 with bewilderment and rage. Afghanistan was not a Western interest; nor did Soviet occupation alter the world’s strategic balance. But for the first time since 1945 the Russians had used force outside Eastern Europe. The President admitted bitterly that the Soviets had taken him in. Unable to ignore the Soviet action, the President faced an unfortunate decision. He could either inform the American people that the Soviet invasion, while irresponsible, did not touch any vital American interest or declare the Soviet behavior dangerous to all southwest Asia. The latter evaluation would demand some form of resistance to Soviet aggression; it would also assure the needed public approval. Brzezinski argued that the Soviet Union threatened American interests from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan, especially Pakistan and the states bordering the Persian Gulf. Soon the President set forth his Carter Doctrine. “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region,” he declared, “will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.” He continued with the assurance that such an assault “will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” But if the President suspected that the Soviets had embarked on a program to control the Persian Gulf, he would have called not for embargoes on grain, technology, and the Olympics but for national mobilization.

Few questioned the importance of the Persian Gulf region to the Western world. Nevertheless, doubts remained regarding the appropriateness of the American response to the Afghan crisis. The administration made no effort to explain what had happened in Afghanistan and why the Soviet invasion endangered all of southwest Asia, much less how the United States intended to defend the region. State and Defense Department officials agreed that the United States could not confront the Soviets successfully along Russia’s southern flank. Some analysts wondered, moreover, how the United States could fashion an effective containment strategy for the Middle East when the dangers to regional stability lay less in Soviet expansionism than in the local and national animosities that existed within the region itself. For the first time in its history the country had created a vital interest beyond its control. Any regional war that involved the big powers would begin with the destruction of the oil, either by the United States or by the Soviet Union. For some the only answer to American vulnerability in the Middle East was the reduction of energy use.

Determined to halt the retreat of the Carter years, the Reagan administration entered office in January 1981 committed to the reassertion of the country’s global leadership. Appraising the Soviets that their days of military dominance were numbered, the new President pressed Congress for larger military expenditures without much concern for where the money would go. The needed message to the world would emerge from the expenditures themselves. The new globalism, freed of its recent restraints, required that the United States again confront Soviet expansionism wherever it occurred—in Africa, the Middle East, or Central America.

Despite its confrontational mood, the new leadership framed no policies that conformed to its self-proclaimed global obligations. The foreign policy phrases honed in the early days of the administration were not the determinants of policy at all. Reagan’s continuing anti-Soviet crusade in El Salvador brought neither security to the cities nor peace to the countryside. He, no less than Carter, coexisted with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Africa, and the Arabian peninsula. In late April 1981 the President undermined his policy of toughness completely by ending President Carter’s embargo on grain shipments to Russia. So casual, inconsistent, and cautious were the Reagan policies toward Russia that analysts accused the administration of having no strategy at all.

If the United States cannot deter Soviet advances everywhere, it has no choice but to determine with some precision what it must defend. At issue is the protection of those minimum conditions that will enable the country to survive and prosper. Perhaps the most troublesome challenge to American policy is that of defining and defending interests in areas where the Soviet Union enjoys a clear strategic advantage, such as the Persian Gulf. The only promising formula for future policy in the Middle East seems to be the assurance of a wider war. Whether the simple threat of nuclear retaliation would defend the region from Soviet attack is, however, uncertain. The Soviets know that any nuclear war fought to protect the oil would endanger the United States and Europe as well. To court such disaster in defense of the Persian Gulf appears dangerous, even irresponsible. It denies, above all, the power and interests of other nations.

In any genuine defense of the international equilibrium, the potential sources of deterrent power far transcend the American nuclear arsenal; every country on the globe opposes Soviet aggression. Amid the world’s general concern for stability, the possibilities of coalition diplomacy should be promising enough. Alliances enable their members not only to maximize the means of policy at their disposal but also to create essential opportunities for mutual instruction. Coalition diplomacy rests primarily on agreements concerning interests and objectives; no country will entrust its defense to another unless the policies they pursue and the ends they seek reflect common perceptions of the dangers they face. It is at the level of ends, not of means, that coalitions break down. Obviously the United States and its European allies have failed to sustain the vital relationships and the common assumptions of danger that once gave NATO its relevance. Britain, the least critical among European countries of Washington’s leadership, never regained its prewar status as a major military-political European power. France, recovered but fiercely independent, has scarcely followed the American lead at all. West Germany’s dissatisfaction with America’s European role has been even more confusing inasmuch as that steadfast country was central to Europe’s defense structure. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has made no effort to conceal his disenchantment with Washington. U.S. policies outside Europe have produced little or no support within NATO at all. In some measure the problem of declining good faith in U.S. leadership lies within Europe itself. Europeans have not always been constructive in presenting their views or in coming to terms with America’s special contribution to Europe’s defense and its special role as world leader.

Fortunately, the decline of the United States, both as a military superpower and as spokesman of the Western world, was no demonstration of national failure. American power was not the only source of stability in the non-Soviet world; neither did the elements of stability exist only as the United

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States gave them unity and purpose. They lay essentially in the sovereignty of nations. Amid such advantages the United States succeeded where it mattered. It protected its essential interests in the world’s balance of power by promoting the independence of those areas whose independence comprised the international equilibrium. It discouraged attacks on its own soil and on the territories of the world’s non-Soviet industrial centers. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in no measure threatened the integrity of Britain, Western Europe, Japan, China, or even the oil regions of the Middle East. George Kennan, acknowledging the world’s fundamental stability, urged Americans not to exaggerate Moscow’s military capabilities or the expansiveness of its intentions. “If we insist,” he warned, “... on viewing [Soviet leaders] as total and incorrigible enemies, consumed only with their fears and hatred of us and dedicated to nothing other than our destruction— that, in the end, is the way we shall assuredly have them, if for no other reason than that our view of them allows for nothing else, either for us or for them” (The New York Times, November 16, 1981).

The current emphasis on being strong does not communicate very much about what the country can or should do with that strength in confronting Soviet influence in the Third World. The Soviets gained nothing militarily and little politically from the continuing revolutions that swept the Asian and African continents. The events of the 1970s shattered the myth of the Communist monolith as the vehicle of Soviet expansionism. For the Kremlin no Third World gain could conceivably counterbalance China’s bitter defection from the Russian camp. Indeed, two thirds of the Communist-led peoples of the world look to the United States, not to the USSR, for support. If the limited Russian military presence outside the Soviet bloc were to remain troublesome, countering policy could have efficacy only in regions where interests were clear and strategic advantages unmistakable. Officials achieve nothing by declaring interests that no other country will take seriously or that the American people will not sustain with a full national response. The record has demonstrated repeatedly that the interests that will elicit the support of the American people over time are exceedingly limited. But the restraints, great as they are, have never eliminated the opportunities for sound leadership to define and to protect those interests that historically have underwritten the security and the welfare of the American people.

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**Reading recommended by the book committee**

**Humanities**

ROBERT B. HEILMAN


These volumes are edited with extraordinary informative fullness. General readers can work through them, or browse in them, with pleasure in the full picture they give of personalities and times (Tennyson and Fitzgerald were both born in 1809, Emily Tennyson in 1813). All three writers knew virtually everyone in the literary world, and the Tennysons knew many major political figures. The Tennyson letters are both by and to Alfred, and by various other Tennysons; they portray many clashes and troubles. Lady Tennyson’s Journal reveals her not only as devoted wife and mother, but as a woman of wide intellectual and artistic interests. Massive correspondence, including over 1000 new letters, shows the translator of the Rubaiyat to be a lively writer and a good-natured, generous, and friendly man.


The fictions by an Italian in 1889, a French vet in 1947, and a Czech refugee in 1978, excellently translated, successfully use sharply different techniques. Focusing on a laborer’s fanciful pursuit of wealth, Verga vividly portrays him and his community by quick and darting movements, highly selected vital detail, and dramatic close-ups rather than panoramas and analyses. Que- neau cleverly borrows materials from Joyce’s Ulysses as he parodies sad-erotic fiction in a satirical black-comic tale nominally about the Irish Rebellion in 1916. Kundera’s novel in the form of variations, interrelating the political and the erotic, connects several narratives by the themes of “laughter,” which is either a rejection of mechanical life or a total skepticism, and “forgetting,” by which dic- toshhips, blotting out history and memory, reduce adults to children.

**Sartre and Flaubert.** Hazel E. Barnes. Chicago. 1981. $25.


Barnes reduces Sartre’s 3000 pages on the forces that shaped Flaubert as man and writer to 400 pages that characterize both Sartre and Flaubert. She may second, qualify, or dispute Sartre. Even in highly technical matters her style is generally lucid and always vivacious. Steegmuller’s volume, the first of two, concentrates on Flaubert’s complicated early life, his travels in Africa and the Near East, and the writing of Bouvry. The translation admirably mingles the colloquial and the more complex and formal, but still flexible, prose of the reflective and analytical observer.

**Conrad in the Nineteenth Century.** Ian Watt. California. 1981. $15.95.

This first of two volumes takes Conrad up to 1900, summarizing the biographic facts quickly and concentrating on four novels. Watt describes exhaustively, but not opaque or dully, the sources of and the influences upon the novels—historical, sociological, philosophical, and aesthetic.

**Shakespeare and the Problem of Meaning.** Norman Rabkin. Chicago. 1981. $16. Rabkin shrewdly argues for both the presence of meaning and the elusiveness of meanings in Shakespeare. His central chapter originally pursues the light thrown upon the tragedies by revisions of them in later periods.


From early on, the flight of literary talent from Communist Russia was immense. Here 40 writers are represented by some 150 poems, stories, sketches, essays, and other forms, many very striking. Biographical and critical introductions to each writer give the volume great reference value.


This unusual history has elements of mystery and detective fiction, constant surprises as new batches of Boswelliana keep turning up, and keen insights into the personalities of various Boswell descendants, collectors, editors, and publishers.

**RUSSELL B. STEVENS**


It is just possible that in reaching for a title with special implication, Sarah Hrdy has overshot. Whatever else be said, this book provides a wealth of information and insight into a neglected aspect of primate biology, the behavior of the female. The prose can be read with comparative ease by the nonspe-
sentially correct—and the documentation of detail suggests this to be largely so—one is left with the disturbing thought that the environmental ethic of the past decade has been shabbily used. The particular arena of Frieden’s series of case studies is the West Coast, and the issues are those of housing development—the classic contest between the builder of new homes and the community that resists the builder’s intrusion. The scenes, the emotions, the logic and lack thereof that he depicts will not be unfamiliar to any who have attended PTA or citizens association meetings on whatever issue. At the same time, the impact of the decisions reached under pressure from the “environmentalist” movement is more than just leaving the reader with a conviction that there simply must be a better, quicker, and more equitable way of resolving the issues at hand.

The Body as Property. Russell Scott. Viking. 1981. $14.95. Perhaps because of, and certainly coincident with, the markedly increased use of a wide variety of human organs and tissues in treating maladies of one sort or another, there has come a great sensitization among the public to the legal and ethical issues involved. In short, we can now do a lot of remarkable things in the laboratory and operating room; the question is how much should we do, and under what constraints. Scott is a lawyer, and the analysis of such things as protheses, transplants, transfusions, and artificial insemination is often dealt with in the context of law, regulation, and the courts. At the same time, the situations are in large measure those that could confront almost anyone at any time, should misfortune strike. No harm can be done by thinking carefully about the issues with which Scott confronts the reader here.

Life Itself: Its Origin and Nature. Francis Crick. Simon and Schuster. 1981. $12.95. It is wholly pointless—at least for this reviewer—to speculate on whether life originated on earth or was transferred from some distant body. Suffice it to say that anyone such as Francis Crick, who participated in the matchless contribution to biological understanding represented by the enunciation of the double-helix model for the genetic code—and who writes engagingly as well—deserves a hearing, even when he argues for a view that most will find very hard to accept.

Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years. Ernest L. Abel. Plenum. 1980. $17.95. Most who undertake to read this volume will be quite taken aback to discover how much there is to know about Cannabis, the source not only of marihuana but of hemp fiber. Abel has put in one place a truly astonishing amount of information on the history, culture, use, and misuse of this remarkable plant. This feat has been accomplished in such a way that the book can be read with pleasure and preconceived notions are for the most part abandoned by those who are against the use of marihuana. Although the author seems not to have taken this as his central objective, his study might serve to damp down the emotional element of the controversy, on both sides.

LEONARD W. DOOB

The Mismeasure of Man. Stephen Jay Gould. Norton. 1981. $14.95. A strident, polemical, effective critique of the attempts to invoke genetic factors as the more convincing explanation for social evolution and for significant behavioral differences of human groups. Faulty sampling, inadequate statistical analysis, and conscious and unconscious “fudging” (the author’s favorite word) of the investigators are exposed in this historical survey of how theories and data come to be linked to the claim of race, the determination of human skulls and other body parts, brain weights, and most especially the tremendously abused IQ derived from culturally slanted tests have been manipulated to justify prejudice, exploitation, endogamy, immigration quotas, and similar social evils. The indictment is not new, but it is ethically useful to have the case against biological determinism and for “biological potentiality” reaffirmed clearly and vehemently.

The Practice of Multimodal Therapy. Arnold A. Lazarus. McGraw-Hill. 1981. $18.95. A challenging, self-laudatory exposition of the author’s impressive contention that the best therapy is long-term from the interaction between the patient’s own needs or problems and the therapist’s talent for “on-the-spot inventiveness.” Such eclecticism, which on occasion turns to psychoanalysis, hypnosis, relaxation training, transcendental meditation—indeed, the whole gamut—is guided by an explicit set of seven psychological categories enabling the therapist and the patient to locate and try to attenuate the difficulties. Copious, intriguing case histories and excerpts from therapeutic sessions with principally middle-class patients enlivens this unconventional handbook.

Growing Young. Ashley Montagu. McGraw-Hill. 1981. $12.95. An intriguing, stimulating, and challenging history and defense of the doctrine of neo-Lamarckian epigenesis, viz., the process of retaining the earliest characteristics of the newly born throughout the later stages of development. Unlike even the most highly evolved animals, human beings have completed “only half” of their gestation at birth, and their inherited bodies and nervous systems remain relatively immature as they grow older. During postnatal maturation, therefore, the very attributes we value aesthetically, ethically, and sometimes even politically are displayed or acquired by very young children: in the author’s own words, the need for love is known, and to work; curiosity, imagination, flexibility, joyfulness, and song. In this sense we have perhaps inherited an evolutionary potentiality of remaining young, which, even in dreary times, too few seem to realize and which perhaps could be more vigorously cultivated.

The Psychodynamics of Race: Vicious and Benign Spirals. Rae Sherwood. Humanities Press. 1980. $55. A very, very detailed, lengthy, sympathetic, insightful, and sensitively written view of the life histories of two opposite-sex siblings and their parents in an English, Indian, and Barbadesi family, all of whom were living during the early 1970s in a crowded, lower-class neighborhood of London and who therefore were ex-
Springing and expressing, each quite uniquely, the tensions and perplexities of prejudice. The data concerning these 12 persons come from interviews conducted patiently by the author and a younger female associate over a one-year period. Emerging from the particulars is a "model" (the fashionable word) suggested by the subtitle.

Left Brain, Right Brain. Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch. W. H. Freeman. $15.95. A commendably cautious, concise, intelligible analysis of "the general picture" of what is and is not known concerning the different functions assumed by the two interconnected hemispheres of the human brain. The "diversity of findings" based upon clinical and experimental as well as physiological and psychological studies of normal and brain-damaged human beings and animals are "not totally consistent": yet they are exciting and promising, and they have profound implications for anyone seeking to learn another basic reason why we behave the way we do. Little wonder that a Nobel prize was recently awarded to one of the pioneers in this field of research.

The Practical Negotiator. I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman. Yale. 1982. $20. A valiant, praiseworthy attempt to collate and document the undocumentable, exceedingly complex, and varied principles guiding largely successful negotiations. The bases for this commonsensical summary are historical records, well-chosen anecdotes, post-interviews with significant negotiators such as M. Averell Harriman and Arthur J. Goldberg (supplemented by questionnaires and memos), and a few laboratory studies.

FREDERICK J. CROSSON

Judaim: The Evidence of the Mishnah. Jacob Neusner. Chicago. 1981. $25. The subtitle is essential. Neusner's aim in this work, building upon a decade of publications by him and his students, is to reconstruct and interpret the "oral Torah," which reached its closure in texts dating from the end of the second century. Hence the focus is on one component among others of Judaism in the first centuries, but one that, in merging subsequently with others, definitely marked the tradition constituting the Judaism we know today. The approach is form-analysis: a deciphering of the development, social context, and meaning of the six divisions of the laws in the periods before, between, and after the two wars against the Romans. This is a magisterial achievement, a work of immense learning, methodically self-conscious, and philosophically illuminating. It inaugurates with distinction a new series of studies in the history of Judaism.

Kant's Life and Thought. Ernst Cassirer. Yale. 1982. $24.50. The first English translation (well-done by James Haden) of a 60-year-old classic intellectual biography. Those readers who know Kant only through the first Critique will find their understanding of that work deepened and illuminated by a long exposition of the precritical writings, but perhaps the most distinctive contribution is Cassirer's argument that the later Critiques, and especially the Critique of Judgment, must be understood not as merely applying the principles of the first to other areas but as subsuming the latter into a larger and more comprehensive framework.


Since many other writers are discussed, it is curious that there is no mention of Aristotle's hylomorphism, to which the author's position is akin.

Logical Positivism. Oswald Hanfling. Columbia. 1981. $20. Logical positivism may be as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes, but its spirit has still to be definitively exorcised from the sciences of man and nature. This excellent presentation of its positions on verification, meaning, metaphysics, ethics, and analysis helps us to see its residues in our own thinking. Hanfling traces the metaphors of the early bold claims under the pressure of criticism, but does not surrender the empirical approach that the movement tried to exemplify.

The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp. Open Court. 1981. $25. For all its size (over 700 pages) and usefulness (extensive bibliography, critical essays), this latest volume in the Library of Living Philosophers series is disappointing, because by the time the finished collection was ready for Sartre's critical response to be written, his eyesight and general health were too poor to allow him to work through the essays. Instead, a long (50 page) interview is recorded, in which he comments on his writings in general and responds (sometimes cursorily) to some of the critical issues raised. The interview itself is interesting, a vivid picture of perhaps the most widely discussed philosopher of the century.

Wittgenstein and Phenomenology. Nicholas F. Gier. SUNY. 1981. $34. $9.95.

It is generally recognized that the proper line of demarcation in contemporary philosophy is not between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, but between Russell and Husserl on the one hand and Wittgenstein and Heidegger (with Merleau-Ponty) on the other. This responsible study makes the line clearer by elucidating the commonality of the linguistic turn toward "forms of life" and "life-world" as the matrix of language and meaning. The most striking difference qualifying this commonality is the issue of whether any universal structures of the Lebenswelt can be established, or whether we must stop at Lebensformen. Gier's readable and informative book does not try to answer that question, but it shows very well how the context in which it is posed has shifted.

Correction. In W. Dickey's article in the issue before last, the origin of the word "quaer" should have been attributed to James Joyce in Finnegans Wake and not to Lewis Carroll, as several of our vigilant readers pointed out.

For more than a half century The American Scholar has remained an indispensable magazine for anyone with a serious interest in modern intellectual life and culture. Each issue offers a strikingly well-balanced selection of articles and essays on intellectual, artistic, literary, and scientific subjects, written by some of the most distinguished writers of our day. And the Scholar isn't just another magazine you won't have time to read. It ranges beyond the hot topics of the day and devotes its pages to subjects of enduring intellectual interest. Whether you read it as soon as it arrives, or weeks or even months later, its freshness and significance remain.

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no familiarity with stylized theater, and certainly no acquaintance with Oriental theater. Working with bodies as well as ideas is particularly satisfying because one is teaching on two levels at once, allowing the student actors to experience kinesthetically the very concepts they are discovering mentally. Several teachers in nonteater courses asked me to relate Kabuki to other forms of art. I found particularly challenging the request, for a course in creative writing at Albion College, that I talk about how elements of Japanese dance represent a narrative tradition distinct from Western narrative.

Since much of my teaching at Pomona is in French language and literature, I enjoyed visiting French classes and talking with them about subjects of special interest to me. Discussions with serious, thoughtful students are always helpful in clarifying one's own ideas. Equally helpful were the many discussions of problems of language pedagogy with teachers at the institutions I visited. In some cases the language and literature curriculum was extremely original and thought-provoking and gave me ideas to consider in planning our own curriculum at Pomona.

A major focus of the Visiting Scholar Program is contact between visitor and students. The most effective ways to meet students seemed to be by speaking to a regularly scheduled class or by sitting down with students during a meal. It normally proved useless to organize a special coffee hour, for it was often attended by no one other than the organizer and myself. At Southwestern in Memphis, however, a stimulating group did show up for an afternoon discussion—without coffee. A dinner with French students at the French House at Macalester allowed me to become acquainted with a number of students there.

In addition to the usual pleasures one might expect to find during these visits, I enjoyed a number of extras in the form of lectures, performances, and exhibits. At Macalester I heard an enlightening lecture on the New Physics and saw a short version of a black theater piece. At Albion I saw an exquisite exhibit of quilts and spent two wonderful hours viewing and discussing the Kabuki print collection of Albion's printmaking teacher. At Clark University, where I was able at last to meet Michael Spingler, a theater scholar with whom I had corresponded for years, I made a shattering discovery in the university museum: a pre-World War II newspaper announced that the leading female role in John Howard Payne's Charles II would be played by a young man from the class of 1927 who was "one of the most finished female impersonators in the Clark University Players." I had previously assumed that using a male actor in female roles was the prerogative of Oriental theater today, only to find that the tradition had persisted in the American university system well into the twentieth century.

The four weeks of my visits were memorable to me for many reasons and perhaps most of all for the opportunities they afforded me to become acquainted with the variety and quality of students across the country, to see old friends and students, and to make new friends among colleagues in a wide variety of disciplines. My experiences have added immensely to my personal pleasure and will, I am sure, enrich my teaching, writing, and performing in many ways.


TRIENNIAL COUNCIL (continued)

Visiting Scholar Program. Nine senators at large and three district senators will be elected for six-year terms. Although the voting members of the Council are the chapter and association delegates, any member of Phi Beta Kappa is welcome to attend the Council meeting. Those wishing to attend as nondelegates may receive information from the United Chapters, 1811 Q Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.