City of Brotherly Love Provides Warm Welcome for 39th ΦBK Triennial Council

Friendship, represented by the third star on Phi Beta Kappa's key, became a recurrent theme at the Society's 39th triennial Council, held in Philadelphia on October 19-22. The beautiful autumn weather throughout the weekend enticed many of the 477 attendees onto the terrace of the headquarters for the Council, the Sheraton Society Hill Hotel, and beyond, through the historic waterfront district and Independence National Park. And banquet speaker Natalie Zemon Davis, Henry Charles Lea Professor Emerita of History, Princeton University, changed the announced title of her address on October 21 to "Heroes, Heroines, and Friendship."

During the plenary sessions the nominees for president and vice president were elected by acclamation, and all seven proposed chapters were approved [see box on page 2], raising the total number of chapters across the country to 262. In addition, the delegates approved amendments to the constitution and bylaws that eliminated some outdated phrasing with respect to Society practices and accorded the associations virtual equality with the chapters in voting privileges at the triennial Councils.

Elections

The new national president, Joseph W. Gordon, is dean of undergraduate education at Yale University. The new vice president, Niall W. Slater, is professor of classics and director of the Center for Language, Literature, and Culture at Emory University. They will serve until 2003.

The delegates elected seven senators at large for six-year terms. The two newly elected are Catherine White Berheide, professor of sociology, Skid-

Resolved: That Phi Beta Kappa Is Gloriously Useless

The triennial Council opened with presentations by philosopher Leroy S. Rouner and academic dean Catharine R. Stimpson designed to stimulate discussion throughout the weekend. What follows is the text of Rouner's remarks.

I'm not sure whether the invitation to speak here is my reward for having said something imaginative, or my punishment for having said something outrageous which I must now defend before 400 of the smartest people in America. But, yes, I did say that Phi Beta Kappa is gloriously useless—in the hallowed pages of the Key Reporter,* no less. I'm glad I said it, and here's why.

Americans are a people who both built a better mousetrap and dreamed a grander dream. At our best, our practicality has enabled our visions. For example, Harvard College, our first venture in higher education, was not established as some ivory tower; it was founded for the practical purpose of providing a literate ministry to the churches of Puritan New England.

Continued on page 4

Key Notes

ΦBK Speakers Address National Honor Society Conference ..................3
Do Horses Gallop in Their Sleep? by Matt Cartmill .......................6
ΦBK in Popular Culture: Mickey Mouse and the Key ..................9
Letters to the Editor ..................10
Multigeneration ΦBK Families
Move to the Web ..................11
Recommended Reading ..................12
ΦBK in History and Literature .............16

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more College, and a write-in candidate, Arline Bronzaft, professor emerita of psychology at Lehman College and former chair of the Conference of Association Delegates.

Reelected senators at large are Allison Blakely, professor of European and comparative history, Howard University; Eloise E. Clark, vice president of academic affairs and professor of biological sciences, Bowling Green State University; Werner L. Gunder- 

Bruce R. Barrett, professor of physics, University of Arizona, was elected to a three-year term as senator at large, to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation earlier this year of Margaret Geller, professor of astronomy, Harvard University.

District senators newly elected to six-year terms are Don J. Wyatt, professor of history, Middlebury College (New England District); Harvey E. Klehr, Andrew Mellon Professor of Politics and History, Emory University (South Atlantic District); and Charles H. Adams, associate dean, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Arkansas (South Central District).

Four persons were elected to serve six-year terms on the Nominating Committee: Frederick J. Crosson, the retiring president of Phi Beta Kappa and Ca-

vannah Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Humanities, University of Notre Dame; Claire Gaudiani, president, Conn-
cecticut College; Neil Harris, Preston and Sterling Morton Professor of History, University of Chicago; and David W. Hart, professor of English and associate dean of the graduate school, University of Arkan-
sas.

New Chapters
Approved at:

- Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.
- Austin College, Sherman, Tex.
- Florida International University, Miami, Fla.
- Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Ill.
- University of Mississippi, Oxford, Miss.
- Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Truman State University, Kirks-
ville, Mo.

Earlier in the summer, the PBK Senate passed the following resolution:

"The Senate believes that Phi Beta Kappa members who have achieved prominence both inside and outside the world of academe and related institutions can add con-
structively to the experience and talents needed to govern the society. We include among such persons not only distinguished "public intellectuals" but also those who have pursued careers in business and in professions not obviously linked to the liberal arts. Therefore, the Senate respect-
fully encourages the Nominating Commit-
tee to give careful consideration to a wide range of talents for nomination to the Senate. The Senate further believes that all candidates, whatever their back-
grounds, should be dedicated to the So-
ciety’s goals of fostering a vibrant na-
tional intellectual dialogue and ad-
vancing the liberal arts in American life. Finally we ask the Nominat-
ing Committee to take all appropriate steps to ensure that candidates possess a strong commit-
tment to Phi Beta Kappa and have af-
firmed a willingness to devote the time and effort necessary for a productive Senate membership."

Associations’ and Fellows’
Elections

Aubrey Farb, a member of the Houston association, was reelected chairman of the Conference of Association Delegates, and Barbara Marmorstein, of the Delaware Val-
ley association, was reelected secretary. They are to serve until 2003. Alvin Edelman was reelected to another one-year term as president of the PBK Fellows.

Some Highlights

The Council opened on October 19 with a late-afternoon symposium at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania’s magnificent Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology. Leroy S. 
Rouner, professor of philosophy and reli-
gion at Boston University, launched a dis-
cussion of the "utility" of Phi Beta Kappa with a somewhat whimsical talk [see page 1] that was gracefully responded to by Catharine R. Stimpson, dean of the Gradu-
ate School of Arts and Science at New York University and a PBK senator.

Three other panelists added brief com-
ments from the perspective of the chapters (Hank Dobin of Princeton University), the PBK Fellows (Elizabeth Swenson of the Cleveland association), and the PBK asso-
ciations (Merrill Shattuck of the Northern California association) before the floor was open to comments from the audience.

Johnnetta B. Cole, President Distin-
guished Professor of Anthropology, Wom-

en’s Studies, and African American Studies at Emory University, moderated the session, which was followed by a reception in the museum’s Chinese gallery and tours of the other parts of the museum.

The plenary session on October 20 opened with the presentation by Catharine Stimpson of the Phi Beta Kappa Senate’s Award for Distinguished Service to the Humanities to Richard J. Franke of Chicago, who was called the "model of a national leader in the humanities" for his support of the Chicago Lyric Opera, Newberry Library, and Chicago Metro Fair.

David W. Hart, chairman of the PBK 
Senate’s Policy Committee, presented the 
Senate’s proposed amendments to the con-
stitution and bylaws, and Scott Enk, a 
delegate from the Greater Milwaukee asso-
ciation, presented some counterproposals 
in which he was joined by a number of 
association delegates. All the proposals

University of Mississippi professor Ron Schroeder adds a pin to the map of PBK chapters while Robert C. Khayat, the university’s chancellor, left, and John Hope Franklin, a past president of Phi Beta Kappa, look on.

The Key Reporter
cirations and with the National Honor Society; transfer students, branch campuses, and distance learning; and plans to observe Phi Beta Kappa’s 225th anniversary in 2001. Reporters recorded salient points of the discussions, which will be summarized and published in a future issue of the Key Reporter as space permits.

**Other Business**

President Crosson recognized three newly chartered associations—in Atlanta, Eastern Indiana, and Baltimore—and presented charters to their representatives at the Council. He also announced that association officers who serve for 10 years or more will be recognized with certificates of appreciation identical to those presented to long-serving chapter officers at the last triennial Council. Eight of these veteran association officers who were attending the Council were recognized during the first plenary session; the remainder will receive their certificates by mail.

The Council approved a revised model chapter constitution and bylaws.

The Council voted resolutions of appreciation to three attendees who were retiring after serving varying terms in the Phi Beta Kappa Senate: President Crosson (18 years) received a standing ovation and a backpack adorned with a Phi Beta Kappa key to take on a planned walking trip to Europe. David Hart (also 18 years) received a key-emblazoned reproduction of a World War I flying scarf. Johnnetta Cole, who has completed a short-term appointment to the Phi Beta Kappa Senate, received a framed certificate.

Two other persons whose service in the Phi Beta Kappa Senate was recognized but who were not present are Eugen Weber, Joan Palevsky Professor of Modern European History, UCLA, 12 years, and Rita F. Dove, former U.S. poet laureate and professor of English at the University of Virginia, 6 years.

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Sidney Hook Award winner Natalie Z. Davis and Phi Beta Kappa Senator Allison Blakely, who introduced her at the banquet, chat before her speech.

were discussed at considerable length before being voted on in later sessions.

Burton Wheeler, chairman of the Senate’s Committee on Chapters, which is empowered to keep tabs on chapters’ vitality, described its policy as “Walk softly and carry a weak twig.” After noting that approximately 50 chapters had neglected to send delegates to the Council, he said that the main questions his committee seeks answers to are “Does anybody on your campus know you exist?” and “What are you doing to carry out your charge?” The goal, he noted, is to strengthen all chapters by getting information about successful, imaginative chapter activities to them.

**Small-Group Sessions**

On Friday and Saturday afternoons Council attendees were invited to participate in small groups for discussion of subjects that ranged from moral character as a membership criterion to ways of increasing chapter visibility on campus, models of collaboration between chapters and associations and with the National Honor Society; transfer students, branch campuses, and distance learning; and plans to observe Phi Beta Kappa’s 225th anniversary in 2001. Reporters recorded salient points of the discussions, which will be summarized and published in a future issue of the Key Reporter as space permits.

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**NHS Conference**

Students Hear Talks on Imagination, Innovation

Phi Beta Kappa provided four speakers from various disciplines to discuss "Imagination and Innovation" at the annual conference of the National Honor Society on November 11-12 in Orlando. Some 1,000 high school students, with their advisers, attended the event. The speakers were:

- Elizabeth Wayland Barber, professor of archaeology and linguistics, Occidental College, whose most recent book is *The Mummies of Uruk*.
- Pamela Conrad, research scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology.
- Margaret J. Geller, professor of astronomy, Harvard University, and a former Phi Beta Kappa senator.
- Leroy S. Rouner, professor of philosophy, religion, and philosophical theology, Boston University.

This is the seventh consecutive year that Phi Beta Kappa has provided speakers for the annual NHS conference, as part of the Society’s effort to raise awareness of Phi Beta Kappa among outstanding students before they attend college.
So, too, the Lewis and Clark expedition and the subsequent Westward Movement were the same happy blending of vision for what Stephen Vincent Benet called our "Western Star"—"fool's silver of the sky"—and the practical heroism of men and women who found their way to the headwaters of the Missouri, and on to the coasts of the Pacific.

But we are not always at our best. Our visionaries sometimes become demagogues, seduced by the grandeur of their dreams; and our mouse-trap builders too often become self-absorbed and greedy. Our only indigenous philosophy is pragmatism, the view that use determines meaning and that ideas are instruments for achieving goals. When one adds to that the indigenous American suspicion of intellectuals whose ideas do not have some obvious practical application, it is clear that the dreamers are the people who must justify themselves in our popular culture, not the practitioners. I am a dreamer, and so are you. We belong to Phi Beta Kappa, which is gloriously useless.

Today the mouse-trap has a dot-com address, and the college kids who really want to major in philosophy or Greek or English are confronted by parents who have ponied up megabucks for their education and who ask the realistic, down-to-earth, practical question—with poignant sincerity, entirely in the interest of this dearly beloved, hideously expensive child—"But darling, what can you do with that?"

This is one of life's ironies. Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth of Athens when in fact it was the youth of Athens who were trying to corrupt him. These Athenian rich kids didn't want philosophical talk about the true nature of justice. They wanted to learn rhetoric: how to make an effective speech about justice in the Athenian Senate. Socrates thought it was important to know what you were talking about, but they wanted a short course in how to get elected without really knowing anything.

Today, the youth of America are being corrupted by their parents. The usefulness—or "relevance"—these parents lovingly espouse is, however, not an appropriate criterion for choosing a college major, for two reasons.

First, you don't really have any way of knowing what is going to be useful in the future. That is the fly in the ointment of Utilitarianism. "The greatest good for the greatest number" is a lofty goal because of its reasonableness and fairness, but it is impossible to predetermine practical means for achieving it. We are left with ideological commitments to trickle-down economics on the right or government aid programs on the left, but we often cannot even recognize when these experiments in practicality actually worked. Did Reaganomics work? It depends on whether the economist you ask is a Democrat or a Republican.

The same is true for college students. You can't predict what is going to be useful even if you know what you want to do in the future. My son Jonathan focused on English literature in high school but decided to major in economics and political science in college because he wanted to be an investment banker. Today he is a partner in a major New York investment bank where he does mergers and acquisitions and has an annual income somewhat in excess of my total retirement fund. Looking back, he says that an English major would have been more useful for him than economics and political science, because his first job after college was with the Morgan Bank, which put him in a nine-month training program for everything you need to know about investment banking; thus he could have majored in anything in college.

Crunch time in his present job comes when he has to give a 40-minute speech to the directors of a company, none of whom are up to speed on the merger or acquisition under consideration, explaining to them how he arrived at an evaluation of the company's worth, what his strategy is for selling or buying it, and why the services of his particular bank can be especially helpful. He has to write a 15-page paper that has a beginning, a middle, and an end; is clear, comprehensive, and persuasive. That's what English majors do.

The second reason is more serious. "Use" is not an appropriate criterion for choosing a college major because education in the liberal arts and sciences is not vocational/technical training. Its goal is not specific, narrow expertise in a practical skill, but broad acquaintance and deep appreciation of cultural traditions. That is why we have distribution requirements. A liberal education is not really supposed to prepare you for anything except "the company of educated men and women" in the continually surprising adventure of life. And when undergraduates complain about distribution requirements—"Why do I have to take a science course? I'm not going to be a scientist."—we reply simply that a well-educated person needs to know something about science. In other words, "It's good for you."

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There is always the temptation to justify the liberal arts and sciences by their usefulness—you can't get a good job without a college degree—but the real purpose of higher education has never been primarily that it was going to be useful in this narrow sense. And nowhere in academia have the life of the mind and the character of the human spirit for their own sake been more energetically endorsed than in Phi Beta Kappa, which is not an institution with practical goals, but a celebration. We are more like a party than a program.
But what makes uselessness glorious? Or to put it somewhat differently, if use is not an appropriate criterion for decision-making in the academic life, what is?

Love.

Next time you come to Boston, take a walk down Commonwealth Avenue to the Boston University School for the Arts, and look at the huge, blown-up photographs of one kid playing the Paganini violin concerto, and another doing a speech from Shakespeare, and so on. At the bottom of each of these wonderful posters is scrawled the message, “Learn what you love.” That’s what education in the liberal arts and sciences is all about: discovering not just something that you are good at, but something that you care about, something you can give yourself to, something you can lose yourself in, something you love.

And here’s another irony. At this point, the wishy-washy, hands-off liberalism of the parents redeems them and they say, “Well, dear, whatever makes you happy.” Which is the right thing to say. My son Timmy, of blessed memory, wrote a senior thesis evaluating several private secondary schools. It was called “Too Much Success: Not Enough Happiness.”

The virtues of love as a criterion for choosing a college major—which is the example we’ve been talking about—are several. First, it is not pretentious. “Use” is pretentious because it claims to know something about the future that it doesn’t really know. Love is immediate, and knows what it is talking about. Right now, I just love—Sanskrit, chemistry, international relations.

Second, love as a criterion guarantees that you will work to your highest potential, because you are self-motivated: you love it. Finally, it provides the surest basis for life-long learning—which we all extol, but which often doesn’t happen—because it is part of who you are, and not just something you think, often wrongly, that you can use.

Which takes us back to Socrates. The best thing ever written on the philosophy of education is Plato’s Protagoras, in which one of these Athenian rich kids wants to study with Protagoras, a Sophist, an ethical relativist who will teach the kid how to make a good speech without knowing what justice or whatever really means. The young man, one Hippocrates, asks Socrates to make the arrangement for him. But Socrates asks him the crucial question about education, and that is, “If you study with this fellow, what will he make of you?” This is not a question that most college deans’ offices like to talk about in this post in loco parentis era. Still, the fact is that a college education feeds an adolescent in one end and gets a young adult out the other. In the process of those four years that person has changed significantly, and you and I have been agents of that change.

We say, “Hey, listen, I just teach history. I’m not their mother or their priest or their shrink.” That’s true. A college is not a family or a church or a hospital. Still, what happens, in the course of what we do, is soul making. When these kids graduate, what we hope for them is that they will be good at whatever they have majored in, however they may wish to use it, and that in joining the company of “educated men and women” they will have learned something that will help them be good citizens, good husbands and wives, good parents, good people.

The popular image of Phi Beta Kappa is that it is not about this moral character stuff, it is just about being smart. Phi Beta Kappa was never just about being smart. It was also about being good; and that is the combination that produces the wisdom we so sorely need.

The popular image of Phi Beta Kappa is that it is not about this moral character stuff, it is just about being smart. There are indeed some chapters that elect people simply on the basis of their grade-point average, but that is not what our charter says, and this is important, for the following reason:

There are probably more genuinely brilliant people in American higher education today than there have ever been in the past. At the same time, there is probably less genuine human wisdom available than there was a generation or two ago.

Phi Beta Kappa was never just about being smart. It was also about being good; and that is the combination that produces the wisdom we so sorely need. Phi Beta Kappa is gloriously useless because it is not an instrument for reaching a goal; it is a celebration of the love of learning, of the mind’s adventure and the spirit’s quest, simply and solely for their own sake.

Leroy S. Rouner is professor of philosophy, religion, and philosophical theology and director of the Institute for Philosophy and Religion at Boston University.

A video record of the symposium will appear shortly on our Web site: www.pbk.org.
The Problem of Animal Consciousness

Do Horses Gallop in Their Sleep?

By Matt Cartmill

Let me propose a thought experiment. Imagine, if you will, that there’s a certain clump of nerve cells in the brain that’s essential for conscious awareness. Now suppose that a certain drug suppresses neural activity in just this nucleus, with no effect on the rest of the brain. Subjects who take this drug do things as usual, but they experience nothing. The drug converts them into sleepwalkers. Finally, imagine that I’ve developed a new form of this drug, which has permanent effects. It abolishes consciousness forever, with no effect on behavior. I want to test it on you. How much will you charge to take it?

I think the question answers itself. Spending your life as a sleepwalker is equivalent to being dead, and so you will charge me whatever price you would charge to commit suicide.

I offer this thought experiment to dispel the notion that conscious awareness is too metaphysical and subjective a phenomenon for science to concern itself with. The phenomenon of consciousness is the source of all value in our lives. As such, it should be at the top of the scientific agenda. Yet despite its fundamental importance, consciousness is a subject that most scientists are reluctant to deal with. We know practically nothing about either its mechanisms or its evolution. In fact, many distinguished scientists and philosophers believe that consciousness has no evolutionary history, because they think that human beings are the only creatures that have it. Although most scientists will admit in private that our close animal relatives probably have mental lives something like ours (because, after all, they have bodies and brains and behavior that resemble ours), a lot of scientists are reluctant to say so plainly and publicly; and those who do can count on being accused of sentimentality and anthropomorphism.

If you have a dog, you have probably had the experience of seeing your dog search out a favorite toy and bring it to you in hopes of getting you to play with him. It’s hard even to describe these familiar experiences without saying things like, “The dog was trying to find his ball,” or “The dog wanted me to play with him.” But scientists aren’t supposed to say things like that, at least when we have our lab coats on. If we discuss such things at all, we prefer to do so in some way that doesn’t involve attributing intentions or any other mental states to the dog.

There are at least two ways we can do this. First, we can use clumsy behavioral circumlocutions for mental language. Instead of saying, “The dog looked for his ball until he found it,” we can say something like, “The dog exhibited repeated bouts of investigative behavior, which ceased after he contacted the ball.” This somehow manages to suggest that the dog wasn’t thinking about the ball while he was looking for it, and that he didn’t perceive anything when he got it in his mouth.

Second, if we find these circumlocutions silly and tedious, we can adopt some variant of what is sometimes called “logical behaviorism,” in which the mental words are still used but they are redefined in terms of the probabilities of certain behaviors. In this view, a dog’s intentions and desires and beliefs turn out, when properly understood, not to be something inside the dog, but theoretical constructs pinned on the dog by a human observer. Therefore, the human observer can know whether the dog has intentions and desires and beliefs, but the dog can’t.

Why Not Attribute Consciousness to Animals?

Why do scientists and philosophers go through all these contortions to avoid attributing mental states to animals? There are several reasons, some of which are better than others. There’s no doubt that sentimentality and uncritical anthropomorphism are real temptations, and that they should be avoided in describing and analyzing the behavior of nonhuman organisms. A lot of us succumb to these temptations. We all know people who insist on telling you what kind of music their begonia likes or what their cat thinks about Rush Limbaugh. These people are mistaken. And scientists sometimes make similar mistakes. Some of the early Darwinians in particular were guilty of this sort of thing. Because Darwin’s opponents often cited the mental and moral differences between people and beasts as reasons for rejecting the whole idea of evolution, many of his early followers tried to play down those differences by repeating anecdotes they had heard about the nobility of dogs and the self-sacrifice of chickens.

The British psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan was dismayed by this uncritical attribution of human mental states to animals, and he tried to put a stop to it. In 1894, Morgan laid down the following law:

In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychological faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.

“Higher” here turns out to mean “human-like,” as it often did in the 19th century. Successive generations of experimental psychologists have adopted this dictum as a fundamental axiom called Morgan’s Canon. It’s generally thought of as a special case of Occam’s Razor, the principle that you shouldn’t make up entities unless you have to. By this view, we are required to deny mental events in animals whenever we can, in the name of parsimony.

All this sounds reasonable, but there’s a fundamental flaw in it. Because we have mental events, we already know that there are such things in the universe. Denying them to animals therefore doesn’t save anything; we have the same number of entities on our hands no matter what we decide about animal minds. So Occam’s Razor doesn’t provide any support for Morgan’s Canon. In fact, some of the animal-rights philosophers claim that Occam’s Razor is on their side. They argue that if we’re going to invoke intentions, desires, beliefs, and other mental phenomena in accounting for our own actions, we should explain other animals’ behavior in similar terms whenever we can—again, in the name of parsimony.

The problem with Morgan’s Canon comes into sharp focus if we transfer the argument from the brain to the kidney. Consider this version:
If Morgan’s Canon represents a safe assumption, so does this one. But it’s obvious that this version is ridiculous, and that physiologists would think I was crazy if I insisted they adopt this rule to avoid the temptations of anthroporenalism. Then why does Morgan’s Canon seem so much more plausible than this one? Are neurologists just more gullible than urologists? Or is there something special about events in the brain that makes them different from events in the kidneys?

Part of the answer is that we don’t care about kidneys the way we care about brains, because brain events are a source of human status and kidney events are not. Our mental abilities are markers of the moral boundary between animals and people. Because nonhuman animals lack some of those mental abilities, we regard them as property, to be used for our ends in any way we choose—on the dinner table, or in scientific experiments, or transformed into soap and shoes and lamplights. The only moral constraint that we observe on our use of other animals is an obligation not to make them suffer. And we acknowledge that duty only because we believe that at least some of the animals are on our side of the second big line we draw across the moral landscape—the boundary between sentience and nonsentience, between things that are conscious and things that aren’t. So both of our major moral boundaries are defined by things that go on in the brain.

Up to this point, I have been assuming that mental events are, or are produced by, events in the brain. Scientists rarely question this assumption, but philosophers question it a lot. Brain events, they point out, are objective and public; mental events are subjective and private. This is the other crucial difference between the brain and the kidneys—and the other source of scientists’ qualms about the question of animal consciousness.

The intrinsic subjectivity of consciousness makes scientists uneasy. Being conscious is the same thing as having private experiences; and the scientific method is fundamentally committed to the assumption that private experiences don’t count as evidence. Only publicly accessible and repeatable experiences have that status. If somebody makes a claim that you can’t check out for yourself, you’re not obliged to take it seriously. This makes science constitutionally antiauthoritarian, which is good; but it also makes it unreceptive to claims about consciousness and its contents. Most of the recent literature on the subject of consciousness is not really about consciousness at all, but about either neurology or behavior. These are public phenomena, and scientists know how to deal with them. So they spend a lot of time trying to convince themselves that studying these things is somehow the same thing as studying consciousness—like the drunk in the story who lost his wallet in Central Park, but went looking for it in Times Square because the light was better there.

Artificial Intelligence vs. Human Essence

The field of computer science called artificial intelligence grew out of these assumptions. In 1950, the English computer theorist Alan Turing offered a famous test for telling whether machines can think. He called it “the imitation game.” Suppose, he said, that we can write a program that will exchange messages with you. If, after five minutes of sending messages back and forth, you can’t tell whether you’ve been chatting with a human being or a computer, then the machine has a human mind—because that’s what having a human mind means: being able to carry on a human conversation. What other test could there be? And Turing predicted that some of us would see such machines within our lifetimes. “I believe,” wrote Turing, “that in about fifty years’ time it will be possible to program computers, with a storage capacity of about 10⁶, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than a 70 per cent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.”

It’s exactly 50 years later now, and 10⁶ equals around 128 megabytes. You can buy the supercomputer of Alan Turing’s fondest dreams off the shelf at Sears for the price of a beat-up used car. Far bigger machines can be had at higher prices. But none of them has yet been programmed to play the imitation game successfully. What went wrong?

I think what went wrong wasn’t just Alan Turing but the whole Western conception of what it means to be human. Our traditions encourage us to define ourselves not by what we are, but by how we are different: to think of the human essence not in terms of our properties, but in terms of our peculiarities—the small subset of human traits that we don’t share with any other creatures. Many of these human peculiarities hinge on our unique skill in manipulating symbols, and that also happens to be what philosophers get paid for doing. It’s not surprising, therefore, that philosophers and professors from Plato on down to Noam Chomsky have told us that juggling words and numbers is the defining excellence that makes people special, and that animals that lack it are mere objects. Marcus Aurelius summed it up in this maxim: “Use animals and other things and objects freely; but behave in a social spirit toward human beings, because they can reason.”

Many Western thinkers have gone further and insisted that because animals can’t talk, their mental lives are defective in big ways, or even nonexistent. “Thinking,” wrote Wittgenstein, “is essentially the activity of operating with signs.” That view of thinking naturally appeals to college professors, who sometimes get so consumed by operating with signs that they wander around their campuses talking to themselves and tripping over shrubs. And since nonhuman animals aren’t very good at operating with signs, many professional types have been reluctant to grant that beasts can have mental lives at all.

Because Western thinkers have always attached so much importance to juggling symbols as a marker of human status, and so little importance to walking around without tripping over things (which couldn’t be very important, because a donkey can do it just as well as a philosopher), it was inevitable that when we managed to build a symbol-juggling engine—a machine that could beat us all at chess and prove the four-color theorem—our philosophers would try to persuade us that it was human. Once we taught it to play the imitation game, they assured us, it would be just like one of us. But so far, it has proved impossible to program such an engine to succeed at the imitation game. The reason is that, although a computer has many of the symbol-manipulating abilities that we prize so highly, it lacks the subtler and more mysterious skills that come with being a sentient animal, inhabiting and experiencing the world in a living body.

Philosophers and professors from Plato to Noam Chomsky have told us that juggling words and numbers is the defining excellence that makes people special.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 8
ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7

Computer metaphors have come to dominate our thinking about brain processes and mental events. They predispose us to believe that mental events are algorithmic—that is, that they are produced by executing a programmatic list of logically connected instructions—and that digital computers (which are algorithm machines) will eventually become conscious if only we can run the right program on the right kind of hardware with the proper stored data. But as the philosopher John Searle has argued forcefully, there are good reasons for thinking that conscious awareness isn’t, and can’t be, produced by running a computer program.

A digital computer is essentially a grid of slots, each of which can be either full or empty. We think of these as ones and zeros. Some of these slots are linked causally by rules of operation, which provide that when a certain pattern shows up in some area, the contents of other slots are changed in various ways, which may depend on the contents of yet other slots. In modern computers, the ones and zeros are represented by electrical charges in semiconductors, but they could be represented by anything: holes punched in cards, or beads on wires, or eggs in egg cartons. The medium doesn’t matter: what’s important is the algorithm. All the operations that you do on a computer could be done in exactly the same way by giving a team of people written instructions for moving eggs around in a football field full of egg cartons, though of course it would take longer. (By board, or waving semaphore flags, or singing songs, or tap dancing. All these processes can be computationally equivalent, with algorithms that correspond in every detail; but none of them seems like a plausible way of producing a subjective awareness. And since a digital computer is just another way of instantiating an algorithm, it seems impossible for such a device to become conscious. If we ever succeed in creating an artificial intelligence, it’s going to have to be something more than just an algorithm machine.

How Is Consciousness Produced?

If consciousness isn’t algorithmic, then how is it produced? We don’t know. The machineries of consciousness are an almost perfect mystery. Neuroscientists and computer scientists have produced a lot of useful and suggestive models of how the brains of animals process sensory data and judge and discriminate among stimuli. We know that such mechanisms exist in our own brains, and that we need them to perceive the world. But although these perceptual mechanisms are necessary for consciousness, they aren’t sufficient, because we can perceive things and respond to them without being aware of them.

The most spectacular example of this is sleepwalking. Many people—as many as 30 percent of all children and 7 percent of adults—sometimes get up and start walking around during the deepest, most unconscious part of sleep. Typically, sleepwalkers open their eyes, sit up in bed with a blank facial expression, pluck aimlessly at the bedclothes, and then rise up and walk. They ignore objects and people nearby, but they usually manage to get around without bumping into things. They may do very complicated and distinctively human things—talk, make phone calls, get into a car and drive off, or even play musical instruments. If you try to wake them up, they struggle violently to get away from you; and if you succeed in awakening them, they’re totally confused and have no recollection of what they were doing or how they got there.

The phenomenon of sleepwalking shows that you can get surprisingly complicated and even distinctly human behavior without consciousness. This makes it much harder for us to find out anything about animal awareness. How do we know that animals aren’t simply sleepwalking all the time, even when they appear to be awake? Do wolves hunt and horses gallop in their sleep, in the same way that a human somnambulist gets into a car and drives off on the freeway at 65 miles an hour? When the cock crows in the morning, is the farmer the only animal on the farm that wakes up? And if we can do so many things without being conscious, then why did consciousness evolve?

Some people have argued that consciousness confers no adaptive advantage whatever; it’s just an incidental side effect of the neural events that produce behavior. But I think that idea can be rejected for Darwinian reasons. If consciousness were a useless epiphenomenon, natural selection would have operated to get rid of it somehow, since we apparently have to pay a high price to maintain it.

The price we pay for consciousness is unconsciousness, of the special kind we call sleep. Most animals don’t sleep. Invertebrates and cold-blooded vertebrates usually have daily periods of torpor when they hide and rest, but most of them show little or no correlated change in neural activity. Among vertebrates, true sleep, involving a shift from fast to slow waves in the forebrain, appears to be limited to mammals and birds, though there are hints of it in some reptiles.

Mammalian sleep is so dangerous, complicated, and time-consuming a performance that we feel sure it must have a payoff of some sort, but it’s not really clear exactly what it is. On the face of it, it sounds like a bad idea to spend about a third of the day plunged into a limp, helpless trance state that leaves you unable to detect or react to danger. Some argue that sleep serves to conserve energy, which is why we see it only in warm-blooded animals. The trouble with this theory is that mammalian sleep uses almost as much energy as wakeful resting. During eight hours of sleep, a human being saves only about 120 calories. These savings don’t seem worth spending a third of your life dead to the world. Another theory holds that sleep is a defense against predators: it’s nature’s way of telling us to hide during those times of day when we don’t need to be

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active. The main problem with this story is that birds and mammals that are too big to hide still have to flop down and fall asleep every day, right out there on the prairie, exposed to every predator in the world. They do it as little as possible—a horse sleeps only about 3 hours a day, of which only 20 minutes is spent lying down—but they'd be better off if they didn't do it at all. They do it because they have to do it, not to save energy or avoid predators.

Sleep appears to be something imposed upon us, not by our environmental circumstances, but by the needs of the brain itself. Consciousness damages or depletes something in the waking brain, and we can't keep it up indefinitely. If we're forced to stay conscious around the clock, day after day, with rest but no sleep, we soon start manifesting pathological symptoms, beginning with irritability and proceeding through fainting and hallucinations to metabolic collapse and death.

If sleep serves to restore something that is damaged or depleted by things that go on when we are conscious, it seems reasonable to think that animals that have to sleep as we do are conscious when they are awake. It seems significant in this connection that animals that are (probably) never conscious don't sleep, whereas sleep is compulsory for the animals that we know are sometimes conscious (that is, people) and for those nonhuman animals that we suspect for behavioral reasons may have mental lives something like ours. The natural inference is that the waking state in these animals is also something like ours, that it includes mental events and awareness of the world, and that the subjective differences for them between being asleep and being awake parallel our own as closely as the objective (neurological and behavioral) differences do.

The Evidence for Consciousness

Because we can't directly observe the contents of animal minds, the evidence for animal consciousness is necessarily indirect. But it seems at least as persuasive as the indirect evidence that we have for other unobservable phenomena—for example, the Big Bang, or neutrinos, or human evolution. The philosophers and scientists who refuse to acknowledge that dogs feel pain when you kick them seem to me to suffer from the same kind of ingenuously willful blindness that we see in creationists who reject the notion of evolution because they have never seen a fish turn into a chicken. I am inclined to believe that these philosophers and scientists are not so much concerned about understanding the universe as they are about looking tough-minded and spurning the temptations of anthropomorphism.

To most of us, the temptations of anthropomorphism don't look quite so dangerous as all that. Our close animal relatives, after all, are anthropomorphic in the literal sense of the word, which means "human-shaped." They have organs like ours, placed in the same relative positions. And interestingly enough, they seem to recognize the same correspondences we do. Despite the conspicuous differences in sight, feel, and smell between a human body and a dog's, a friendly dog will greet you by licking your face and sniffing your crotch, and a murderously angry dog will go for your throat—just as they would behave in similar moods toward members of their own species. These are sophisticated homologous judgments; and they encompass not only anatomy, but behavior as well. Just as we anthropomorphize dogs, horses, and other animals, they cytomorphize and hippomorphize us—and each other—right back in the other direction.

Psychological accounts of these facts often treat them as mistakes: category errors, resulting from what the ethologist Heini Hediger called the "assimilation tendency" in social animals. I suggest that the assimilation tendency isn't a mistake, but an accurate perception of the way things are.

In a world inhabited by closely related species, it confers an adaptive advantage. A gazelle that can tell when a lioness is thinking about hunting is less likely to be eaten; a lioness that can tell when a gazelle is thinking about bolting is less likely to go hungry. A man who doesn't notice that a horse is furiously angry, or a horse that can't make that sort of judgment about a human being, is correspondingly less likely to have offspring. Insofar as anthropomorphism recognizes and incorporates these facts about the world, it is not a vice but a survival skill. Indeed, one of the adaptive advantages of consciousness itself may lie precisely in the fact that it facilitates the reciprocal perception of other minds—not just in our own species, but in others as well—by analogy with our own. If this perception is adaptive, as I believe it is, then perhaps we should stop resisting its incorporation into the world view and vocabulary of science.

Matt Cartmill is professor of biological anthropology and anatomy at Duke University Medical Center. He excerpted the text of this article from a talk he gave as a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar in the 1999-2000 academic year. An earlier version of this talk was published in the March 1998 issue of Natural History.

**Phi Beta Kappa in Popular Culture**

When e-Bay auctioned off this stamp last summer, the Key Reporter bought it (for $5), and it is now on display at Phi Beta Kappa's headquarters along with donated gold keys. It turns out that the American Scholar had asked the Disney Studio to create the original drawing of Mickey Mouse to illustrate an article published in the Summer 1939 issue, "But Is It Art? A Disney Disquisition," by Jean Charlot. According to Disney's chief archivist, Dave Smith, Charlot had earlier given some lectures at the Disney Studio.

The sheet of stamps issued by St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1996, Smith says, was part of a series of "Disney Characters at Work." This particular sheet is "Disney's School of Education," and features Disney characters in such roles as The Classroom Teacher, The Bank Teacher, The School Principal, The Professor, and finally, The Graduate. These stamps were produced for the Caribbean country, Smith says, by the Inter-Governmental Philatelic Corporation of New York City.
Cybersquatting

Morris A. Nunes’ article [“Squat? Not!” Key Reporter, Summer 2000] struck me as scary and frustrating for those of us concerned with First Amendment rights in the Information Age.

It seems to me that the only reason a law such as the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act would be passed is to protect the interests of big businesses. No “information systems vice president” wants to explain that some clever whippersnapper has beaten Wingding Corporation to register wingding.com. However, this does not give the vice president the right to demolish the other site! The analogy with 1950s squatters is apt, but misses one key point: The site name wingding.com does not “belong” to Wingding Corp. any more than www.highschoolstudent.com belongs to me! There’s nothing magical about being big. Vice presidents just have to learn that sometimes life isn’t fair.

And that’s the main problem with the act. In its overzealous haste to shield vice presidents from the competitive nature of the Internet, it’s teaching our corporations (and, apparently, organizations) that they can have whatever they want, whenever they want. Need a new domain name? Bill Smith already has the one you want? No matter—just haul him into court. He probably won’t even get cash compensation for registering the name (it’s not free!), maintaining his site for weeks/months/years, and “attorney fees.”

Arthur O’Dwyer, via the Internet

Morris Nunes responds:

The act is available not only to “big businesses” or “big organizations.” Even you could use it. Indeed, perhaps you’d want to use it if I were to register the Web site “arthur.o.dwyer.com” on which I put links to the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazi Party, and Posses Comitatus, while extolling the “virtues” of all three organizations and suggesting that anyone who disagrees come find “me” and see if they’re man enough to take “me” on.

The point is that if someone is free to masquerade as someone else or as another organization and mislead the public, that is not a matter of First Amendment rights. Just as it is not an infringement of First Amendment rights to prohibit persons from yelling “Fire” in a crowded theater, it is not an infringement to protect against fraud or to protect the privacy (another constitutional right) of those who use the Web.

Your example of registering “high schoolstudent.com” is not apt, as one cannot register a trademark for a generic name (e.g., “car” for a kind of automobile). The trademark law prohibits it. Only names that are “fanciful and distinctive” can be registered. “Wingdings” may be fanciful and distinctive, and if the first user has properly registered the name and invested in its use, then not only is he entitled to protection, but so is the public, which has a right to deal with the real “wingdings” when it wants to and not be unwittingly seduced by an impostor. Trademark law was initially prompted as much by a desire to protect the public as by a desire to protect those who invest and work in providing quality goods and services.

The courts have been exceedingly careful about the application of the act, imposing high proof burdens on claimants and requiring detailed technical compliance with the provisions of the act.

The Constitution is not a suicide pact, and the strength of the American system has been its ability to balance the noble concept of unlimited personal rights with the needs of society when the rights of two or more people intersect and sometimes conflict.

‘Census 2000’

Ever since the debate began on statistical sampling for the census, the question I’ve waited to see answered is, “If you can’t find them to count them for the census, how do you find them in a statistical sampling?”

I have never seen this question answered by any proponent of sampling, including Margo Anderson and Stephen Fienberg in the summer issue of the Key Reporter (“Census 2000: Politics and Statistics”). When I was doing my graduate work in economics, one of the major lessons was that the further you delve into the labor statistics, all of which are based on sampling, the more you realize how imprecise they are.


I found “Census 2000: Politics and Statistics” very interesting and partially enlightening. The authors at least begin to explain what I see constantly repeated: that the census undercounts the population, and specifically certain parts of the population.

I have often wondered how one can know that the count is inaccurate, apart from the fallibility of all human endeavors, and, more specifically, how one can tell by how much the count is off. From this article I can see that the Census Bureau conducts a presumably detailed follow-up on “over 300,000 households in randomly selected blocks across the nation.” It seems to me, though, that this is still a minuscule fraction of the total number of households; and I cannot help wondering why the results of such a follow-up, also necessarily fallible but now extrapolated to the whole country, should be significantly more accurate than the original count.

John H. R. Pott, Oakland, Calif.

What is especially pernicious about the use of sampling for apportionment or redistricting is that there will be a very high correlation between those whom the direct enumeration misses and those who do not vote (those on the voter rolls can usually be reached). This means that those who do vote in “undercounted” districts will have their votes given more weight than voters in other districts that don’t have their populations inflated by invisible constituents imputed by sampling.

The only argument in favor of this disproportion is the claim that those who do vote somehow “represent” those who don’t because people of similar minority or ethnic background all think alike and have the same interests—a form of group-think that verges on outright racism.

David C. Williams, Albuquerque, New Mex.

Anderson and Fienberg respond:

Churchill and Pott ask why sampling can be expected to provide more accurate information than the full census enumeration. The answer is that the latter has relied on an untrained work force, especially in recent decades. By focusing on households in a relatively small number of blocks nationwide, the Census Bureau can concentrate its resources using its permanent, professionally trained interviewers; re interview people when there is conflicting information; follow up on “movers” and other problematic cases; and physically check for missing housing units and occupancy status in a systematic fashion.

It is useful to remember that if a household forgets to list a member of the household, or includes someone who should not be included (e.g., a college student living away from home in a college dormitory) and then mails the form in, the Census Bureau has no mechanism for identifying and correcting such an error. In 1990, two-thirds of all census omissions occurred within households that had been included in the census enumeration. Sampling allows the bureau to identify both omissions and erroneous enumerations and thereby remove a clear and identifiable bias in the enumeration process.

Williams questions the fairness of a
population count as a means of apportioning house seats because it diverges from the proportions that one would get if one used a vote count. When the Founding Fathers debated the apportionment clause in the Constitution, they explicitly discussed this issue before deciding to base the apportionment on a population count, not a vote count. They knew at the time that these counts would be very different, since women, children, aliens, slaves, and men without property were not permitted to vote. So Williams has a valid point, but his beef is with the Founding Fathers and the Constitution, not with the census. The nation has addressed the question of this discrepancy between population counts and vote counts by changing suffrage requirements over the history of the Republic, and we expect that it will continue to do so.

As for the claim that there is "a very high correlation" between census omissions and those who do not vote, we do not know what this correlation is, because no one could possibly calculate it. What we do know is that there is, by definition, an even higher correlation between erroneous enumerations and not voting!

The Pfrenger’s Life in Russia

I just received and read my Summer 2000 issue and wanted to let you know how much I enjoyed the article by Andrew and Wendy Pfrenger [Life Outside Academe]. Beyond the fact that it was so well written, it allowed me to feel that I’d actually gotten to know, a bit, two unusually kind, committed individuals. An introduction to such people on paper or in person is always a real pleasure.

Gayle Turin, Merrick, N.Y.

These two Peace Corps volunteers sound amazing, and I appreciated their calling attention to the lack of textbooks and other materials. A friend of mine who taught for Teach for America in southeast Los Angeles reports a similar situation. From Russia to Los Angeles, the paltry funding for basic books and supplies is striking and troublesome. I wonder if you might consider doing a piece on what others are trying to do about this problem.

Susan Mannon, Madison, Wis.

Wendy Pfrenger writes: Thank you so much for your support and for the support of your readers—it has meant a lot to us! Of course we would hugely appreciate any donations people wanted to make. Books can be sent to us by surface mail (M-bag is the cheapest, but there are weight restrictions) at School 7, Primorski Krai, Arsenyev-1, Russia 692530.

Editor’s note: The appeal to Phi Beta Kappa members for used textbooks, reference books, and collected journals to be shipped to universities in China [Key Reporter, Spring 2000] has had an astonishing response, reports Alex Lee, who made the request to us on behalf of the nonprofit organization Bridge to Asia, Foreign Trade Services, Pier 23, San Francisco, CA 94111.

Another Key Story

My husband and I were missionaries in the Philippines from 1932 to 1945. During World War II, we, along with our two young sons, were interned in a concentration camp by the Japanese. I spent most of the night before we were interned sorting out a few items to take with us, including a little clothing and bedding and some first-grade books for our older son. The one item I secretly kept was my Phi Beta Kappa key [Washington State University, 1930], which I put in the handbag I took.

After three years in a concentration camp, we were liberated by American and Filipino troops at Los Banos, and in due time we were brought home on an American troop ship, the Admiral Eberle. When we arrived in the United States, my Phi Beta Kappa key was the only personal item remaining from my internment.

Elsie K. Bollman, Seattle, Wash.

Multigeneration ΦΒΚ Families Move to the Web

This department is a victim of its own success. Ever since the Spring 1995 issue, when we ran a photo of one three-generation family of Phi Beta Kappa members posed in front of Phi Beta Kappa Hall at the College of William and Mary, readers have been inundating the Key Reporter with information about their own ΦΒΚ family connections. The family that had 15 members has subsequently added a 16th. The hundreds of listings submitted have been checked and compiled—and they have piled up in our files for, literally, years.

We have been amazed at the numbers of multigeneration ΦΒΚ families, and gratified at the interest in this department. At the same time, it has become impossible to find space in the newsletter to publish what we receive. Therefore we have reluctantly decided to move the listings to the Web site. The entire backlog has been posted there, and new submissions will be added quarterly.
Michael Griffith


Barkley’s first novel (after the story collection Circle View) is a charming and bitter-sweet comedy about a teenaged son who gets caught up in his supersalesman father’s doomed schemes to win back his wife, and equally enmeshed in his mother’s new life with her former brother-in-law. Father and son start off with small-time door-to-door misadventures, but soon the dreams and disasters turn grandiose, and they find themselves traveling the southern carnival circuit (along with a moneyman who quotes Rod McKuen and a former Miss North Carolina), hawking tickets to view Death Cars of the Stars. This is a loopy Horatio Alger picaresque, and a poignant coming-of-age.


Saunders’s second book of short fiction, like its predecessor, CivilWarLand in Bad Decline, is dark and fearless and strange—and laugh-out-loud funny. Whether he’s spinning out a gruesomely witty vision of the future—as in the title story, in which two workers are marooned in their theme-park cave by day, pretending to be Crab-Magnons, waiting to see whether the cash-strapped Management will come through with a goat for them to skin and eat—or doing something a bit more traditional, as in the brilliant tale of a lovelorn haircutter, “The Barber’s Unhappiness”, or the brief and haunting “The Falls,” he is a master of black comedy or bright tragedy, and lurking beneath the satiric laughter is always a pathos, a tenderness for his hapless and overwhelmed characters.


Lethem twists and subverts the conventions of the detective novel in this ingenuous book—winner of the National Book Critics Circle Award—which follows Lionel Essrog, a neophyte detective and a sufferer from Tourette’s Syndrome, as he searches for his boss’s killer. The book’s great triumph is Essrog’s voice; Lethem’s real object of fascination is Essrog’s miswired mind, and he lovingly examines all its coils and convolutions, its tics and oddities. Essrog is rendered with humor, but also with enormous empathy; his echolalia and verbal quirks allow Lethem an opportunity for intellectual and linguistic games, but the play is never at Essrog’s expense. Motherless Brooklyn is a remarkable feat of imagination, and a page-turner besides.


Gilbert’s debut novel (which follows her luminous 1997 story collection, Pilgrims, and is taken as a long-simmering, intermittently exploding feud between lobstermen on two remote islands in Maine. Its protagonist is Ruth Thomas, a smart, stubborn young woman who’s fiercely devoted to her rugged native ground and is determined, despite family pressures, not to leave it. Gilbert deftly and patienty unfolds Ruth’s story, providing plenty of charming, offbeat minor characters and sprinkling in bits of Up East legend and lobster lore. As in her first book, she demonstrates a gift for sharp, clever dialogue. Like its heroine, Stern Men is an unusual combination of flint and finesse, and in it Gilbert reaffirms her status as one of our most promising and versatile young writers.


Every year Louisiana State University and the Southern Review sponsor a prize for the best first collection of stories by a U.S. writer. Among the best of the books submitted by publishers this year were these three.

Englander’s inventive and dazzling stories take place in New York City, Eastern Europe, Stalinist Russia, Tel Aviv, but they have in common a compulsive concern with the clash between Jewish tradition and secular or political reality. Whether he’s writing about ghetto-dwellers trying to escape the Nazis by posing as a troupe of circus tumblers or, in a lighter vein, about a Brooklyn rabbi pressed into miserable duty as a department-store Santa, Englander shows astounding range and maturity.

Billman’s stories about hardscrabble Wyoming and its denizens—featuring airbrush artists, firefighters, prison hockey teams, dogsled builders, baseball bat-smorners, the proprietors of fake uranium mines—are well wrought, clever, and often funny.

Perabo’s first collection is remarkably eclectic; she seems equally at home in several disparate modes, and in stories like “Explaining Death to the Dog” and “Some Say the World” she manages, against heavy odds, to combine postmodern irony and old-style heartbeat.

Anna J. Schwartz


A perennial example of a speculative bubble that is common lore is the legend of the astronomical prices at which the Dutch traded tulip bulbs in the 1630s until the crash in 1637. This book provides an intriguing alternative reading of this episode.

The earliest anecdotal version of the legend appeared in an 1841 book by Charles Mackay, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, which all later references repeated. To check on the accuracy of this secondary source, Garber collected 17th-century tulip price data in Dutch pamphlets, which showed that really high prices were limited to rare varieties that had unusual colors and took a long time to propagate. Once these tulips became readily available, their prices declined, casting doubt on the notion of a tulip mania.

Garber also impugns the interpretation of the Mississippi and South Sea company price histories as bubbles. He names economists who in his view are cavalier in so describing these events. Some have retaliated by passionately attacking his position that even extreme movements in market prices may be based on fundamentals, not irrational exuberance.


This is a study of the role of telecommunications in advancing the strategic aims of
nations that at different times dominated the world economy. The central theme is that, starting in 1844, with the completion of the first user-friendly, public-use electric telegraph line from Baltimore to Washington, D.C., information has conferred power over the world economy, although not necessarily power in the sense of ruling territory.

Hugill, a professor of geography, traces long-wave cycles in information infrastructure: the telegraph in the late 1830s, the telephone in the 1880s, the cathode-ray tube technologies, such as television and radar, in the 1930s, and the beginnings of a fiberoptic highway system in the 1980s. He focuses on the development of each technology in turn. A glossary defines technical terms. In each of two 50-year long-wave cycles that coincided with one century-long world leadership cycle, one nation emerged as the dominant geopolitical, technological, and economic power.

The author is particularly concerned to explain why until 1945 the British beat the Germans and Americans in all forms of civil and military communications, and why only since then has U.S. hegemony prevailed. In elucidating his views on geopolitics, he shows how they relate to the work of earlier geographers.

**Governing for Prosperity. Edited by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root. Yale, 2000. $35; paper, $18.**

The editors aim in assembling this collection of essays by economists, political scientists, and historians is to direct “attention to the political rationality that underlies the persistence of regimes with poor policy performance” (p. 3), although economists know the right policies to foster growth. The problem is that political leaders are self-interested, not civic-minded. A question the essays address is, How can governments stay in power despite failed outcomes? Autocratic and democratic governments alike may hold on to power despite poor policies, e.g., Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko and India, the third world’s oldest democracy, with policies that produce poverty and social unrest. Another question is, Why is democracy not sufficient to ensure successful policies? The solution, the editors say, is to construct political arrangements that give political leaders incentives to support growth and not inhibit it.


No economic event has been more diligently investigated than the worldwide economic collapse from 1929 to 1933 known as the Great Depression. Initially, empirical investigation centered on the U.S. experience. Nine essays in this book (written over a span of years by a leader in the field who describes himself as a Great Depression buff) present research findings that broaden the perspective from the U.S. case to a comparative international basis. Current professional understanding of why the Depression happened and why it was so severe and prolonged has been strongly influenced by the author’s research.

One section of the book discusses the overwhelming evidence that a worldwide contraction in world money supplies at the onset of the Depression was the main factor in producing a sharp decline in demand for goods and services. The monetary collapse was itself the consequence of policy errors and weaknesses of the interwar gold standard. Study of the international data confirms that adherence to the gold standard explains why declines in demand occurred simultaneously in so many countries, and reveals that countries that abandoned the gold standard at an early stage recovered more rapidly from the Depression than those that did not. The author also stresses the part that nonmonetary financial factors, such as banking panics in many countries, played in cutting off access to credit and thus contributing to the world disaster.

The second section of the book deals with the transmission of the monetary and nonmonetary financial collapse to output and employment. A central theme is that the failure of nominal wages and other costs to fall along with the prices for goods and services contributed to the rise in unemployment and the decline in sales. Instead of cutting nominal wages, employers cut the number of workers and the number of hours each worker worked. The data support a strong relationship between low output and high real wages across time and across countries. The author, however, conjectures that the persistence of unemployment in the Great Depression is attributable rather more to repeated major shocks that reduced demand than to glacially slow nominal-wage falls.

**Larry Zimmerman**

**Soul of a Citizen: Living with Conviction in a Cynical Time. Paul R. Loeb. St. Martin’s/Griffin, 1999. $15.95.**

I first read Loeb’s discussion of Rosa Parks in a book excerpt in the *Utne Reader*. I immediately assigned it to 40 students in my class on race and ethnic identity, and soon after assigned the whole book! When faced with perplexing social issues, students, like many of us, often express a “darned if you do and darned if you don’t” attitude, which leads to cynicism and feelings of powerlessness. Loeb uses stories of ordinary citizens such as Parks to show that one doesn’t have to be a “great” man or woman to have a social impact. He also clearly demonstrates that no one we call “great” ever works in a vacuum, and that sometimes great results are achieved by someone who just takes action. Action connects us to our community and to those in it who hope for a better society, inspiring even greater action from many others. *Soul of a Citizen* is an inspirational book. Put it in the hands of any people you know who think that what they do won’t make a difference.


In 1993, Roof raised the issue of baby boomer religion in *A Generation of Seekers*. He returns to look at some of the same people in midlife, suggesting that the boomers have altered many historic interpretations of religious beliefs, practices, and symbols, and, perhaps, even an understanding of what is sacred. He explores the development of the subcultures of the dogmatists, born-again Christians, mainstream believers, metaphysical believers and seekers, and secularists, looking at their spiritual styles, family patterns, and moral visions and values. This is a terrific book, and a good one for self-examination if you are a baby boomer, as I am. Roof clearly demonstrates the old saw that people create their gods, not vice versa.


Using a behavioral ecology model— involving the concepts of selfish genes, conflicts of interest, and the tendency for the sexes to reproduce using different strategies—Low shows how many human behaviors come down to evolution and sex. She demonstrates her points with many cross-temporal and cross-cultural examples, but she does recognize that men and women act in complex ways that are culturally shaped. Her arguments, examples, and conclusions are fascinating and well reasoned, although some anthropologists might argue that some examples are given only limited cultural context.


As an applied anthropologist with social work training, Pengra realized after a summer of working with Mexican American clients that many of the problems she saw stemmed from cultural differences. When she realized that cultural differences were

Continued on p. 14
sometimes targeted for eradication, she started to understand how difficult it is to provide culturally sensitive services. She advocates what she calls values-based solutions, which, in her work in the field of developmental disabilities, become normalization, self-determination, and inclusion. She proposes schema analysis, that is, finding the mental models people have of the meaning of actions and objects, and using this method to pinpoint cross-cultural communication difficulties. She demonstrates how American values of privacy, independence, and equality are removed from the developmentally disabled, with limits created by others rather than by their own impairments. This volume provides an impressive and theoretically solid methodology. It should be read by anyone who is a caregiver or provider of social services.

**Visions of War: Picturing Warfare from the Stone Age to the Cyber Age, David D. Perlmutter, St. Martin’s, 1999. $26.95.**

Some of the most persistent human images are of conflict and warfare. This fine book explores the wide range of images from Upper Paleolithic cave paintings through the nearly instant images of the Gulf War. Perlmutter suggests that war stemmed originally from hunting. He uses images to consider the presentation and positions of commanders, comrades, and enemies, as well as to look at the horrors of war. His final chapters on Living Room Wars and the Future of War are engrossing. Images of war still condition our expectations of what war should be like, and as he notes (p. 230), “virtual” warfare may not replace war but may determine how it is fought, how long it is, what costs are acceptable, and how war is presented to people at home.

**SpeakingRelationally: Culture, Communication, and Interpersonal Communication, Kristine L. Fitch, Guilford Press, 1998. $39.95.**

In this impressive, tightly focused, and intriguing ethnographic study, Fitch examines the concept of interpersonal ideology among urban, middle-class Colombians. Interpersonal ideology is “a set of premises about personhood, relationships and communication around which people formulate lines of actions toward others, and interpret others’ actions.” Looking at personal address, directives (requests and demands), and palancas (narratives relating to personal relationships), she found that framing personal objectives in terms of connectedness to, and acknowledgment of, social hierarchy makes more sense than emphasizing the rights of individuals and their unique desires.

**ThomasMcNaugher**

**Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, Frederik Logevall, Univ. of California, 1999. $35.**

Logevall dismisses the common argument that Lyndon Johnson and his advisers were driven inexorably into Vietnam by domestic and global political forces largely beyond their control. In his view they had choices, including that of withdrawal. French President Charles de Gaulle was the most vocal advocate for withdrawal, arguing as early as 1965 that further escalation of the war was futile, given the scant prospect of building a legitimate, stable political system in South Vietnam. De Gaulle also provided a reasonable rationale for withdrawal by noting that the widening Sino-Soviet rift eviscerated the “domino theory”; far from cooperating in a Communist take-over of Vietnam, these two countries were more likely to compete for Vietnam’s loyalties (as they did after 1975) if only the United States would get out of the way.

No one listened to de Gaulle, of course, and no other ally was so adamantly vocal. But even those who offered public support were privately dismayed by deepening U.S. involvement. Logevall finds much the same contrast between public support and private misgivings on Capitol Hill. And the media were all over the map, with strong voices, notably that of Walter Lippman, sharply opposed to escalation.

Logevall concludes that Johnson could have generated international and domestic support for withdrawal if he had wanted to. But of course Johnson had no such intention; indeed, he and his advisers squashed all talk of withdrawal, sometimes brutally. Logevall attributes Johnson’s motives less to a concern for the nation’s credibility than to concerns for his own credibility and that of his party. On that basis, Logevall speculates that had Kennedy lived, he might, as a second-term president with some foreign policy successes under his belt, have been less committed to escalation. Deeply researched, beautifully written, and ultimately quite persuasive, this book is a “must read” for students of American foreign policy, and especially Vietnam-era veterans.

**Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, John W. Dower, W. W. Norton, 1999. $15.95.**

“Something about Japan,” Dower asserts early in this award-winning volume, “invites people to view it hermetically . . .” (p. 29). Here, as in many of his earlier books on Japan and its relationship with the United States, Dower seeks to unpack Japanese “uniqueness,” highlighting instead the humanity and variety of the Japanese as individuals. The Japan we see today, he argues, is the hybrid product of Japanese culture and choices, on the one hand, and the culture and choices of U.S. occupation authorities, on the other. Dower reminds us of the level of hunger and social and political confusion that haunted Japan in the years immediately after the war. Yet even amid the disaster Japan was alive with many possibilities, a veritable “revolution from below” waiting to happen.

While U.S. rhetoric may have favored that kind of change, however, the actions taken by Gen. Douglas MacArthur and his staff largely reinforced the power of Japan’s established bureaucracy (especially in the economic sphere), and its conservative politicians and businessmen. So did the top-down, mandarin-like style of their rule. “As it turned out,” Dower puts it wryly (p. 561), “one did not have to be the bearer of a Confucian cultural heritage to promote autocracy, hierarchy, harmony, consensus, and self-censorship.” Dower marshals data stretching from the grand to the minute—from surveys of broad economic and social trends to vignettes on the lives of individuals, their families, the schools they attended, even the pulp literature they read. He weaves here an intricate, sympathetic, and remarkably perceptive story of the events that shaped the Japan we know today.

**The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, Edited by Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, Oxford, 2000. $29.95.**

After 40 years of planning to fight “the big war” with the Soviet Union—and after actually fighting Iraq’s Soviet-like forces in 1991—America’s armed forces have been deployed repeatedly to keep the peace, protect minorities and refugees, feed the hungry, and coerce petty tyrants. They have operated in international coalitions, worked alongside nongovernmental organizations, and shared authority with U.N.-sponsored police forces. They are increasingly supported by civilians (the result of “outsourcing” and “privatization”), and have come under pressure to absorb social trends in the society they serve (for example, by admitting gay soldiers). Although these trends and issues no longer command the public attention they received during the cold war, a veritable cottage industry of scholars and policymakers has worried, over the past decade, about their implica-
tions for the military organization and for civil-military relations.

Moskos, Williams, and Segal help order this discussion by presenting a framework that relates these trends to broader changes in international and domestic society. In contrast to the "modern" military that reached maturity in the 19th century, in close association with the rise of the nation-state, today's national militaries must contend with "postmodern" erosion of state authority and integrity under the pressure of globalization. They also confront a world that happily (but perhaps also temporarily) lacks major military threats. The required adaptations are substantial, and, as chapter case studies show, the need to make them confronts militaries in most of the advanced industrial world.


Regime here refers to the bundle of treaties, institutions, and international norms and customs that were compiled over the course of the cold war in an effort to slow, halt, or even reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The Nonproliferation Treaty is perhaps the most prominent element of the regime, but has been joined by, among others, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Overall, the regime has "worked," Cirincione argues, to hold the level of nuclear proliferation well below what many writers of the early cold war era expected. But hope that the regime might work even better with the end of the cold war has been dampened considerably in recent years. India and Pakistan have tested nuclear devices. Iraq, Iran, and (perhaps until recently) North Korea continue to work on a range of weapons and delivery vehicles. And the United States has so far failed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, in effect relinquishing the leadership role it exercised in building the regime in the first place.

A conference report, this book pulls together articles by an international array of prominent scholars and diplomats who spotlight progressive damage to the regime and suggest what might be done to repair it. The arguments are cogent, and the book's appearance could not be more timely; the U.S. debate about national missile defense (NMD), after all, is in some sense a debate about the regime's future, since deployment of a major NMD system would probably eviscerate the antiballistic missile treaty of 1972 and launch China on a major buildup of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Whether the book can help rebuild the bipartisan U.S. support this regime enjoyed during the cold war remains to be seen. But the effort here is comprehensive and valiant.

Svetlana Alpers


It is startling to learn that when the 14-year-old Charles Eliot Norton (1827-1908) entered Harvard, about 150 years ago, there were only 9 professors and 300 students. The general interest of this outstanding, historical biography lies in the account it gives of the Boston Brahmin world that, within Norton's lifetime, turned from making money to professing culture. Norton himself sailed to India as a trader in 1849, left business to be an amateur scholar and writer, and took up a professorship only in midlife.

Norton was the first professor of fine arts at Harvard. One might say that he was an inventor of the teaching of the history of art in America. In its time, his was the most popular course at Harvard. It was Norton who put the study of art (done without images) at the center of the study of culture. For better or worse, he invented what came to be known as the teaching of Western civilization.

Norton also was instrumental in the founding of many long-lived institutions, among them the Archaeological Institute of America, the Fogg Art Museum in Cambridge, and the American Schools in Athens and Rome. How did a Unitarian, with an inbred hatred of Catholicism, become a world-class Dante scholar (I recall being assigned the Norton prose translation as an undergraduate) and write authoritatively on medieval Italian churches and Greek archaeology? This is a riveting American story.


I became curious about Norton because of the bleak portrait of him in this, the second and final volume of the definitive biography of Rusk in, the English writer on art. It was Rusk in's good friend Norton who, with Joan Severn (Rusk in's second cousin, erstwhile ward, and final caretaker), made a bonfire out of all the personal papers they could put their hands on after Rusk in's death.

Seen from the point of view of Rusk in's biographer, this was the unforgivable act of a narrow New Englander. But reading about Norton, we learn that he formed exceptionally close friendships while insisting on an absolute separation between private experience and public achievement. He was a sanitizer of reputations, not a simple destroyer.

These eminent Victorians, so these biographies suggest, are now at the right distance in time to warrant reappraisal. Their concern with the morality of culture and its civic and educational role seems timely.

It is Rusk in who remains the more elusive, not to say in the end the wild one, of the two. Hilton offers a marvelously detailed evocation of his life and times, including those personal matters that Norton tried to obliterate. But Hilton does not really try to get at the interest to us of Rusk in's writings on art, if that indeed is possible to do.

Tales from the Art Crypt: The Painters, the Museums, the Curators, the Collectors, the Art. Richard Feigen. Alfred A. Knopf, 2000. $30.

This is a prickly, anecdotal, autobiographical account of the art world as seen and experienced by a clever and successful international dealer/collector who was born in Chicago in 1930 but now operates out of New York. We are treated to a careful as well as some telling information about the running of American museums, and the virtues and vices of particular collectors, artists, works of art, the market. Accusations are made, names are named (because there is no index, you have to read through to find them).

Amid everything else, Feigen reminds us of what happened after Norton to the study of art history at Harvard as well as at many other American colleges and universities: A focus on the nature of art works as such replaced the interest in them as giving access to a culture. Put too simply, connoisseurship replaced the study of art in culture; Bernard Berenson's views replaced those of Norton, his teacher. Indeed, without Turner's book to hand, no one really knows anymore what it was that Norton taught.

Feigen admires the generation of Harvard-trained museum directors who emerged, albeit a few years later, in the wake of this turnabout. But, in an angry and totally misleading attack, he claims that all that they believed in has now gone. His explanation? "Reverence for the object seems to have lasted at Harvard barely a century."

So, is it really back again to Norton? Things are not that simple. After all, he also had a taste for the object—whether for Giotto's frescoes at Padua or for Dante's poetry. Now, as then, the test lies in how one accounts for the relationship between art and culture. ♦

All of us in Coney Island did whatever we legally could to earn what money we needed, and somehow everyone I know of managed to fare pretty well. The fathers all worked, as did the older brothers and sisters as soon as they had liberated themselves from high school by graduating. Almost none of us then thought seriously about going to college or wanted to go, or could have afforded to. (My brother did want to go, would have given anything to have been able to, my sister, Sylvia, tells me.) For me, years before the time for decision, Lee was sending away for catalogs and applications to colleges such as MIT, Oberlin, Harvard, Yale, and others of that elevated level for which I could not possibly have paid and to which I could not then conceivably have gained admission. At New York University after the war, when I was selected in my junior year for membership in Phi Beta Kappa—as much for success with the publication of a few short stories as for classroom distinction—I didn't know what Phi Beta Kappa was. But Lee did and was flushed with pleasure in the pride he took in me. "Some Phi Beta Kappa," was his happy comment on that ignorance of mine. . . .

. . . I have no idea what happened to my Phi Beta Kappa key. . . .

*Contributed by James D. Sheppard, Greenville, S.C.*

"Lee, the brother, was 13 years older than Joseph; Sylvia was 7 years younger.

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